By SPIEGEL Staff
Another goal was to break taboos. And few things are as taboo in German politics as anti-Semitism.
The two politicians did not make openly anti-Semitic remarks. The FDP would not have stood for that. But Möllemann openly voiced sympathy for Palestinian suicide bombers. He was trying to lure Jamal Karsli, a Green politician known for his anti-Semitic remarks, into the FDP. He also accused the vice-president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Michel Friedman, of contributing to anti-Semitism with his behavior.
Westerwelle said that Friedmann had "no higher moral authority" in the debate. When asked about his position on Germany's Nazi past during a visit to Israel, Westerwelle said: "We want to ask questions in a different way and answer them differently." He neglected to explain what he meant.
Former FDP Chairman Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who had been German foreign minister for many years, had soon had enough and demanded an end to this populist approach. Möllemann was increasingly isolated within the party leadership, so that Westerwelle had to distance himself from him in order to save his own skin. "Project 18" dragged on for a few more months until it was quietly terminated. In June 2003, Möllemann committed suicide in a parachute jump, an act motivated primarily by a campaign contribution scandal.
Today Westerwelle's friends claim that Möllemann deceived him into falling for his repugnant ideas. Indeed, Westerwelle has managed to relegate the episode to an almost-forgotten past, while the public seems to remember only the more outrageous, fun aspects of that period: the Guidomobil, Westerwelle's appearance on the reality show "Big Brother" and photos taken of him playing beach volleyball.
Was it just role-playing or do these incidents offer a glimpse of the real Westerwelle? Hartmut Lennarz, his former German teacher, says that the Westerwelle of Guidomobil and Project 18 fame reminded him of the student he once taught.
Rancid Machismo
Westerwelle discovered his ideal role during the time of the second SPD-Green Party coalition government, playing to the neoliberal zeitgeist by loudly criticizing the government's social and fiscal policies. But then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer refused to treat him as an equal, joking and smirking on the administration bench whenever Westerwelle spoke in the Bundestag. It was the heyday of a "rancid machismo," as columnist Gustav Seibt recently wrote in the Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper.
Angela Merkel was just as much a victim of these attitudes as Westerwelle. She too was not taken seriously by her testosterone-charged fellow politicians Schröder and Fischer. In the end it was CSU Chairman Edmund Stoiber who put the widespread resentment against Merkel and Westerwelle into words, famously describing them as "lightweights."
"The outsiders" would have been a better description. Merkel and Westerwelle, the chancellor and the future vice-chancellor, have played remarkably similar roles in life. Just as Westerwelle long concealed his homosexuality, Merkel could not manage to express her inner disapproval of the East German system. Both had to train themselves to keep a core element of their personality hidden.
And both had to learn to live with the fact that they were relatively unpopular with the public and even a large segment of their political associates. Westerwelle faced discrimination for being gay, Merkel for being a childless woman from the former East Germany in the West German old boys' club that was the CDU at the time. Both politicians are also all too familiar with painful comments about their appearance, including countless vicious remarks about their faces.
Saying the Wrong Thing
Neither Merkel nor Westerwelle are loved within their parties. They are condemned to success; if they failed they would be ejected. How can someone who is never given a sense of security come across as confident? This is now becoming evident.
Merkel has a tendency to say the wrong thing or to look uncomfortable, while Westerwelle finds it difficult to find the right tone and volume. But the two understand each other, united by their similar experiences.
As chancellor, Merkel has had the pleasant experience of being popular, and she has become more confident as a result. Westerwelle now plans to follow her into the new government, but that also means that he must abandon the delights of being in the opposition. The opposition is the idea place for role-playing. Words and gestures are important tools in the opposition, a magical realm where anything can be demanded or claimed. Those in power can also play, but here and there they are required to act, make decisions with which they will become associated.
Westerwelle is now standing at this threshold. He has inspired high expectations among his supporters, who are tired of government intervention and social handouts. They want Westerwelle to trim the government.
High Expectations
During the coalition negotiations that begin this week, it will become clear whether he is capable of satisfying those expectations. But a different decision will really speak volumes about Westerwelle, namely the question of which cabinet post he assumes.
If Westerwelle takes the things he has been fighting for throughout his political career seriously, he will become finance minister. It would be the position in which he could redefine the role of the state, and it would be a natural role for Westerwelle.
But instead he is expected to become foreign minister, a post that traditionally goes to the junior coalition partner in a German government. How is this supposed to work? Will new financial and social policy be made in Germany, while Westerwelle spends his time in Lima? Will Westerwelle tour Africa while German unions stage protests at home against the new CDU-FDP government?
This could be his opportunity to once and for all ditch the image of role-player and jokester politician. The door to the realm of painful gravitas is open. The Finance Ministry is nothing if not a serious place. A politician doesn't make himself popular by embarking on a course of radical belt-tightening.
But a politician does make himself popular as foreign minister: red carpets the world over, and no decisions that are painful to German citizens. It is an incredibly tempting prospect for someone who has spent much of his life being disliked and insecure -- the prospect of suddenly becoming popular.
Westerwelle's Next Role
And what a temptation it is. Westerwelle's life up until now suggests that he will not be able to resist. "He always envied people who could walk into a room and attract everyone's attention, people who were natural magnets for the sympathy of others," says his biographer Majid Sattar.
But Westerwelle has never been all that interested in foreign policy. It would be like playing his next role.
There have been many jokes in the past few days about Westerwelle's English language skills. On Monday of last week, he refused to respond in English to a BBC reporter's question, prompting speculation over whether the future foreign minister can really speak the language. "Now I will be happy to take questions in German," he said after a meeting of the party leadership on Thursday, and smiled at his self-deprecating humor.
A journalist asked a complicated question. "Well, it was certainly in German, but I still didn't understand it," Westerwelle said. "I could also ask the question in ancient Greek," the journalist replied. "Then I'll answer it in Latin," Westerwelle said, "because that was my main subject in high school."
The journalists laughed and Westerwelle was pleased to have scored a point. But instead of leaving well enough alone, he added: "And then there's also the question of how good your ancient Greek is."
Of course, there is also the question of Westerwelle's Latin. In high school, his grades in Latin were miserable. He owes it to his teacher's leniency that he passed the subject at all.
SVEN BECKER, DIRK KURBJUWEIT, RALF NEUKIRCH, MERLE SCHMALENBACH, MERLIND THEILE
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
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