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  Beer, Brats and Bad Behavior: German Elite Troops in Afghanistan Marred by Reports of Misconduct

Beer, Brats and Bad Behavior German Elite Troops in Afghanistan Marred by Reports of Misconduct

Part 2: "Beer Was Like a Currency"

For the US troops, Kandahar -- located in the midst of Muslim Afghanistan -- was a so-called "dry camp." Beer and wine were strictly prohibited. But in the German zone, an e-mail with the subject line "BEER DAY" had already been sent around as early as Jan. 12, 2002. The e-mail explained that the commanding officer had approved "the following beer days: Saturday, Monday, Wednesday, Friday."

The commanding officer allowed every soldier a maximum of two cans of beer on these days and added that he expected "modesty in times when the forces must renounce beer consumption due to preparations for deployment." Moreover, a stock of 120 cans was to be held back for the troops.

According to a "shipment expectation" dated Jan. 5, 2002, the soldiers could expect the arrival of 2,000 cans of beer, 48 bottles of red wine and 24 bottles of white wine -- in addition to 150 bottles of Desperados, a tequila-flavored beer.

Word about the arrival of the German beer spread quickly in Q-Town. And soon enough a veritable beer bazaar developed, with KSK soldiers trading their lager for warm socks, long underwear, T-shirts and US army paraphernalia.

"Beer was like a currency," says one US soldier, who stocked up on the beverages provided by the KSK troops. "To us, the German beer supplies were Big Rock Candy." And the German and US troops also bonded over their beers. The KSK troops were especially interested in socializing with US reconnaissance troops. By drinking with them, they obtained access to confidential situation reports, and even satellite photographs and intelligence reports. Sometimes they were able to make phone calls using US satellite facilities. Even helicopter flights and other transportation services were traded for beer. One source says the KSK used the alcohol trade to "creatively compensate for the material deficits of the German forces."

And so the frugal lifestyle of the German troops gradually improved. There were even parties. And the "expectations" of the Americans were high, one commander noted in his daily report, number 42/02, urging the Germans to help "materially with the allocation and provision of German specialties (beer, canned sausages, Black Forest ham, etc.)."

Sometimes the "coalition forces" partied together, and at others the KSK contingent's chaplain would organize barbeques and free beers after the Sunday sermon. By Tuesday, the alcohol was flowing again – in one instance prompting a soldier to note the following day that, "Following alcoholic excesses by the troops last night, highly restrictive rules for alcohol consumption were issued today." By that same evening, however, soldiers popped out the booze again for an "Intel party" to celebrate a change in intelligence personnel.

Indeed, the soldiers openly mocked the alcohol directive. As well, it was an open secret among the troops on location that the contingent commander himself was fond of drinking. "He was inebriated for long periods of time," one soldier recalls.

Chain of Command

A number of participants went even further in their description of the colonel, calling him an "alcoholic" whose drinking habits had already attracted attention even before he joined the KSK. The officer "often drank until he fell over," another soldier told SPIEGEL.

The company commander also had a "known alcohol problem," one KSK soldier recalls, although "it was not as acute and not as obvious as that of the contingent commander." According to eyewitness accounts, the company commander unintentionally fired his gun once -- apparently after hitting the bottle. "Normally you would be relieved of your command for something like that," one member of the unit alleges, "but nothing happened."

It's a serious charge, to be sure: Were the German military's elite forces being led by a man with a known alcohol problem?

The suspicion is all the more grave considering that it was during those days in early January 2002 that incidents occurred that are still being probed today by two state prosecutors and as many parliamentary investigative committees. Following his return from Guantanamo, Murat Kurnaz, a Turkish citizen raised in Germany, went on the record saying he had been maltreated by two KSK soldiers stationed in Afghanistan -- an accusation that those questioned have vehemently denied. Some members of parliament are now questioning whether the alleged abuse might have been carried out by drunken soldiers.

Back in Germany, Operations Command in Potsdam reportedly also knew about the problems of the 1st Contingent in Kandahar. KSK Commander Reinhard Günzel traveled to Afghanistan to visit the troops in his supervisory role. Upon his return and in light of the incidents, the commander responsible for special operations, Manfred Gerhardus, asked him to take action. Günzel replied that he had not observed any alcohol problem that would necessitate action.

The inactivity of the responsible officers angered and frustrated some of the soldiers who had been deployed to Afghanistan, who by now were being given assignments by the American troops -- primarily reconnaissance tasks.

