By Brahma Chellaney
Ordinarily, the readiness to play by international rules ought to matter more than regime form. But regime character often makes playing by the rules difficult. In modern history, the fault line between democrats and autocrats has at times been papered over through a common geopolitical interest. But today the failure to build greater political homogeneity by defining shared international objectives carries the risk that, in the years ahead, political values could become the main geopolitical dividing line.
It is well established that democracies rarely go to war with each other, even though democratic governments may not be more wedded to peace than autocracies. What role outsiders can play to help democracy take root, however, remains a difficult issue internationally. Yet that issue looms particularly large in Asia. Unlike Europe, where democracy has become the norm, only 16 of Asia's 39 countries surveyed by Freedom House are really free. And, as shown by Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index, a number of Asian countries are among the worst suppressors of freedom, with North Korea ranked at the very bottom of the 167-nation list, Burma 163rd, China 159th, Vietnam 158th, Laos and Uzbekistan 155th, Bangladesh 151st, Pakistan 150th, Singapore 140th, and the Philippines 139th.
With the Asia Pacific region becoming more divided in the face of conflicting strategic cultures, major democracies are likely to be increasingly drawn together to help advance political cooperation and stability through a community of values. It can hardly be overlooked that China's best friends are fellow autocracies, including pariah states, while those seeking to forestall power disequilibrium in the Asia Pacific happen to be on the other side of the values-based divide. In that light, political values could easily come to define a new geopolitical divide.
What may seem implausible globally, given America's lingering tradition of propping up dictators in the Arab-Islamic world, is thus conceivable in the Asia Pacific theater as a natural corollary to the present geopolitics. It was China that took the lead in 2001 to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to help unite it with Eurasian strongmen in a geopolitical alliance. Designed originally to bring the Central Asian states under the Chinese sphere of influence, the SCO is today shaping up as a potential "NATO of the East." Yet, when Australia, India, Japan, and the United States started the exploratory Quadrilateral Initiative in 2007, Beijing was quick to cry foul and see it as an "Asian NATO." The Quad was supposed to serve as an initial framework to promote security dialogue and partnerships among major Pacific Rim democracies. Such collaboration is already being built. The Quad will not only survive the current vicissitudes, but it also foreshadows what is likely to come. But for the divergent geopolitical interests at play, the differing political values would not matter so much.
More broadly, there is a need to improve global geopolitics by building cooperative political approaches that transcend institutions whose structure is rooted in a world that no longer exists. The reality is that just as the G-8, in order to stay relevant, has initiated dialogue with the emerging powers, the five unelected yet permanent members of the UN Security Council can no longer dictate terms to the rest of the world and need to share executive authority with new powers.
It was a mistake to believe that greater economic interdependence by itself would improve geopolitics. In today's market-driven world, trade is not constrained by political differences, nor is booming trade a guarantee of moderation and restraint between states. Better politics is as important as better economics. That requires several major steps that so far have been frustrated: institutional reforms; greater transparency in strategic doctrines and military expenditures; cooperative approaches on shared concerns. No international mission today can yield enduring results unless it comes with consistency and credibility and is backed by consensus -- the three crucial "Cs."
Against this background, what role can India play? India's growing geopolitical weight, high GDP growth rate, and abundant market opportunities have helped increase its international profile. It is widely perceived to be a key "swing state" in the emerging order. Given the greater political and financial volatility in the world, geopolitical risks today are higher. As a "swing" geopolitical factor, India has the potential to play a constructive role to help mitigate those risks by promoting collaborative international approaches. It is obvious that new thinking and approaches are needed to bridge the global fault lines and build greater international cooperation and consensus on the larger geopolitical issues.
India has important advantages that it could exploit to play the role of a bridge between the East and West. Not only is it the world's largest democracy, India also is the globe's most diverse country. With a sixth of humanity living within its borders, India is more linguistically diverse than even Europe. India is where old traditions go hand-in-hand with postmodernity, epitomized by the image of electronic voting machines being carried to a village balloting station atop an elephant.
India also has its constraints. Its neighborhood is more combustible than ever, with an arc of failing or problem states posing serious security-related challenges. Democracy may be India's biggest asset. But Indian democracy tends to function by the rule of parochial politics. Putting a forward-looking national agenda ahead of parochial short-term politics is not easy. Furthermore, partly due to its historical experiences, the Indian state is intrinsically cautious and shy rather than proactive.
Yet India has a long, historical record of playing a mainstream, cooperative role in international affairs. With its wealth of philosophy and a culture emphasizing compromise, conciliation, and creativity, India views the world as a stage not for civilizational wars but for building bridges and meeting common challenges. Over the centuries, Indian civilization has thrived on synthesis. This ability to synthesize is one of the great strengths that India needs to employ internationally. It is such traditions that explain, for example, why India lacks the US zeal to export democracy. Instead it looks at democracy in practical terms, as "the most effective means to reconcile the polyglot components of the state," according to former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He notes: "India, striving neither to spread its culture nor its institutions, is thus not a comfortable partner (of the United States) for global ideological missions."
