The End of East: West German Secret Service Opens GDR Files

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The BND was able to wiretap telephone conversations with its dense network of radio reconnaissance stations along the inter-German border. The agents called this information, which also included reports to party headquarters from the SED's county administrations, "bug material." In May of 1989, the BND reported "deep-seated unease" within the base and "a lack of orientation and loss of confidence in the leadership." In the waning days of the GDR, the agency noted that there was "mistrust and resignation, not just among ordinary party members, but also among officials in the base, county and district organizations."

Nevertheless, for a long time the BND doubted that the SED leadership would give up power voluntarily. It was not until Nov. 3, at a time when hundreds of thousands of East Germans had already taken to the streets, that the BND's chief analyst for East Germany, whose code name was "Schönbeck," reported that the SED would "possibly have to relinquish its monopoly on power," which it was still "tenaciously defending."

Just how widely the quality of the BND's sources varied became clear at the moment when the second German nation literally imploded. The analysts in Pullach were already well-informed about the National People's Army, based on information that was being leaked to the West from the East German Central Committee, as well as its foreign and interior ministries. But the BND agents still hadn't gained access to the inner circle of the politburo -- about a dozen senior officials -- where the real decisions were made.

Of course, this didn't stop the intelligence service from merrily reporting details about the SED leadership. Some of the information was true, and some wasn't. This probably had something to do with the fact that the Stasi had likely turned around almost all informants, as the BND admits today.

Turbulent Times

In this conflicting situation, differentiating between truth and disinformation was a tricky undertaking. In July, for example, Honecker was forced to leave the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Bucharest early. According to the BND, the 76-year-old had suffered a "harmless attack," and he was treated on the spot. The analysts concluded that the politically isolated SED chairman had not returned home for health reasons, but to "get away from the unpleasant mood at the summit."

But Honecker was in fact seriously ill and had to undergo gall bladder surgery. And the BND's performance still didn't improve. In August, Wieck wrote in his report to Bonn that Honecker had pancreatic cancer, and incurable and highly malignant disease. If that had been true, Honecker would probably not have survived 1989.

They were turbulent times, both in East Germany and among the agents and analysts in Pullach. Honecker had hardly returned to the politburo in late September before Wieck reported that there was "information from a competent source" to suggest that the SED General Secretary was about to introduce reforms in the GDR. Gorbachev, according to Wieck, had pressured Honecker. By then Ulrich Schwarz, the SPIEGEL correspondent in East Berlin at the time, had already written that "the political days of Erich Honecker are numbered."

Two weeks later, the BND was back in touch with actual developments on the other side of the Wall. The agency wrote that it expected to see "staffing consequences at the top of the SED, in which Honecker may be included."

Honecker Steps Down

In fact, on the very next day, Oct. 17, members of the politburo asked the aging and senile Honecker to resign. That same evening Honecker, a native of the western Saarland region, cleared his desk.

The BND leadership learned of the development through an intercepted telephone call the next morning between two senior SED officials: The wife -- referred to as "A" by the BND analyst -- was in East Berlin and knew what had happened, while the husband ("B") was in the northern port city of Rostock and only gradually comprehended the situation.

The Central Committee still had to approve of Honecker's removal from power that afternoon, and the wife was concerned:

"A: You probably haven't heard yet. However, I don't want to put it in so many words on the telephone. Just as a pricaution (sic!), one might set aside a bottle of champagne or wine for this evening. (Speaks cautiously and knowingly, choosing her words carefully)

B: Aha

A: There will be something to celebrate.

B: Okay.

A: Everything's new.

B: Good. We are anxiously awaiting things here. But we're also somewhat tentative, of course.

A: Exactly, and that's why. I think that you will -- okay, absolutely and try during the day, really everything, and it's very serious.

B: I heard about it early this morning. There was that thing yesterday with the students in ...

A: No, no. I mean really everything and very serious. (Speaks slowly, emphatically, sounds believable)

B: Good.

A: Okay, I'm going to spell the word leadership. L - E - A - D - E - R - S - H - I - P.

B: Okay, darling.

A: Goosebumps. Let's hope it goes well.

B: Yes. (...)

A: Sweetheart, because you suffered so much because of it, so I thought I should let you know right away.

B: Okay, honey.

The documentation of a change of government in a dictatorship. That evening, A and B were able to pop the corks and drink their champagne. The Honecker era had come to an end.

His successor was a man named Egon Krenz, Honecker's crown prince for years. The BND had also consistently speculated that Krenz, who was seen as "flexible and pragmatic," was one of the leading contenders to replace the SED General Secretary. But was there any significance to the appointment, when more and more people were taking to the streets every day, demanding an end to the SED dictatorship?

The BND did not release its dossier on Krenz. Only one detail can be deduced from the documents now available in the national archive, and what the document says is true, it does not shed a favorable light on Krenz. After the death of his mother in 1975, he is believed to have personally seen to it that the entry permit for his half-sister, who lived in West Germany, was delayed so that she could not attend the funeral in East Germany. Krenz denies the accusation, saying that it is based on "misinformation." He claims that he had no contact with his West German relatives since 1957, and that he had not known whether "they even wanted to come to the funeral."

Politically speaking, Krenz came off surprisingly well at the BND. "We had pinned our hopes on him, to a certain extent," says Gandersheim. The BND had long believed that it was to Krenz's credit that the police, factory militias, the Stasi and the East German army did not shoot into the crowd during the massive demonstration in Leipzig on Oct. 9. But the truth is that Honecker's successor had nothing to do with it.

The Border Guards Give In

The BND also attributed the opening of the Berlin Wall on Nov. 9 to the new SED General Secretary. In truth, however, the party leadership had planned something entirely different from the festive chaos on that night of nights. After a transition period, East Germans would be permitted to travel to the West as part of an orderly process. It was to be an act of mercy, granted from above, complete with permits issued by the police and, of course, the option of denying such permits at any time.

But in his legendary press conference on the evening of Nov. 9, politburo member Günter Schabowski conveyed the impression that East Germans could cross over to the West immediately. Thousands of East Berliners promptly gathered in front of the border crossings and loudly demanded that they be opened. Without any instructions to the contrary, the bewildered border guards finally gave in.

On Nov. 10, 1989, the BND wrote in its report to Bonn: "To reduce the flow of refugees, the SED surprisingly opened its western borders on the evening of Nov. 9, which prompted large numbers of Germans to pay a visit to the respective other part of Germany. ... This downright sensational measure can be seen as Krenz's most radical step to date, which he using in an attempt to gain the trust of the population."

None of those in charge at the BND at the time can claim today that the agency was in top form in those days surrounding Nov. 9.

When the Wall came down, Kohl and Genscher were in Warsaw on an official visit -- and completely in the dark. BND President Wieck was in Washington on official business. He heard about the opening of the Wall from the television set in his hotel room.

Wieck called Pullach immediately, where a few experts on East Germany were also gathered in front of the TV. They told Wieck: "We too were taken by surprise."

That report was true. Undoubtedly.

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• Part 1: West German Secret Service Opens GDR Files
• Part 2: Did Informants Just Give BND What it Wanted to Hear?
• Part 3: The Truth about the Fall of the Berlin Wall