SPIEGEL: Can the debt brake in the fiscal pact, which will force signatory countries to reduce their structural deficits to almost zero, address these shortcomings?
Schmidt: If you are satisfied with a short answer, then the answer is: not really.
SPIEGEL: That compels us to ask: why not?
Schmidt: There is a lack of momentum, such as we had 30 or 40 years ago, namely the absolute will of the French president and the German chancellor to work together -- no matter what the problem is. As long as this will is not present, the technical tools are of secondary importance. You cannot replace this with the fiscal pact, even if it is significantly better negotiated than the preceding euro stability pact.
SPIEGEL: How do you explain this lack of drive? Do the president and the chancellor not know each other well enough, or does it have to do with the fact that a postwar generation has taken the helm?
Schmidt: We can philosophize at length over the reasons and motives. You are apparently not disputing this lack of momentum, which is something that I can regrettably understand.
SPIEGEL: The question is: Will it improve with time?
Giscard: I think so, yes.
Schmidt: We can only hope that it does. The majority of the French and the Germans favor enhanced cooperation and integration. So it is up to their leaders to commit to these goals. They should not merely say it; they should also genuinely proceed in this direction.
Giscard: One should not expect that there can be a German leadership in Europe. From a historical perspective, that is impossible. A French leadership admittedly does not work either. The European landscape simply looks like this: There are two large countries in the middle, Germany and France, which coexist. They have to work together -- period.
SPIEGEL: And they have managed to do this, despite all the crises and tensions.
Schmidt: If I may, I would like to make a basic observation: The reconstruction of postwar Germany was possible at first thanks to the Americans and, to an increasing extent after 1950, to the Europeans, primarily the French. The European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1952, and the Élysée Treaty on German-French cooperation was signed 11 years later. Both came about as the result of French initiatives. The Germans benefited from the global situation and from their neighbors' solidarity, which was not granted out of selflessness, but rather out of necessity. After 1945, they could not allow the formation of areas of extreme poverty in the heart of Europe. And today the Germans, for their part, are in a position where they can -- and must -- pay. And they should embrace this. It first needs to be explained to the German people, however. But this is not happening -- at least not to a sufficient extent.
SPIEGEL: Who has to explain it?
Schmidt: The chancellor, the German president and the governing parties in the Bundestag.
SPIEGEL: They would respond that they are making every possible effort. And that includes Sigmar Gabriel, the chairman of your own center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD).
Schmidt: Some of them are doing it a bit, including Mr Gabriel, who you mentioned. The chancellor is doing very little (to explain the situation to the German people). The conservative group in the Bundestag is hardly doing it. The (influential mass-circulation) Bild newspaper is not doing it at all.
Giscard: Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer made this effort because they could vividly remember the war. Helmut and I did so likewise. (Former German Chancellor) Helmut Kohl and (former French President) François Mitterrand as well. Then it somehow stopped. The postwar consumer generation didn't care about it. They had no interest in it. We have to return to a simple, fundamental idea: European integration, the European merging process, has to take place in the euro zone. France and Germany are the driving force behind this. All of this is feasible; none of it exceeds human capabilities.
SPIEGEL: Shouldn't the self-imposed rules of the Euro Group include an exit mechanism for countries that don't adhere to the regulations?
Schmidt: I see that as an entirely unimportant, tertiary question.
SPIEGEL: Nonetheless, with regard to Greece, it is a question that is currently being emphatically asked in Germany.
Schmidt: Of much greater importance is the absolute determination to work together, not how you escort someone out the door -- whether with compliments or kicks.
Giscard: It depends on everyone standing by their responsibilities and obligations. We cannot absolve Greece of this. If the country doesn't feel that it is able to cope, then it needs to decide for itself. If you are a member, you have to play by the rules.
SPIEGEL: Who would form the United States of Europe, if it came to that at some point in the future? The 17 members of the Euro Group or the 27 members of the EU?