Yet India will continue to pride itself as a model of a non-Western democracy. While the concepts of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are normally associated with the West, India can claim ancient traditions bestowing respect to such values. As the 1998 Nobel economics laureate Amartya Sen has said, "A good example is the Emperor Ashoka in India, who during the 3rd century B.C. covered the country with inscriptions on stone tablets about good behavior and wise governance, including a demand for basic freedoms for all -- indeed he did not exclude women and slaves as Aristotle did...." According to Sen, "The claim that the basic ideas underlying freedom and tolerance have been central to Western culture over the millennia and are somehow alien to Asia is, I believe, entirely rejectable."
Another issue relates to India's role in helping shape a stable balance of power. At a time of warming US-Indian relations, too much is made about America's desire to use India to hold China in check. A durable US-Indian partnership can be built not on strategic opportunism but on shared national interests, which mean far more than shared democratic values. India is unlikely to allow itself to be used as a foil against another power.
In the coming years, India will increasingly be aligned with the West economically. But, strategically, it can avail of multiple options, even as it moves from the nonalignment of its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to a contemporary, globalized practicality. Given the new international equations and power shifts, nonalignment in its original form holds no relevance today. But many Indians believe that the concept of following an independent foreign policy is still relevant.
In keeping with this long-standing preference for policy independence, India is likely to retain the option to forge different partnerships with varied players in order to pursue a variety of interests in diverse settings. That means that it is likely to become multialigned, though tilt more toward Washington and preserve the core element of its previous nonalignment -- strategic autonomy. In other words, India is likely to continue to chart its own course and make its own major decisions. A multialigned India pursuing omnidirectional cooperation for mutual benefit with key players will be better positioned to advance its interests and promote cooperative international approaches in the changed world.
In the Asian context, India's interests lie in ensuring that strategic competition among the key players does not deteriorate into a major geopolitical confrontation. The deepening mistrust and nationalistic chauvinism in Asia threaten to create conditions that could seriously harm the interests of everyone in the region. The common challenge is to find ways to minimize mutual mistrust and maximize avenues for reciprocally beneficial cooperation. This can be done not by shying away from the most contentious issues in Asia but by seeking to tackle them in a practical way.
India cannot but be concerned about the way that energy competition is making Asian geopolitics murkier. What is striking is that the new flurry of alliance formation and partnerships in Asia is being led by Asia's rising powers, not by the United States, which has policed Asia since the end of World War II. In that light, Asian cooperation and security will be very much influenced by the equations between and among the major players. The need to secure stable energy supplies will drive the major players to increasingly integrate their energy policy with foreign policy as they consciously promote diplomatic strategies geared toward seizing energy-related opportunities overseas.
Energy-driven competition must not be allowed to aggravate interstate rivalries. Mercantilist efforts to assert control over oil and natural gas supplies and transport routes certainly risk fueling tensions. Given the lack of regional institutions in Asia to avert or manage conflict, the sharpening energy geopolitics makes the need for Asian energy cooperation more pressing. A challenge for India, China, and the other important Asian economies is to manage their energy needs through more efficient transport and consumption and more cooperative import policies. Multinational cooperation on the security of sea lanes is essential to avert strategic friction in Asia. Where maritime claims overlap, the answer to any such dispute cannot be unilateral drilling or production by one side. Disputes over what are legitimate zones of energy exploration in open seas need to be managed through an agreed code of conduct.
In an increasingly interdependent Asia, the interests of India, China, Japan, and other players can hardly be advanced if they are seen as engaged in efforts to reduce the promotion of security to a zero-sum game. In fact, the three main Asian powers can set a model for other states in Asia by establishing stable political relationships that accent mutually beneficial cooperation. Without these powers taking the lead, it may not be possible to deal with the increasingly complex security, energy, and development challenges facing Asia. Deterrence, stability, and peace have been at the heart of Asia's growing dynamism and prosperity and must be preserved and even strengthened.
The challenges the world confronts today are new -- ranging from global warming to international terrorism -- and their reach is truly global. In the past, the competition for a balance of power was centered on Europe. Even the Cold War was not really an East-West rivalry but rather competition between two blocs over Europe. For the first time, we are facing the task of building power equilibrium across the world while simultaneously having to both adjust to new power shifts and deal with transnational challenges.
Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic studies at the privately funded Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. His latest book is "Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan."
To read the footnotes and sources related to this article, please visit the Web site of our partner Internationale Politik Global Edition.
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