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Westerwelle To Bring New Face But Old Ideas as Foreign Minister

By Claus Christian Malzahn

Guido Westerwelle is a blank slate in Washington. The new foreign minister's demands that US nuclear weapons be removed from Germany may be popular at home. But Berlin's Western allies could be asking themselves if Westerwelle has any new ideas for dealing with today's problems.

A foreign minister in Germany, particularly one who is a member of the Free Democrats (FDP), has to have his own foreign policy issue. Any issue.

A topic that can somehow overshadow a chancellor who has become accustomed to the world's international conferences. An issue that can wipe the noble smile off the face of rising political star Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg's face and take current Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier by surprise. An issue that provokes collective nods of approval. A theme that doesn't cost a lot but that is sure to make the headlines.

But what should it be?

Try a nuclear-free zone, may well have been the advice former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher gave FDP leader Guido Westerwelle. It won't cost much, and it will attract lots of applause and hardly any opposition. And wham! It worked. A breaking news report from the Associated Press news agency on Saturday announced: "Westerwelle wants to push through the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany!"

Westerwelle's demand -- which managed to find a place in the coalition agreement between the FDP and Merkel's conservatives this weekend -- will have been expected in Washington. The initiative may not have provoked much admiration, but nor did it incite concerns about a new German foreign policy. "There was a furrowing of brows overseas," was the commentary from the foreign policy analyst Ulrich Speck on his "Westerwelle Watch" blog. He went on to ask: "Why is the new foreign minister seeking to distinguish himself with such a marginal topic?"

The Times Have Changed

After all, the fact that there are still nuclear weapons in Germany 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall has more to do with loyalty to the Western military alliance and NATO symbolism than any possible military scenarios. NATO's "nuclear participation" was intended above all for those countries that did not have their own nuclear arsenal. And an unwritten law of the Western alliance has always been that the Americans are to decide about the withdrawal of their nuclear weapons -- and not a future foreign minister who still has yet to prove his own merits.

It is hardly surprising that the Genscher generation are still interested in this issue: The confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the associated nuclear disarmament talks were the burning themes when they were involved in politics. The times have obviously changed.

Relying on Genscher's Expertise

The nuclear threat to the world is no longer to be found in the US military depots -- but rather in the new nuclear-armed countries or those with ambitions to be so, such as Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. But it is not possible to cut a popular figure with these complicated issues nor is it possible to solve them with the diplomatic tools of the Genscher era.

No one knows this better than Genscher himself, who served as German foreign minister almost continuously between 1974 and 1992. He has admitted to those close to him that he hardly understands today's world with its terror threats and asymmetric wars, its new nuclear powers and sleeping giants.

Still it is natural for Westerwelle to rely on Genscher's expertise. And it is also understandable that he would want to distinguish himself from Chancellor Angela Merkel and the new Defense Minister Guttenberg when it comes to foreign policy. However, Westerwelle doesn't just have to set himself apart from his cabinet colleagues but also from his FDP predecessors. He won't succeed if he just appears on the world stage as Genscher's heir.

That is why things will only get interesting when Westerwelle comments on today's conflicts -- and not just on yesterday's problems. And it won't be enough to emulate Genscher by trying to say as little as possible using as many words as possible. Westerwelle wanted the job, now he has to prove that he wants to make foreign policy -- rather than just pursuing popular symbolism.

So the decisive weeks and months lie ahead: Which countries will he visit first? Will he meet US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton alone or as Chancellor Angela Merkel's sidekick? Will his populist anti-nuclear weapons stance be followed by an intelligent comment directed toward the outside world? And if so, aimed in which direction? Europe, the Middle East, Russia?

Discord Ahead

There are enough problems that will need to be addressed in the coming weeks. It is likely that Germany will be asked to supply more troops in Afghanistan as soon as US President Barack Obama's makes his decision on whether to increase troop levels at the beginning of November. And it looks like there will be a new conflict with Germany's biggest neighbour to the east, Poland, over the plans to establish a memorial center dedicated to Germans expelled at the end of World War II. The conflict is also likely to divide the coalition. These problems are all likely to bring discord rather than applause.

Up until now there has been little indication of what Westerwelle aims to do in office. One can count his foreign policy speeches on a single hand. This poking around in the dark is irritating the Americans in particular. The vacuum has left space for speculation: Should Westerwelle's refusal to speak English at a press conference ("We are in Germany here!," he told a BBC reporter who asked him a question in English immediately after the election) paired with the demand for the nuclear arms to be withdrawn be interpreted as a distancing himself from the trans-Atlantic relationship?

This was certainly not the intention. Westerwelle is fully aware that the nuclear weapons will not be withdrawn unless the Americans agree to do so. It is a decision that will be embedded in a new NATO strategy. In light of the problems the future foreign minister will have to deal with in the coming years, this issue is merely a diplomatic footnote -- even if Genscher can take delight from the fact that, at the age of 82, he is still able to influence German foreign policy.