Giscard: Definitely the 17! Anyone who wants to join this group must be determined to integrate. But we are not exerting any pressure whatsoever. If the British, the Danes and the Swedes don't want to belong, then that is simply how it is. This is not a source of conflict. On the contrary, the EU could fairly easily expand -- for instance by accepting Turkey or Ukraine -- as long as its core, the euro zone, remains unaffected. We could form the United States of Europe, but only within the close-knit core, not the larger union. Canada and Mexico are also not about to become part of the United States of America.
SPIEGEL: Even within the core, a transnational democracy, such as the one that would be required for a federal state, would present Europe with considerable challenges. How do you propose to rectify the often-deplored deficits in democracy and legitimacy within the European Union?
Giscard: Yes, the system suffers from a lack of democracy. It has to be gradually introduced. Who in the general public has heard of the permanent president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy? When it comes time to appoint his successor, it will not be possible to suddenly and immediately hold general elections to choose the president. But we can expand the circle of decision-makers, for example, by including the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
Schmidt: Over 30 years ago, Valéry and I both gave the European Parliament legitimacy by ensuring that it is directly elected. We presumed at the time that the parliament would henceforth start to speak out and make itself heard. But it has not done this. We thought that the parliament would stand up for its own rights. It has not done so, at least not yet.
SPIEGEL: But it has tried to do so, and it tries again and again.
Schmidt: These days we hear about the attempts. But we can hardly read about them. The German press refuses to publish even short stories about the negotiations and deliberations in the European Parliament. That is one of the many minor defects in the European system.
Giscard: The European Parliament is doing good work, but it has never shown the courage to make strong, weighty political decisions, and make its mark.
SPIEGEL: Such as?
Giscard: If the European Commission is unsatisfactory, it has to be replaced. Parliament could do that.
SPIEGEL: The best and most capable politicians still have no desire to pursue a career in European agencies.
Giscard: When Jacques Delors was the president of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, Europe had a strong and well-known leadership figure. We have to enlist a generation whose ambition is to serve in important agencies in Europe. The president of the European Central Bank is above the individual presidents of the national central banks. It therefore should not be difficult to arouse ambitions.
Schmidt: One has to want such figures; one has to appoint them without being afraid of standing in their shadow.
SPIEGEL: Are you afraid that the crisis and the dispute over money will ultimately overwhelm Europe?
Schmidt: I am not just afraid of a re-nationalization, a manifestation of selfish national interests -- I observe it as a fact. It is not only happening in Germany, but it is particularly obvious in Germany. We are doing relatively well, while the others are doing poorly. So we want to keep our pennies for ourselves. That is a perfectly understandable attitude -- and yet it is unforgivable.
SPIEGEL: Can Europe fail due to historical amnesia?
Schmidt: That cannot be entirely ruled out. Nevertheless, Germany's recent history will never be forgotten, not even in 100 years' time. And that is a good thing.
Giscard: Nationalistic tendencies, which have reappeared everywhere, even in my country, are all backward-looking; they don't pave the way to the future. National nostalgia can only pull Europe down. Young Europeans know that there is no future in this. We have to instill new life into integration and reboot the system. That is the task that France and Germany must tackle.
SPIEGEL: Herr Schmidt, Monsieur Giscard, does one tend toward pessimism in old age? How do you see Europe's future?
Schmidt: Expecting optimism from a 93-year-old is quite a tall order. I am not looking to the future with pessimism, but rather with skepticism. Throughout my entire political career, I have never allowed myself to be an optimist or a pessimist. I have always endeavored to judge the situation as realistically as possible, and then act pragmatically. That has not changed in old age.
Giscard: With increasing age, one tends to see the long-term trends and tendencies, and they are not in our favor.
SPIEGEL: Will Europe be among the global powers of the 21st century?
Giscard: Yes. It has what it takes. And we should give it an opportunity to become one.
Schmidt: I would be somewhat more cautious here. The European Union will hardly coalesce to become a genuine global power. And Europe doesn't have to be a global power.
SPIEGEL: Herr Schmidt, Monsieur Giscard, thank you for this interview.