By Yassin Musharbash and Marcel Rosenbach
The answer lies primarily somewhere in the future, when other trials may have to be conducted. According to prosecutors, Gelowicz and his fellow defendants actively recruited friends and acquaintances for the holy war, and at least half a dozen of them have headed for the terrorist training camps. If the Sauerland group is found guilty, it should be easier to convict their alleged recruits, such as Houssain al-Malla and Eric Breininger, should they ever return from the Hindu Kush.
In Waziristan, though, there are no bugs or wiretapping, only a wealth of hearsay and hypotheses -- which are significantly more difficult to use in a court of law.
Federal prosecutors have therefore gone to great lengths in their bid to document the foreign activities of the Sauerland gang. The result is a tale with dubious witnesses, mysterious sources and a number of contradictions. Their version of events begins in the summer of 2005 in Damascus, where Gelowicz and Yilmaz had traveled to take an Arabic course. In the Syrian capital they allegedly met a member of the IJU for the first time. They later referred to him as "Jaf" in their e-mails, sometimes also as "Jafer." Prosecutors say that this man is an Uzbek national named Gofir Salimov, born Feb. 27, 1978 in Parkent.
Salimov smuggles people across borders for the IJU, but in the case of the Sauerland cell, he was apparently also acting as a recruiter. The prosecution says that the decision by Gelowicz and Yilmaz to head for the terror training camp in Pakistan dates back to their encounter with Salimov.
At this particular point, the investigators' reconstruction of events may sound logical -- but it has gaps. There is no evidence to substantiate a meeting between Gelowicz and Salimov in Damascus. The prosecution has in fact constructed this piece of the puzzle based on ambiguous e-mails.
And even if this meeting actually took place: Did Salimov mention an organization called the IJU to the Germans? Or did he merely promise to show them the fabled door to jihad?
In December 2005, Yilmaz left the Syrian capital, and Gelowicz followed suit in April 2006. Shortly thereafter, both of them traveled via Turkey to Iran and, with Salimov's help, continued on to Waziristan, to an IJU training camp somewhere near Mir Ali, close to the border with Afghanistan. That's the prosecution's version of events.
As proof of the defendants' integration into IJU structures, prosecutors have produced what is supposed to be a top witness, an insider: Surat J., who, by his own account, was once the number two man in the IJU. Although the 40-year-old is not familiar with the names Gelowicz and Yilmaz, he has identified the two men from photographs. The Uzbek says that he saw them three times within the organization in Waziristan between March and May 2006. He says that the IJU's leader, Najmiddin Jalolov, personally gave the Germans the order to carry out attacks in their homeland.
The witness says that Germany became a target for the Uzbeks because of the air base operated by the German military, the Bundeswehr, in the Uzbek town of Termez: The German soldiers were apparently blocking the route between the IJU's country of origin, Uzbekistan, and their current base of operations in Pakistan.
This statement has a flaw, though. For over two years now, the witness has been held in a prison in Kazakhstan, a country that human rights organizations have repeatedly accused of mistreating prisoners. German investigators and a representative of the Federal Prosecutor's Office visited him in the Kazakh capital Astana in July 2008. The prisoner received his guests wearing a yellow Jesus t-shirt with a peace dove on it. According to the record of the meeting, a Kazakh witness stated that J. was in good physical condition.
Nevertheless, the entire investigative approach raises difficult questions. What value does such testimony have? What importance should it have in a fair and legal trial? Who can rule out that J. was briefed before he was questioned? To top it off, the Uzbek maintains that he saw the two Germans back in March 2006, when the prosecution says that Gelowicz was still in Damascus. An easy mistake to make, noted Germany's Federal Criminal Police.
Things are equally problematic with another incriminating source that investigators visited in Uzbekistan, a country where the rule of law is virtually non-existent. Sherali A., who has been in prison since 2006, remembers two Germans named Abd al-Malik and Talha, who he met in a terror camp, he says. This happens to match the names that Gelowicz and Yilmaz used for themselves.
But there are problems with this story, too. A. maintains that he met the Germans long before April 2006. And he says that he has absolutely no knowledge of the Islamic Jihad Union. The witness refers merely to the "Ahmad Group," although this group is also supposed to be led by Najmiddin Jalolov.
Consequently, prosecutors face a familiar problem, which is particularly serious in this case: Virtually nothing is more difficult than proving that someone is a member of a specific Islamist terrorist organization.
Although the IJU connection is rather obscure, after the two men returned to Germany, a decidedly clearer picture emerges. As soon as they arrived back home, Schneider and Gelowicz began to communicate with a man referred to as "Sule," who investigators identify as Suhail Buranov, apparently one of Jalolov's representatives. Yilmaz maintained contact with "Jaf".
Based on e-mails, federal prosecutors believe that they can place the defendants within the hierarchy of the IJU. The correspondence refers to a "boss" and a "big brother" in the "homeland," which is apparently a reference to Pakistan. Commands can also be reconstructed, such as taking care of "the matter" in 15 days.
The defense sees opportunities for counterattacks against the second pillar of the prosecution's case in particular. They are preparing a number of petitions. For instance, defense lawyers want the testimony of the prisoners in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to be ruled as inadmissible, because of -- among other reasons -- the simple fact that they cannot question the witnesses themselves.
But what role did the Germans actually play for the IJU? Were they useful idiots, full-fledged members or subcontractors? The trial will also address these questions.
This matter could of course be clarified by the defendants, who were recently transferred to the Rhineland region in a top secret operation. Schneider was the first to be flown in by helicopter; agents escorted him to the takeoff pad in front of the Schwalmstadt prison walls. Gelowicz followed on Wednesday. During the preliminary hearing, though, it became clear that the defendants would exercise their right to remain silent at the outset of the trial. This is also suggested by the fact that the first witnesses -- the defendants' relatives -- will already be called to the stand on the second day of proceedings.
However, the defendants appear to be more open when it comes to secondary events. Schneider is also accused of attempting to murder a police officer during his arrest, and he is apparently prepared to testify on that matter at least. Earlier, during questioning, he denied any intention to kill.
And Gelowicz also showed a certain degree of willingness to cooperate, or so it appeared. On his computer, police found an encrypted data container, which the BKA couldn't crack. In response to requests from investigators, Gelowicz handed over the password 14 days ago. But police didn't find anything enlightening. There was nothing inside -- except traces of shredded data.
Translated from the German by Paul Cohen
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