President Bush has waged war twice within 17 months. When he had the Taliban regime eliminated, the principal objective was the hunt for terrorist leader Osama bin Laden. At the same time, the strategic advantage to installing military bases across Central Asia could certainly not be overlooked. As in the Middle East, America's imperial ambitions in this corner of the world clearly go hand-in-hand with gaining a wealth of new oil resources.
As the Bush White House began to list more and more reasons for waging the most recent Gulf War, the world outside America was already filled with suspicion as to what his true motives could be. Although one objective is certainly to topple a dictatorship, a broader goal is to use Iraq as a launching pad for changing the status quo in the Middle East. Although weapons of mass destruction are certainly an issue, a greater issue is to set an example for other regimes in the neighborhood. And while oil is a factor, the true objective is to exhibit a show of force in this rich, stagnating, blood-soaked region.
The world order Bush has in mind is based on the unfettered freedom of a superpower that treats war as a conventional political tool and prefers solo performances over any alliances. But is this the way to create more peace?
Until recently, the United States defined itself as a "superpower," a rather abstract term for an unquestionable superiority that extends beyond military might to include economic and cultural power. A superpower is an imperial power in the making. It has the potential to exercise its supremacy and to redefine its spheres of interest, but it does not necessarily take advantage of this potential.
However, Bush's America possesses a pronounced urge for hegemony. It has a missionary zeal that calls for spreading its ideas of order, good behavior and democracy to even the most explosive regions of the world, such as the Middle East -- and it harbors a conviction that peace can be achieved through war.
Call it hegemony, spheres of interest or imperialism. Such terms were once used as expressions of the greatest possible contempt, particularly in the United States. They were reserved for the other, now-faded, superpower: the Soviet Union that built the Berlin Wall in 1961, sent tanks to Prague in 1968 and expanded its sphere of influence to other continents, such as Africa. But America always wanted to lead in the realm of the good, the free West, and to foster democracies on all continents -- until it reached a point in the Vietnamese jungle where its moral credibility began to disintegrate.
With the ignoble collapse of the Soviet empire, the age of imperialism was supposed to have been relegated to the past. After all, a few other relics of glorious powers from the past are still in evidence today: Great Britain is currently seeking to regain the prominence it lost long ago by declaring its unqualified solidarity with the United States; France is a textbook study in the phantom pains a country experiences when only fragments of its erstwhile colonial splendor remain.
It is no coincidence that Bush is currently being compared with another president of a similar persuasion who has been permanently underestimated: Harry S. Truman. He created the underpinnings of the UN and NATO, and was responsible for rebuilding and integrating Japan and Germany into the Western world. Effectively, he was the architect of US influence in the post-war era.
And now that mentality has returned. The speeches that Condoleezza Rice and George W. Bush are giving today resound with echoes of the post-war years. What happened then in Europe and Asia is now being reenacted in the Middle East. It, too, is to become a stage for democracy, and a heretofore isolated region of the world is to move closer to the West. Does this spell visa-free travel from Baghdad to Berlin?
But there is a decisive difference between Truman and Bush. Bush questions every aspect of the institutions, alliances and treaties that have survived from the former world order. It seems that the internationalism of classic US foreign policy is being replaced by a rabid unilateralism. This approach could be effective in building an empire, but certainly not a world comprised of allies that expect to be taken seriously. In Washington, the phrase "a new empire" has long since lost its derogatory ring.
In contrast, Helmut Schmid, a dedicated atlanticist, wrote in the weekly German newspaper Die Zeit: "The nationalist-egocentric influence of imperially-minded intellectuals on the strategy of the United States is currently greater than it has been since the end of the World War II."
America is no longer pushing for coalitions and alliances -- Washington is demanding allegiance. This claim is now so all-encompassing and pompous that American intellectuals have already complained that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld no longer speaks in prose, but instead proclaims his views on the state of the world in full lyrical verse: a modern-day Nero reciting poetry to the world.
Under Bush, the administration views as amoral the former national purpose of maintaining stability, once touted as the premier objective of US foreign policy by such statesmen as Henry Kissinger. Now destroying the status quo is seen as a necessity. According to the logic of Washington's would-be renovators of the world, any outcome of this policy, whatever it may be, will represent a moral step forward.
