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  Playing Second Fiddle: Germany Left Out of Global Policy Loop

Playing Second Fiddle Germany Left Out of Global Policy Loop

By Markus Feldenkirchen, Dirk Kurbjuweit and Alexander Szandar

Part 2: The Downside of Being a Medium-Sized Power

Seen in this light -- and from a moral standpoint -- Steinmeier's outrage seems somewhat dubious. But the German government certainly cannot be faulted for wanting to help German companies earn revenues and preserve German jobs. And there is a difference between the occasional arms deal and developing an entire region into a giant battleship. By supplying arms to its allies in the Middle East, the US hopes to contain Iran, whose afforts at developing a nuclear program it views as a major threat.

But the Germans have always pushed for dialogue with Tehran rather than confrontation. Their successes have not exactly been earth-shattering, but while diplomatic missions may not always bring improvement, they generally do not complicate the situation any further. The story usually changes when weapons come into play.

Germany: Powerless to Make Decisions on its Own

The United States believes that it is not obligated to consult with its allies because it feels sufficiently confident in its own strength. This makes it easier for the Americans to take political action than for the Germans to. Whenever the Americans feel that something is truly important to them, they suddenly become unilateralists. They take it upon themselves to make decisions. The Germans, on the other hand, are virtually powerless to make international decisions on their own, and perhaps this is not even their intention. This is why they are multilateralists, their decisions consistently dependent on seeking allies. Germany does want to exert its influence on world events, but its role as a medium-sized power precludes it from being able to assert this claim.

In theory, this should also apply to France. But the Grande Nation perceives itself as being much larger and, for this reason, it has a penchant for acting alone at times -- especially when a new president apparently has something to prove to the world. At first Paris took its partners in Berlin by surprise when Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former French finance minister, was named head of the IMF. President Sarkozy had notified various European countries of the decision ahead of time, but not Berlin. Niels Annen, a German politician and member of the Social Democratic Party, was not just speaking for himself when he called Sarkozy's move "an outrage."

Sarko's Audacity

Berlin is also annoyed by the audacity with which Sarkozy celebrated as his personal triumph the release of five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian-Bulgarian doctor from death row in Libya. Ironically, it was Foreign Minister Steinmeier who, as president of the EU Council, spent months negotiating the prisoners' release, together with Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU's external relations commissioner.

Sarkozy's wife Cécilia had hardly dropped off the prisoners in Bulgaria for a photogenic return when he flew to Tripoli to announce France's intention to build a nuclear power plant in Libya, with the Libyan revolutionary leader Moammar Gadhafi standing by his side. He also promised an extensive arms package, including "Milan" antitank missiles and military wireless equipment.

France must "subordinate its national interests to a European strategy," said Andreas Schockenhoff, the deputy leader of the conservative Christian Democratic Union's parliamentary group. His Social Democratic counterpart, deputy parliamentary leader Ulrich Kelber, even voiced the suspicion that Sarkozy had only intervened on behalf of the nurses to garner contracts for French industry. "This is really the sort of behavior one would expect from despots," Kelber said. "It makes US President George W. Bush pale by comparison."

Officials at Germany's Foreign Ministry were not as judgmental. Though somewhat offended over having not been informed, they are convinced that Sarkozy will return to Germany's side in a short time. "He'll calm down soon enough," officials in the hallways of the Foreign Office could be overheard saying.

Sarkozy's predecessor, former President Jacques Chirac, also dropped a bomb -- a real one -- shortly after taking office. He had the French military test six nuclear warheads in the South Pacific in 1995, triggering worldwide protests. But to Angela Merkel's relief, Chirac later became a reasonably cooperative multilateralist.

Merkel is now being forced to realize that she is no longer stands at Europe's helm. Sarkozy, even if he calms down, has far more élan than Chirac, who doddered toward the end of his term. The new British prime minister, Gordon Brown, is no lame duck -- as Tony Blair was for a prolonged period of time -- but a man with great ambitions. Neither of the two men is burdened by the histories of their respective countries.

After the catastrophe of the Third Reich, the Germans were forced to behave in a different way on the international stage. They learned to be modest. For a country with such a horrific past, it was unseemly to mention national interests and, even more so, to pursue them. The sort of unbroken national consciousness that prevails in the United States, France and Great Britain could no longer exist in Germany. But the Germans managed to turn this drawback into a virtue, building a reputation for being understanding and reserved. They developed the principle: What is good for Europe is good for Germany. In his book "Germany's Return -- an Undivided Postwar History," journalist Peter Bender pointed out that East Germany was particularly socialistic while West Germany was particularly European, because both were no longer permitted to be truly German.

This was the Germans' only option for being re-admitted to the circle of decent people. They were polite and accommodating. If there were such a thing as a trophy for fair play in international politics, it would have gone to Germany many a time.

It was only former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who created the impression that he intended to put an end to Germany's timidity. He shifted his rhetoric in the early days of his chancellorship. German payments to the European Union were suddenly no longer the country's contribution to peace and prosperity in Europe but money that was being "burned." He sounded like someone who wanted change and fully intended to practice a rustic form of representation of Germany's interests.

But Schröder's plans never quite materialized. A few more business executives than before accompanied him on his travels abroad, and he took a somewhat more hands-on approach internationally than his predecessors. But Schröder was both unable and unwilling to shake up the traditional view of Germany and its role in the world.

The key tenet of German foreign policy remained the ongoing search for consensus. But perhaps this is no drawback, after all.

Christoph Bertram, the former head of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, doubts that countries can benefit from short-term successes in the long term. "Antagonizing others doesn't do anybody any good," says Bertram, pointing out that the Americans, by going it alone in Iraq, demonstrated that unilateral reflexes do not end well. "How far have the unilateralists actually come?" Bertram asks. His answer is clear: "not far."

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan