Secret Report on Investigators' Failures: How Neo-Nazi Terror Cell Gave Authorities the Slip

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Again, there was conflict between the various authorities. Officials from the state branches of the domestic intelligence agency in Thuringia and Saxony placed the woman and Jan W. under surveillance. However, their colleagues in Brandenburg wanted to protect their source "Piato" and refused to supply the police with a written report, saying only that "Piato" had received the information during a private conversation.

Because there was no written report, police investigators didn't get actively involved in the case. As a result, the weapons lead was not properly followed up. What stands out is the fact that Chemnitz is repeatedly mentioned in these exchanges. For example, in the intelligence agency's report, it says that investigators had, "by mid-March 1999 at the latest," more and more information "that the sought-after individuals were reportedly staying in the Chemnitz area."

Today, investigators know from various statements that the three neo-Nazis found a hideout in Chemnitz at the very beginning of their time underground, in the apartment of an individual identified as Max-Florian B. There, Zschäpe, Böhnhardt and Mundlos spent their first few months in hiding. Mandy Struck, B.'s girlfriend at the time, had put them in touch with B. There are photographs that were in Struck's possession which show her and Beate Zschäpe holding up a banner together while protesting against an exhibition about the crimes of the Wehrmacht, Germany's Nazi-era military.

TV Appeal to the Public

A meeting was held in Chemnitz on April 26, 2000, attended by intelligence officials from the state branches of the intelligence agency in Thuringia and Saxony as well as Saxony's State Office of Criminal Investigation. The meeting was called to discuss a new operation called "Terzett" ("Trio"), specifically because new information had turned up. Officials had learned that a Saxony-based right-wing extremist had reportedly said on the sidelines of an NPD training event that things were going well for "the three" and that Jan. W., who had already been mentioned by the informer in Brandenburg, had allegedly been "responsible for taking care of the logistics of supply trips for the trio."

During the meeting, police and intelligence officials hammered out a new strategy. They set their sights on four suspected supporters who they wanted to frighten with an appeal to the general public. The plan was to have MDR, the regional German public broadcasting network, show a "wanted" announcement during an episode of "Kripo Live," a television show that asks the public for help in solving crimes, on May 7. The officials wanted to see whether, in reaction to the show, the suspects would lead them to the hideout of the fugitives who had gone underground.

The surveillance operation began on May 6, 2000. A photograph from this day shows Mandy Struck with her then-boyfriend Max-Florian B. -- whom officials initially misidentified as Uwe Mundlos -- pushing a shopping cart to their car. And there are also those shots showing a man resembling Böhnhardt outside the house in Bernhardstrasse in Chemnitz, which was listed as Struck's official residence.

The intelligence agents from Thuringia, who were conducting the surveillance, had their doubts about the identification. They eventually asked their colleagues from Thuringia's State Office of Criminal Investigation (LKA) for help -- but they only did so on May 15, 2000, or nine days after the sighting. The LKA, in turn, asked the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) for help. The BKA responded by saying it was highly likely that it was Böhnhardt in the photograph. But the answer got lost somewhere in the official channels and never found its way to the intelligence agency officials, thereby costing valuable time.

It was only on July 7 that the Thuringian officials brought the photograph that supposedly showed Böhnhardt to the attention of their counterparts in Saxony. The agency in Saxony reacted by placing Struck's boyfriend under observation for three days, without success. In this way, Operation Trio petered out without any consequences.

Too Expensive

There are now serious doubts about whether it really was Böhnhardt in the first picture. In retrospect, however, it really doesn't matter if it was or not, because the surveillance operation led officials in any case to the correct address, Bernhardstrasse 11. And investigators say that Böhnhardt really did turn up there.

In that summer of 2000, the neo-Nazis are believed to have made preparations for their first murder. On Sept. 9 of that year, they allegedly shot the florist Enver Simsek in broad daylight on an arterial road in Nuremberg.