Of course, the old master of realpolitik is no friend of such adventures. Last Monday, Henry Kissinger, who is generally reluctant to criticize the White House, published a cool summary of US foreign policy since 9/11: "The initial solidarity, based on America as a victim, weakened when the US gave the challenge a military cast by declaring war on terrorism. And it disappeared with the elaboration of a strategy of pre-emption.."
It goes without saying that Kissinger would prefer the restoration of beleaguered alliances over any form of triumphant unilateralism: "A continuation of these trends would involve the progressive erosion of the Atlantic alliance, which has been the centrepiece of American foreign policy for half a century."
Distracted by the 'New Economy'
A major shift is looming, one not unlike that which enveloped Europe after the discovery of the New World. At that time, Columbus may have represented the first American to many Europeans. He agreed whole-heartedly with his critics, who claimed that discovering the New World was quite easy -- as easy as balancing an egg on a sharp object. Legend has it that when no one was able to accomplish this feat, he said: "One simply has to know how to do it," and dropped the egg onto a table with such force that it remained in place. The fact that it was also cracked disturbed neither America's discoverer nor today's architects of a new world order.
There have rarely been such crass contrasts between foreign policy goals on either side of the Atlantic, and it has rarely been so clear that the differences are based on the experiences of different generations. On the one side, there are the traditionalists, veterans from earlier administrations, including Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, but also the current secretary of state, Colin Powell. On the other side are the neo-conservative revolutionaries led by the president. The fact that this rift even passes through the Bush family, between the father and his eldest son, lends a special note to the controversy.
When the Berlin Wall fell and the communist empire imploded, George Herbert Walker Bush, an aloof, unimaginative but experienced president, was in the White House. Unlike François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, he felt confident that things would take their course. In particular, he had confidence in Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl. His essential condition was that the unified Germany remain a member of NATO. Due to a lack of imagination, this Bush America did not draw any consequences from the monopoly of power it had unexpectedly gained as a result of the demise of its ideological opponent. Everything remained essentially as it had been.
When Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait, the United States, as a matter of course, formed a coalition with as many partners as possible, obtained the approval of the UN Security Council, and entered into a limited war: no regime change, no change in the status quo, no hegemonic ambitions, and no imperial objectives.
The junior Bush, whose political career had just suffered a blow after he had lost an election, was then a frequent visitor to the White House. He was still considered one of his father's most important advisors.
At that time, his radical aspirations to establish a global power were being cultivated elsewhere. In 1991, the Secretary of Defense, whose name happened to be Dick Cheney, instructed two of his most gifted strategists, whose names happened to be Paul Wolfowitz and Colin Powell, to describe the political consequences to be drawn from the end of the Cold War. A decade later, each of those men is part of an administration that derives its guiding foreign policy principles from those ideas of their collective past. In one case, these ideas have even taken on the poetic title of "Cheney's Song of America."
Powell's ideas were moderate and pragmatic. In his view, the United States was the only remaining power promoting order in the world, and it was to prepare itself for poorly controlled regional conflicts and unpredictable surprises. His belief was that America must maintain its monopoly as a single global power and, to do so, should strengthen such traditional alliances as NATO.
For the most part, Democrat Bill Clinton heeded such recommendations. He embarked on his presidency with neither substantial experience nor a particular interest in foreign policy. In Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999, he only intervened after considerable delay, and took pains to prevent his soldiers from being exposed to any risks. Clinton did not deploy any ground troops, only the air force. To achieve his goals, he involved the UN in one conflict and NATO in the other.
Wars were not popular in the America of the 1990s. The country was experiencing a boom that had lasted longer than ever before, and it was self-involved and intoxicated with the New Economy. Turbo-capitalism, which promised rapid growth, was more important than a unipolar moment in global politics. In the light of this collective mood, even Osama bin Laden's first attacks only generating fleeting attention. When Clinton launched a barrage of cruise missiles against supposed Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan, he was acting in concert with the nation.
At the time, Wolfowitz's more radical version of "Cheney's Song of America" was making the rounds of the neo-conservatives, who were spending their time in exile from the administration working in think tanks not far from the White House. Wolfowitz also considered the fall of the socialist half of the world to be of fundamental importance. But his concept of a world order was filled with pessimism. At times, the United States came across as the good guy among many evildoers, and at times as a Gulliver fettered by treacherous Lilliputians.
