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Interview with General Major Doron Almog

"The Israeli Military Is in a Crisis of Leadership"

The dramatic failures displayed by the Israeli military in the war against Hezbollah have many in the country doubting Israel's military might. In an interview, Major General Doron Almog, 55, who heads one of the army's internal investigative commissions, warns that his country is now less feared by its neighbors.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Your commission is investigating the army's responsibility for the abduction of two soldiers by Hezbollah. What mistakes were made?

Almog: Brigadier General Gal Hirsch, who was responsible for the border area, had issued orders to prevent kidnappings. He had even developed a plan. But he neglected to make sure that this plan was also implemented by those under his command. He sent ambiguous messages to his officers.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: What exactly do you mean?

Almog: On the one hand, soldiers were instructed to stay as far away from the border as possible. Patrols along the border were required to travel in armored vehicles. On the other hand, the commanders would drive around in non-armored vehicles, including one who went on weekend outings with his wife.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Your interim report has angered the comrades of kidnapped soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. You have claimed that the patrol behaved as if it had been "on a trip."

Almog: But that was precisely the mood, although it wasn't the soldiers' fault. They were merely acting in accordance with existing instructions. They were reservists who came from civilian jobs, put on uniforms and began their service in the reserves, and they were not adequately prepared when they embarked on their patrol. They were victims of the ambiguous culture of authority that I have described.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Brigadier General Hirsch, whom you criticized, has already stepped down. Will there be other resignations?

Almog: I would rather not comment on that, because our investigations are not yet complete. But I can say this: We will issue further recommendations, including those relating to specific individuals. A strong military also needs strong commanders with the courage to say: I have made a mistake.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Can (Israeli Defense Forces) Chief of Staff Dan Halutz remain in office?

Almog: That's his decision. This is currently too sensitive a question to be answered.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: How much damage has been done to the army?

Almog: The army is in a double crisis, a professional crisis and a crisis of leadership, which stems from the public's expectations regarding the Lebanon war. The crisis revolves around the way the army operates, but it also relates to decision-making at the political level. Many officers believe that the army is capable of more than it has demonstrated.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: What were the mistakes?

Almog: There was a lack of preparation for this type of war. The intelligence services should have gathered information about Hezbollah's bases and its missiles, and the army should have developed a clear plan of operation. That sort of plan has to be tested in a simulation. The air force did it, but the army was not prepared for the war. It was dealing with fighting terrorism in the Palestinian territories.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Did Israeli politicians underestimate Hezbollah?

Almog: Nasrallah interpreted our withdrawal from southern Lebanon in the summer of 2000 as a sign of weakness. We made two big mistakes. We should have launched an offensive against Hezbollah before withdrawing. And we should have insisted that the UN establish a buffer zone and not allow Hezbollah to advance to our border. Nasrallah saw our withdrawal as a sign that we were no longer prepared to fight.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: What leads you to draw these conclusions?

Almog: Hezbollah kidnapped a number of our soldiers in October 2000, a few months after the withdrawal. Although then Prime Minister Ehud Barak warned, before the withdrawal, that Israel's response to Hezbollah attacks would have to be disproportionately more severe from then on, he held back the army. Nasrallah interpreted this to mean that Israel can be forced to its knees with kidnappings.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: This year's war is unlikely to have changed that perception.

Almog: Our country is surrounded by Muslim countries. Fanatical Islam is on the rise. Our deterrent potential is a very important factor in this regard. If we had shown Nasrallah our strengths, this may have served as a deterrent for others. Syrian President Assad probably wouldn't be talking about the next war now. And perhaps Ahmadinejad would be singing a different tune and the Palestinians would have gotten a different message.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: From the Israeli perspective, all attempts to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians have failed. The right has long believed that it could ignore the conflict. The left relied on negotiations and failed, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has already buried the third option, a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank. Can the conflict be resolved?

Almog: I still believe that a separation between Israel and the Palestinians is the right idea. It is not the job of the political leadership to simply drift in the current of effects and maintain the status quo. The political leadership must take the initiative.

The interview was conducted by Christoph Schult