Böhnhardt and Mundlos are believed to have driven to Bavaria several times to case the location. And they managed to do so even though officials had friends of the trio, and individuals who helped them find places to stay, under observation at the time -- as well as the fugitives themselves on at least one occasion.

Three weeks after the murder in Nuremberg, officials were back on the lookout on Bernhardstrasse in Chemnitz. They had been tipped off that Böhnhardt might attend the birthday party of Struck's boyfriend at either his or her house on Oct. 1.

Intelligence agents took up position in a house across the street. On Sept 29, 2000, the officers set up a video camera in their clandestine apartment. They turned the camera on, but then left, believing it wasn't necessary to be there in person. Under the circumstances, the reasoning went, the staffing costs needed for round-the-clock monitoring could not be justified.

On that same day, two figures appeared at the front door across the street for roughly three seconds. Investigators assume they were Böhnhardt and Zschäpe. Today, Mandy Struck says that she was only in contact with the trio until the summer of 1998, she did not aid terrorists and that she had nothing to do with the series of murders the trio allegedly committed.

'Law Enforcement Officials Have Systematically Failed'

The series of slip-ups that has now been presented will also fuel the debate regarding the consequences of the state's failures. In the German parliament, the Bundestag, the opposition Green Party and far-left Left Party have called for the establishment of a parliamentary committee to investigate the affair.

But Germany's federal structure makes things complicated. The most serious mistakes were made in Thuringia and Saxony. To do its job properly, a central investigative committee in the Bundestag would need these states to open up their files, but so far they have not agreed to do so. The federal structure of Germany's law enforcement agencies has become a problem again -- just as it did during the manhunt over a decade ago.

"Law enforcement officials have systematically failed," says Thomas Oppermann, a senior member of the opposition center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). "What we need is a fundamental change in how things are done." Oppermann has proposed an "intelligent combination" of a Bundestag committee and a commission made of representatives from the federal and state levels, which the SPD expects would result in a comprehensive overhaul of the current system. Oppermann talks of a "purifying effect."

Once the facts have been established, the important thing will be to take relevant action. Indeed, the Interior Ministers' Conference, which includes officials from the state and federal level, has already made two important decisions. To tackle communication problems within the Office for the Protection of Constitution, which has both a national agency and 16 state-level branches, the national agency will take over the coordination of similar cases in the future. Similarly, a new joint center to combat right-wing extremism has been set up to aid cooperation between the intelligence agencies and the police.

'Failed Completely'

In their flight from justice, the neo-Nazi terrorists benefited from the disastrous condition of the authorities, particularly those in Thuringia. In June 2000, Helmut Roewer, the head of the intelligence agency's state branch in Erfurt, was suspended for a range of irregularities. A 2001 report that remains confidential found that the operational capability of certain sections of the state-level agency had "failed completely" on his watch.

In the wake of Roewer's departure, Tino Brandt, aka "Otto," stopped being used as a source. After 2001, according to the national agency's investigative report, "no information on the whereabouts, activities or contacts of the three fugitives" was passed on to the organization. "Owing to the lack of relevant information, there were no starting points for further investigations," it wrote. As a result, the neo-Nazis could continue their alleged murder spree unmolested for an entire decade.

Brandt supplied one final report. It shows that officials already had clear indications in 2001 that the trio wasn't just on the run but was also planning new crimes. In April 2001, Brandt reported that Wohlleben had declined a cash donation, saying that, "according to his information," the trio didn't need any more money because they "had already done so many things/operations." The statement is potentially highly incriminating for Wohlleben, who is currently in custody. He apparently knew about the criminal activities of the fugitives by 2001 at the latest. "My client declines to comment on the accusations," says Wohlleben's lawyer.

According to Brandt, Wohlleben provided one more detail in April 2001. He allegedly said that the trio had no more contact to their parents, after a far-right activist had given them the message that the three neo-Nazis would "rather shoot themselves than surrender."

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• Part 1: How Neo-Nazi Terror Cell Gave Authorities the Slip
• Part 2: Money to Buy Passports
• Part 3: Investigation Ran Into the Sand