Merkel has let the German partnership with Russia, forged during Schröder's chancellory, cool.
Putin and Merkel are divided by their personal histories. Both experienced the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the beginnings of the collapse of the Soviet Union in East Germany, but on different sides of the barricades. Merkel, then a physicist at the East Berlin Academy of Sciences, quickly became involved in the civil rights movement. She took advantage of the new freedoms and drafted flyers. Meanwhile Putin, then a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB, was busy burning intelligence records at his office in Dresden. The end of the Soviet superpower marked the beginning of a new era for Merkel. For Putin, it was the collapse of an old one.
Now, Merkel routinely repels the Kremlin leader's overtures. When Putin offered Germany an exclusive partnership in the exploration and exploitation of the giant Stockmann natural gas field in the Barents Sea in October, the chancellor -- in sharp contrast to the Baltic Sea pipeline project that Schröder and Putin launched, more or less on their own -- coolly declined, citing a common European energy policy as an obstacle to cooperation with Russia.
Vague and Noncommital
At home, Merkel has been careful not to step on any toes among Germans, whose once-enthusiastic attitudes toward America have suffered tremendously, especially as a result of the Iraq war. Whenever siding with the Americans and against the Russians appears too risky for her -- as in the current controversy over the missile defense shield -- she flees into the relative safety of the vague, noncommittal statement.
The Bush-burned British are following this balancing act with sympathy. The special relationship, the Economist noted pointedly, comes with the "big danger ... that America may expect too much from Germany." The British magazine even warned Merkel against becoming too cozy with the Americans: "Even this political acrobat could lose her balance if she is hugged too hard."
For both sides, the tangible outcome of the new trans-Atlantic friendship is currently mixed. Despite an omnipresent and optimistic sense of embarking on something new, there have been no breakthroughs so far. In the Middle East, for example, Washington, after prolonged hesitation, revived the Middle East peace quartet -- made up of the United States, the EU, Russia and the United Nations -- as a forum for new peace initiatives early this year. However, the US government was not prepared to show more flexibility in dealing with the Palestinians or to apply more pressure on the Israelis.
Iran is another example. In response to German pressure, the United States has agreed to accept new offers to Tehran's mullahs in an effort to curb the country's budding nuclear program. But the US continues to balk when it comes to the central issue of recognizing Iran as a regional power.
Cooperation on climate policy can be characterized as nothing less than miserable, even when seen in the most positive light. Merkel's successful plans to set EU-wide targets for the reduction of carbon emissions have not been received enthusiastically across the Atlantic.
The recently forged economic pact with America has also encountered birth pangs. Any significant thoughts about a free trade zone between the United States and the EU had to be streamlined. Merkel, speaking before the German parliament's Europe committee, called the concept "a fascinating idea." But it was asking too much of the elites on both sides of the Atlantic.
Differences to Become a Thing of the Past
The Americans were unwilling to eliminate tariffs designed to protect their farmers, and Merkel's advisors were concerned that the world's two largest economic blocs going it alone would put an end, once and for all, to negotiations over the liberalization of global trade, or the so-called Doha Round. The European Commission also proved to be uncooperative, with EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson denouncing a Western alliance as protectionist.
As a result, the chancellor has toned down her ambitions. Instead of eliminating tariffs, she proposed getting rid of so-called non-tariff barriers to trade, which also impede the unrestricted flow of goods. For example, the two economic regions have different licensing procedures for chemical and cosmetic products, automobiles are subject to different safety inspections before being allowed on the road, and companies use different methods to compute their earnings, even though their stocks are traded in financial markets on both sides of the Atlantic.
Merkel seems to be positioning Germany as the new Britain.
The goal of the agreement is to make licensing procedures more uniform, or at least to ensure mutual recognition of such procedures. Regulatory authorities in Europe and the United States will be instructed to improve cooperation. The two sides also plan to cooperate more, and more effectively, in the development of future-oriented technologies in the energy sector.
One thing is already clear, and that is that industry on both sides of the ocean will benefit from the plan. Companies will be able to pass on to their customers the billions they stand to save or use the savings for additional investments. One way or the other, consumers will also benefit.
Merkel as Warmonger?
In a mixture of generosity and flattery, the Americans have opted to give the chancellor sole credit for not only coming up with the plan, but also making it happen, and are calling it "the Merkel initiative." Nevertheless, Bush's hopes that his charm offensive could transform the chancellor into a stronger ally in the multi-front war against terror have not been fulfilled. When it comes to Iraq, the new chancellor has not deviated from her predecessor's policy. The Germans are not sending troops to Iraq, and they have only agreed to provide training assistance outside the country, which essentially means no training at all.
Merkel's caution in dealing with the military ambitions of the United States is not based solely on opinion polls, which point to a clear opposition to the war among Germans. She must also keep a constant eye on the SPD. Her coalition partner views any rapprochement with Washington with great suspicion, and many in the SPD are merely waiting for the right opportunity to paint themselves as peacemakers and Merkel as a warmonger.
The chancellor is especially wary of her foreign minister. Although Steinmeier has distanced himself from the abrasive tone favored by his former mentor Schröder, officials at the chancellery are convinced that he still maintains close ties to the former chancellor. Merkel's advisors believe that reports that the two have had a falling out are nothing but misinformation put out by the Foreign Ministry to cover up the fact that the two men are, in fact, quite close.
When Steinmeier gives a speech, officials at the chancellery are always anxious to receive the transcript. When the topic is especially sensitive, as was the case with Steinmeier's recent presentation to NATO, Thomas de Maizière, the chief of staff in the chancellery, asks for an advance copy -- a request that only irritates the foreign minister.
Still, Steinmeier knows that Merkel, as did Schröder, thinks like a head of government and pays close attention to who holds the foreign policy reins. Unlike her predecessor, though, the current chancellor prefers to hold them in the background.
By Ralf Beste, Jan Fleischhauer, Georg Mascolo, Christian Reiermann, Matthias Schepp, and Gabor Steingart
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
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