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  Germany's New Chancellor: Merkel's Surprising Rise to the Top

Germany's New Chancellor Merkel's Surprising Rise to the Top

By Ralf Neukirch

Part 2: Part II: Through the Muck on the Way to the Top

Her next move came in 2002 when she grabbed leadership of the CDU parliamentary group away from archrival Friedrich Merz after her party barely lost the general elections that year. Last year, she then got her presidential candidate, Horst Köhler, elected -- yet another slap in the face to the CDU party dinosaurs.

She has been so successful in pushing for the top that even her perhaps cleverest antagonist, Hesse governor Roland Koch, has said of Merkel that she "has a distinctive lust for power and the ability to grab and hold on to power." These, of course, are the characteristics most necessary for a chancellor. But her climb has left a not-so-pleasant aftertaste in the mouths of many in her party. The determination with which she shoved her opponents aside is, for them, uncanny. She demands the utmost loyalty, but she has yet to prove that, when the going gets tough, she herself can be loyal.

In April 2004, Merkel traveled to Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. For the last two years, coalition there between the conservatives and the liberals has been governing the country and has made large steps in reforming Slovakia's economy. The labor market has been made more flexible, the pension system radically redesigned, and a flat tax of 19 percent was introduced. At the Volkswagen factory there, some are saying that productivity is higher than it is in Germany.

For Merkel, Slovakia seemed the fulfillment of her reform dreams. "In Germany, people would rather talk about the risks than the opportunities," she sighed during one of her speeches there. Following a talk with the Slovakian minister of finance, Ivan Miklos, she said only half jokingly, "he's even more radical than I am."

Seeing Germany through an eastern lens

Merkel's worldview, of course, has a different origin than most of her party colleagues: Rather than growing up during the "economic miracle" in West Germany, she was getting by in a communist dictatorship. The result is a different point of view on Germany than many of her contemporaries. Which is also one of the reasons that many in western Germany have found it difficult warming up to her.

Her disintegrating apartment in Berlin's Prenzlauer Berg neighborhood, the view of the Wall, the pathetic technical equipment she was forced to use at the science academy where she worked -- all that made it clear to Merkel that socialism could never work. She didn't experience the East German system as the ultimate safety net, rather as a choking vice grip.

And she has now applied that experience to the Germany she lives in today. Merkel feels that the country's current social system is likewise restrictive -- if not a death grip, then a corset that makes it difficult for the population to breathe. But for most of her fellow party members who grew up in post-war West Germany, the system is part of their political identity. It was something Germans could be proud of at a time when Germans had little cause for pride. There is an emotional chasm between Merkel and the West Germans -- a chasm that was also apparent in the general election results of three weeks ago.

It took a long time for Merkel to come out with her reform ideas. She is a master of the political double entendre -- she will often talk about the "we"-society and is fond of pointing out how the liberal market economy can be socially just. Indeed, for a long time, the left wing of her party -- that part which places great emphasis on the social system -- was among her strongest supporters.

It was only in her Oct. 3, 2003 speech -- held in Berlin's German History Museum on the occasion of the 13th anniversary of reunification -- that she finally provided a clear outline of how she wanted to modernize the country. It was essentially her political coming out -- the years of observation and strategizing were over. Her proposals -- simplifying the tax code and lowering taxes, simplifying health care, and radically overhauling how old-age care insurance was financed -- became party policy just two months later in an almost unanimous vote at a party conference in Leipzig.

The CDU was proud of Merkel and for the first time, she felt as though her party actually liked her. But the euphoria didn't last long; Edmund Stoiber still saw himself in the chancellery waiting room and didn't waste much time in systematically destroying her reform agenda. When the smoke had cleared, all that was left were a few lazy compromises including a gutted tax reform.

Since then, the party has wondered just how far Merkel would go to see her visions become reality. Would she risk her political future for her reform plan as Schröder had done with his Agenda 2010? Who would support her?

The low point

In October 2004, Merkel was in Berlin to drum up support for her healthcare plan. The audience was made up of CDU members from Berlin, where Merkel lives, from Brandenburg, where she grew up, and from Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania where her electoral district is. For the first time in a long time, she was among friends and the applause was loud and long. She didn't interrupt it -- a friendly gesture is exactly what she needed at the time.

The Berlin appearance came during the most difficult days Merkel had experienced during her years as party head. The CDU had lost support in three of the last four state elections and the bitter fight with sister party CSU over competing healthcare plans had reached its high point. Even worse, parliamentary group deputy leader Friedrich Merz had just withdrawn from all leadership positions in the party because he was no longer willing to work with Merkel. Only the governor of Thuringia, Dieter Althaus, and a few women from the parliamentary group are willing to support Merkel. It's the peak of her political solitude and the low point of her political career.

But Merkel learned from the experience. She learned that she is not party head because she inspires hope and fulfils wishes. Rather, her position is thanks to a cynical cost-benefit analysis. She can only survive if getting rid of her is politically more expensive than holding on to her. And since the Sept. 18 general elections, the calculations have been run through once more.

The moment of solitude was painful for Merkel, but since then, she knows who her reliable allies really are. And she knows that there are few state governors she can depend on -- and a few she cannot.

Roland Koch from Hesse, Christian Wulff from Lower Saxony, Günther Oettinger from Stuttgart and Peter Müller from Saarland all belong to the younger generation of CDU politicians who, after the Kohl era ended, had planned to divide power among themselves. Merkel, though, was an unexpected wrench in the works. And Koch, Wulff and others are still in a state of shock. The rise of Merkel is like their version of an industrial accident -- they have a lot to win were she to fail.

Merkel's own support group is small and quickly listed. In addition to her office manager Baumann, spokeswoman Christiansen and the former CDU business manager Willi Hausmann, there are only very few that she completely trusts. They include Norbert Röttgen, deputy parliamentary group leader Ronald Pofalla, general secretary Volker Kauder and Baden Wurttemberg minister of culture, youth and sports Annette Schavan. All of them are now being considered for cabinet posts in Merkel's new government or top posts in a reshuffled CDU.

When Merkel moves into the chancellery in Berlin, the office will surely change her just as it has all previous chancellors. Already, it has begun casting its shadow. Her campaign was a tough one, and there was little time for rest even though she was sick as it got started. "I already have gotten a taste," she said, "as to just how great the pressure will be.