"The situation in Kandahar was very unpleasant on the whole," one soldier lamented, looking back on the experience. "I have never seen conditions like those in this unit anywhere in the German military," he says. "There were disagreements on all levels. The leadership failed."

In the Dark

Of course, it could be that the leadership never found out about what was happening. Then-Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping emphasized last week he was not familiar with the accounts of alcohol abuse in Kandahar "from reports (he received) at the time." Former Bundeswehr General Inspector Harald Kujat also stresses that, by his recollection, alcohol consumption within the KSK unit "was not an issue at the mission briefings I participated in."

For many KSK members though -- and the accounts provided by several sources to SPIEGEL were consistent -- the experiences in Kandahar were reason enough to look around for a new job following their return. "These experiences led me and and other members to leave the KSK as soon as possible," one soldier says.

Even those who remained faithful to the unit apparently haven't forgotten what happened, either. Years later, some were still worried the events could be made public -- causing further damage to the KSK's reputation. The elite force's image had already taken a major hit with Günzel's dismissal in 2003 and the allegations that emerged in the Kurnaz case.

When media reports about the unit's internal fears of being deployed in eastern Afghanistan were published in the summer of 2005, one member of the 1st Contingent apparently panicked, fearing that another "betrayal" could possibly yield more explosive details. The soldier sat down in front of his computer and wrote an urgent e-mail to Gerhardus at the Operations Command Potsdam on July 14.

The e-mail's first item mentions the company commander's "alcohol abuse" and "all problems associated with it." It also states the commander's full name. The second item refers to the "constellation" made up by the contingent commander and the company commander and the "failure of everyone familiar with the problem to act." The third item is no less explosive: It alleges that the company commander ordered soldiers to participate in "vehicle training" in "mine-infested Afghanistan."

The author of the e-mail also proved far-sighted in his remark about the "surveillance of detainees of the US forces," specifying that this would become a problem "when the 'Bremen Taliban' is set free, at the very latest."

The soldier was well aware of the explosive nature of his remarks, and he ended his missive with the words: "It may be advisable to make the DM aware of these developments" – "DM" being short for the Defense Minister. That office was held at the time by Peter Struck, who it seems was left in the dark about the incidents, too.

Inconsequential Action

The way their company commander was greeted when the 1^st Contingent returned home to Germany, struck many of the unit's soldiers as downright farcical. The contingent commander received the honorary pin of the German military's Special Operations Division (DSO) and a time piece from the Bundeswehr's Chief of Army Staff -- the highest honorary award available from that office.

Chief of Army Staff Hans-Otto Budde, who at the time was also still the commander of the DSO and therefore the immediate superior of the KSK at the time, has refused to comment on allegations about the elite unit's drinking habits in Kandahar.

But he will not stand for criticism of the unit's activities either. "I am convinced the KSK soldiers did a good job and are still accomplishing their tasks superbly today," he says.

In fact, the unit did uncover a so-called safe house -- a site that served as a refuge for potential suicide bombers -- in Kabul in autumn 2006. And even Green Party politician Nachtwei praises the KSK's "valuable contributions" to the protection of the German ISAF troops in northern Afghanistan.

But the new allegations raise the question of whether the KSK needs to be supervised more closely by parliament -- a practice that has long been customary for Germany's intelligence agencies. So far, the government has resisted calls to establish a supervisory body analagous to that for the intelligence agencies, which meets regularly, for the KSK.

Rainer Arnold, a Social Democrat, is also part of the chorus in parliament that is reacting to the incidents by demanding more information about the activities of the secretive elite unit. Arnold says that the voluntary reports the Defense Ministry gives parliament about the KSK's activities should be made mandatory.

Still, drinking excesses within the KSK have at least become an issue within the Bundestag's Defense Committee. But only a few dozen of the 613 members of the Bundestag soon to decide on the possible extension of the German military's ISAF and OEF mandates -- and, by implication, on the KSK's future Afghanistan missions -- are getting much information about what happened inside the unit.

They will be forced to make their decision in parliament based on considerable faith but very little knowledge. In that sense, the current situation isn't much different than it was in November 2001, when the Bundestag voted to give the 1st Contingent its first mandate for a deployment in Afghanistan.

ALEXANDER SZANDAR, MARCEL ROSENBACH, SUSANNE KOELBL UND JOHN GOETZ