Canadian soldiers, part of the NATO-led forces in Afghanistan
Pro:
AFP
NATO is Indispensable as a Successful Multilateral Security Forum
by Karl Kaiser
Since the Soviet Union’s demise, NATO has often been written off as superfluous. However, NATO remains critical to world order. The Atlantic alliance is a forum for forging solutions to contemporary security issues. Many of its functions have become even more important in the 21st century.
Under the NATO umbrella, the Atlantic region has become a zone of peace where the UN principle prohibiting the use of force has become a reality. Thanks in great part to American leadership, NATO has fostered a special bond among its member states, altering them so profoundly that war among these countries is now unthinkable. Many policies contributed to this process, from the integration of military command structures -- previously directed against each other -- to the reinforcement of political and economic cooperation. The chances of maintaining a minimum of world order in the 21st century will be gravely reduced if we cannot uphold this island of peaceful relations.
The Atlantic alliance has also functioned effectively as a formative framework that aids in the growth and democratization of nation states. Beginning with the successful reintegration of Germany after World War II, NATO has proven itself as an effective transitional facilitator. When President Harry S. Truman, despite considerable resistance, insisted at the signing of the NATO treaty in 1949 that Germany should in the long run be made an equal member, he laid the groundwork for NATO’s future. This enabled Germany’s development into a stable democracy and an important NATO partner. In 1990, in the course of the reunification of East and West Germany, NATO again played a vital role -- one eventually even accepted by the Soviet Union. It provided the overarching framework without which reunification might never have happened.
In the same vein, integrating former communist states and supporting their democratization is another important -- and by no means finished -- task for NATO. Moreover, NATO’s role in shaping relations with potential members and cooperation partners like Russia and the Ukraine is crucial for maintaining stability in Europe and near its borders.
NATO has also contributed considerably to the rational handling of nuclear weapons. Through its strategy, military practice and selective cooperation with the Soviet Union to avoid a nuclear conflict NATO has managed to marginalize and effectively brand nuclear weapons as taboo. Given the remaining and unnecessarily vast nuclear weapons potential stored both in NATO states and in Russia, this still represents an existentially vital function.
Finally, NATO’s important role in the Cold War only further justifies its relevance. With its important change of strategy -- formulated in the Harmel Report of 1967 emphasizing détente and cooperation with the adversary on a par with deterrence and defense -- the Atlantic alliance was able to bring the world-wide East-West conflict to an end without a shot being fired. This successful resolution of a conflict that could potentially have destroyed humankind remains a model and an inspiration in contemporary conflict situations. Only an enduring and vital alliance can fulfill this role.
Unavoidable Challenges
Though the continuation of these traditional functions would constitute a good enough reason to maintain NATO, the search for solutions to security challenges that have arisen since the end of the East-West conflict provide further motivation. These challenges can be grouped into four problem areas. The first is those developments arising from the dissolution of states, civil wars, and ethnic conflicts. These situations can directly impact the security of alliance members and thus require common action. In the Balkans, for example, NATO has provided a vital stabilizing force and aid in state building.
A second security issue arises in situations where -- mostly in connection with failing states -- conditions allow terrorists to establish bases of operation and safe havens. These conditions enable attacks, such as those of September 11, 2001, and thus necessitate common action to destroy or to prevent their establishment. Afghanistan is an excellent example, where NATO troops work along side other institutions and countries. This is related to the third problem area: the spread of weapons of mass destruction, above all into the hands of terrorists. Again, NATO could be vital in coordinating an international response to these threats. Fourth, and finally, a massive violation of human rights, such as ethnic cleansing and genocide, requires action by the international community that NATO could organize or take part in.
None of these tasks can be tackled by one state alone with any hope of success, not even the United States. But no state that is in possession of resources like those of Germany can reasonably abstain from some form of participation. In the contemporary world of transnational interdependence and relatively permeable borders, all alliance members will be affected by the possibly catastrophic consequences of these new threats.