The principal theme in his global plan was unilateralism, because, as Wolfowitz believes, treaties and institutions represent nothing but obstacles to a monopolistic global power's ability to act. The key purpose of today's military superiority is to intimidate potential competitors of tomorrow, be they China or the European Union.
The basic constellation in this neo-conservative manifesto was still that of the Cold War, but with an empty slot created by the fall of the "Evil Empire." This gap was only closed after September 11th. Communism was replaced by terrorism, and the Bush administration declared war on it.
Today, Wolfowitz is the most influential neo-conservative intellectual with a position in the administration. President Bush has gradually taken on his basic ideas. The right to wage preemptive war and the need for unilateral action, presented for the first time in a speech at the military academy at West Point, were incorporated into what has long since become known as the Bush Doctrine.
Even before the war in Iraq, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice made it clear that this represented a turning point in the decade following the collapse of the Soviet empire: "It is now possible, and even likely, that this transitional period is coming to an end. If this is indeed the case, we are not just living in a time of serious danger, but also one of tremendous opportunities."
Bush knew how to take advantage of this. University of California political scientist Chalmers Johnson blames Washington's political elite for his contention that the "irreplaceable nation," as the Americans like to call themselves, are attempting to assume "the role of an ersatz Rome," and that America has become "arrogant, overbearing and self-confident." sixty-five major military bases around the globe help guarantee the superpower's global dominance.
But history teaches us that sooner or later global powers reach critical stages, particularly when they become imperially overextended. The Roman Empire began to break apart during a period when the Romans simultaneously had to control the Teutons, the Persians and other barbarians. Ultimately, the Habsburg Empire also failed because it overestimated and overextended itself.
In the 19th century, only the British Empire was aware of the limits of its power. London's mission to civilize its colonies was based on its proud notions of "Rule Britannia," or, as Rudyard Kipling said, "the white man's burden." But the British were satisfied to exploit their colonies, and were clever enough not to attempt to control the entire world.
The United States, however, in the assessment of British historian Eric Hobsbawm, "wants global dominance." Hobsbawm believes that the Americans could prevail in any war today, "except against China," but also believes that Washington runs the risk of destroying itself: "The occupational disease of a superpower is its megalomania."
Selling Democracy by Force
For French historian Emmanuel Todd, whose obituary of US superiority is at the top of European bestseller lists, Bush's America is no longer a benevolent hegemony, but a colossus on the verge of tipping over. In his opinion, the United States conjures up such insignificant enemies as Iraq "because it will do anything in its power to create the impression that it is the center of the world." This, Todd believes, creates fear, and fear creates diplomatic and political opposition, such as that faced by the US during the debates on Iraq in the UN Security Council.
Todd predicts that the masters of the world will come into great difficulty as a consequence of the war in Iraq. The decline of the United States as the sole superpower will accelerate and, according to this optimistic Frenchman, an emancipated Europe will emerge as a counterweight: "America's might will be broken."
The fact that the Lilliputians of this world, for fear of the new Gulliver, the United States, are also looking for new support has rarely become more apparent than in their reactions to America's military campaign in Iraq. People throughout the region are embittered by the prospect of an "American caliph" being put in charge on the banks of the Tigris.
It is for this reason that the focus of discussion in what has become a cynical Middle East is not on prospects for peace, but rather on how states in the region can avert further military action by the new crusaders from the United States. In Tehran, where the government issued official proclamations of its sympathy for America in the wake of the attacks of 9/11, Washington's policies have for the first time led to a closing of the ranks between the reformers surrounding President Mohammed Khatami and religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's hardline supporters.
In spite of official denials, there is considerable evidence that Tehran is continuing its efforts to build a nuclear bomb. The prevailing belief there, as in the presumed nuclear power North Korea, is that this represents the only guarantee against US attack. Incidentally, it is only now, after having been included, together with Iraq, in US President Bush's "Axis of Evil," that these two states have banded together. According to intelligence sources, Pyongyang is helping the Iranians in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons.
