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  Taliban Talks: Secret Negotiations with the Islamists Proved Fruitless

Taliban Talks Secret Negotiations with the Islamists Proved Fruitless

By Matthias Gebauer and Holger Stark

Part 2: Everyone Talks with the Taliban

The intelligence agents went out of their way to ensure their Afghan guests had a comfortable stay. No maids interrupted the talks. Lunch and dinner were delivered directly to the suite -– but only by men, so as not to offend the Afghans' sensibilities. The hotel staff removed all alcoholic beverages from the mini bar; they were replaced with tea, water and Coca Cola. The talks lasted three days, with prayer breaks in between.

The BND was pursuing one goal in particular: It wanted to know whether or not the Taliban were prepared to withdraw from al-Qaida's embrace. Creating a rift between the two groups is considered by the West as a precondition for the lasting success of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In return, the German government would intensify its involvement in reconstruction by building hospitals, roads and mosques -- the sorts of projects that the German public tends to support.

The Taliban demanded political recognition of the kind once given to Yasser Arafat's PLO. "We do not want to be considered terrorists. We want to be treated as a political force," the "commander" is said to have demanded, whereupon the agent leading the BND's three-man delegation is said to have responded: "Then break with al-Qaida." The BND agent outlined a multi-stage process in which Berlin would begin by offering civilian aid, to be followed by regular talks –- at which point recognition of the Taliban as a political party could be discussed.

British Deal

The current debate in Germany makes it seem as though the offer made by the BND was a uniquely German idea. As though Berlin had opted to do an end run around the back of its allies. As it happens, nothing could be further from the truth.

In September of 2006, for example, British troops in the city of Musa Qala in southern Afghanistan agreed on a highly controversial truce with the rebels: The British soldiers promised to withdraw from Musa Qala in return for the Taliban guaranteeing that they would stay away from the city and allow the Afghan government in. The agreement was mediated by local tribal elders.

Even the US, which officially refuses all contact with the Taliban, have repeatedly used mediators to discreetly gauge the willingness of the insurgents to talk. The BND coordinated its secret talks with the US intelligence agencies, and European countries such as France were also in the know. "There was a time when many Western countries spoke to the Taliban," says one German government official.

For Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, keeping the door open for the Islamists has become a survival strategy. In 2005 --- simultaneously with the talks conducted by the BND -- Karzai created a commission to prepare negotiations with the Taliban. In May of this year, the upper house of the Afghan parliament voted in favor of direct talks with the militants. "Afghan Taliban are always welcome. They belong to this country," Karzai said. Still the "atrocities" committed by men like Mullah Omar were a matter for "the people to judge," he added. Early this year, Karzai admitted there were "meetings between Taliban representatives and delegates of the Afghan government for an extended period of time." He also said he himself had participated in these talks.

"Afghan Taliban Are Always Welcome."

The German talks eventually collapsed, apparently due to the insurgents' refusal to distance themselves from al-Qaida. The BND took that refusal to mean that the Taliban is not all that interested in civilian reconstruction. But the negotiations only came to an end after eight to 10 weeks of secret diplomacy. The German intelligence agency organized about half a dozen flights from Afghanistan to Europe, shuttling Taliban delegates back and forth. Sometimes the trips were disguised as family visits and sometimes as medical emergencies like that invented to explain the arrival of "the commander" and his advisor.

When the three days of talks in Zürich were over, the two Afghans did indeed travel to the University Hospital in Balgrist. They explained their request to the doctors responsible in English and showed them the wound, which had long since healed. The "commander" even shook the female doctor's hand, albeit unwillingly, and promised to return.

But that never happened: The BND terminated the sensitive project because the delegation from Afghanistan was unable to prove it was negotiating in the name of Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura. Back in Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership is said to have criticized the "commander" and his advisor for this unsuccessful result. Since then, there have been no more talks.

From the BND's point of view, the decision to end the talks has since been proven the correct one. Since 2005, the Islamists have changed their strategy and -- like al-Qaida in Iraq -- are avoiding face-to-face battles with their technically superior enemy. Instead, they are focusing on explosives buried inconspicuously along roadsides, as well as on suicide bombers. Moreover, many civilian aid organizations have moved into the Taliban's crosshairs –- such as the 19 South Koreans (out of a group that originally numbered 23) who have been held by the Taliban for about four weeks. The BND is sceptical as to whether renewed talks represent much of an option at present -- especially with its former negotiating partners.

In late summer of 2005, when the talks had already ended, the BND agents discovered that the names of both the "commander" and his advisor featured on a blacklist issued by the US authorities. The men were among the 200 most wanted terrorists in Afghanistan.