The opinion that German troops should not take part in NATO combat missions blindly ignores the transnational level of these threats.1 Were the Taliban and Al Qaeda to reestablish their basis of operations in Afghanistan, the probability of attacks in Germany or its allies would increase drastically. Any policy pursued by Berlin that fails to acknowledge this ignores Germany’s international status and growing responsibility as a world player. Moreover, it disregards the resentment that such a “it’s-not-my-problem” attitude generates among allies who are forced to pay for the protection of German interests with their own casualties.
In taking on these new tasks, NATO is bound to encounter some new structural difficulties. While skeptics use this as an excuse to write off the alliance, the interests of the West require that these difficulties be identified and resolved. To this end, NATO must confront its organizational challenges and adapt its strategy and institutions accordingly.
NATO’s first challenge is that current security threats have become a matter of interpretation. In contrast to the era of the East-West conflict where military potential served as a relatively clear indicator of threat (albeit with differing assessments), today the question as to when and if cases of domestic destabilization, an ethnic conflict, or the rise of a radical group represent a security threat is less clear: evaluations differ both within and among individual alliance members. It is, therefore, no wonder that diverging views have become the norm and that NATO constantly has to step in as referee, broker, and manager of dissent. But this does not condemn NATO to failure. On the contrary, it forces the alliance to improve internal dialogue and aids in consensus building.
Second, unlike the era of the East-West conflict when NATO sought to prevent war through deterrence, risk is no longer hypothetical. Back then even societies with pacifist traditions could live with the deterrence concept. But in the new NATO practically all operations -- from “robust peace keeping” and development missions in crisis shaken countries to actual combat missions -- involve real risk for the lives of its soldiers, as well as considerable material cost. This is a new state of affairs for numerous societies, because many of them, including today’s Germany, have no tradition of military intervention nor an historically grown acceptance of losses as do the United States, Britain, and France. Therefore, if this new security policy is to gain domestic legitimatization, the political classes will have to demonstrate the wisdom and courage to make it clear to their own societies that their security depends upon the deployment of their own soldiers and resources in far away countries. This is both necessary and possible.
In order to achieve this goal, NATO must shift its previous philosophy of “collective defense” to one of “collective security.” At stake is no longer the prevention of an attack by a Soviet army that would have dragged everyone into a war -- a danger that was relatively easy to explain domestically. Today NATO works to create political conditions in far away countries that will help prevent potential threats such as attacks on alliance countries. Explaining why development aid and state building, in addition to peacekeeping and military deployments, are important security measures requires the development of a complex domestic line of argumentation. This is all the more difficult to sell when it does not involve an identifiable self-interest such as the prevention of attacks and instead humanitarian goals form the basis for the deployment of one’s own troops and resources.
Genocide is rejected everywhere, but to move from revulsion to the actual deployment of troops in order to prevent or end it is a large step, most notably in democracies, as the case of Darfur illustrates. There is, nevertheless, no way around the necessity that the democratic societies within NATO must redefine security policy and work toward renewing its legitimacy if these democracies are to avoid exposure to potentially catastrophic attacks.
This redefinition and legitimatization must be accomplished by jointly developing a new strategic concept.2 Launching such an undertaking for the occasion of NATO’s 60th anniversary in 2009 will be made easier by the imminent return of France to NATO and a new American administration. The project should fulfill three tasks. First, strategy, self-definition, consultation procedures, operative implementation, the contributions of individual members, and institutional rules must be redefined. Second, the process of redefining strategy should trigger a debate within the member nations and help clarify security issues in order to strengthen and solidify domestic support and generate domestic legitimacy. Third and finally, this should become a “unifying endeavor”3 helping to move, wherever possible, beyond today’s differences of opinion within the alliance toward a consensus on its transformed security role.
The success of this undertaking hinges on NATO’s ability to overcome attempts to reduce it to a “coalition of the willing,” which could be fatal to the alliance. The process must, furthermore, clarify the connection between civilian and military approaches and reassess cooperation with other institutions -- first and foremost the European Union -- and partners outside of NATO.
Karl Kaiser is a guest professor at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs/ John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Post to other social networks:
Stay informed with our free news services:
| All news from SPIEGEL International | Twitter | RSS |
| All news from Europe section | RSS |
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2008
All Rights Reserved
Reproduction only allowed with the permission of SPIEGELnet GmbH