At the same time, Teheran is also attempting to further expand its strong ties with Russia, particularly in the military arena. Iran has intensified its dealings with nuclear power Pakistan (which is in turn involved in a highly explosive conflict with India) and, after years of cool relations, has renewed ties with Saudi Arabia.
Even the Saudi princes are concerned about US plans to restructure the region, since they are fully aware that they are the prime targets of such intentions. The US administration has distanced itself from Riyadh ever since it became known that 15 of the 19 terrorists of 9/11 were from Saudi Arabia, and that the Saudi royal family protected itself from attacks for years by funding terrorists. Access to Iraqi oil reserves will enable the United States to become more independent from Saudi Arabian resources in the long term, and will increase Washington's ability to exert pressure.
For this reason, ruling crown prince Abdullah, a cautious reformer, dispatched a secret delegation to Moscow to negotiate a military assistance pact. Two weeks ago, Abdullah also paid a visit to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, which resulted in the two leaders proclaiming "a common Arab initiative to protect Iraq from foreign control at all levels."
A new orientation is also emerging in Moscow. At one time, Russian President Vladimir Putin may have dreamed of Russia's return to superpower status while under the protection of a strategic partnership with the United States. But now the man in charge at the Kremlin is increasingly turning his attention to Europe. It was certainly no coincidence that he chose to meet with like-minded allies Schröder and Chirac last Friday in the expensively restored "Europa" Hotel on Nevski Prospect in St. Petersburg.
Using rather old-fashioned diction, Putin referred to the US administration's strategy as "exportation of the capitalist-democratic revolution," claiming that it would provoke "an endless series of military conflicts" and therefore create a "very dangerous situation." At the same time his defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, assured rogue nation North Korea that Russia is prepared to guarantee its "independence and territorial integrity."
But instead of relying on what may ultimately prove to be unreliable allies, the Muscovites are focusing again on their own military power. Following the outbreak of the Gulf War, Ivanov recalled the words of Czar Alexander III who, at the end of the 19th century, concluded that Russia had only "two friends in the world: the army and the navy."
The Chinese leadership is also alarmed over America's show of force in the Gulf. It was already concerned after the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, as the United States has since gained a foothold in Central Asia and, in doing so, has fanned the flames of China's fear of encirclement. In the opinion of the Chinese, by invading Iraq Washington has finally demonstrated that it is pursuing a "hegemonic strategy," and that it is prepared to disregard international law and ignore the UN.
As a veto power on the Security Council, the Chinese have thus preserved their claim to international influence. The communist party newspaper the Peoples' Daily complained that "it looks as though the 21st century will remain an era of the politics of power."
For the Chinese, the new situation bears both political and economic risks. By gaining influence over the world's largest oil reserves, America could keep its potential strategic rival China "on the ground," forecasts Su Jingxiang of the Beijing Research Institute for Modern International Relations. Experts estimate that by 2030 the Chinese will be forced to cover 84 percent of their oil needs through imports.
But the Middle Kingdom cannot afford a confrontation with the Americans, since the Peoples' Republic is still a long way from attaining the status of a rival to be taken seriously. Without US intervention, Beijing would have trouble funding its reforms, and without exports of electronics and textile to the United States, it would be impossible to feed China's millions of workers and farmers.
Of course, Beijing also expects something from the Americans in return for its temporary good behavior, such as US restraint with respect to China's conflict with Taiwan. Beijing also hopes to gain contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq. Most of all, party functionaries are hoping for a contract for the use of oil wells, thereby securing their country's energy needs. "We wish," declared diplomat Wu Chunhua, "to participate enthusiastically in the reconstruction of Iraq."
America's Quest for Unilateral Security
Nonetheless, old Europe has thus far voiced the greatest opposition to the Americans' new world order. French President Jacques Chirac, in particular, repeatedly chants his mantra of political beliefs: International stability, security and peace can only be guaranteed in a multipolar world, since the dominance of a single power, however well-intentioned, will inevitably trigger resistance against it by the rest of the world. French diplomats believe, however, that the United States under Bush is acting on one principle: unilateral security, which means insecurity for everyone else.
In late March, Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin gave a policy speech before the London Institute for Strategic Studies. The speech was conceived as a political and philosophical counterproposal to US neo-conservative theories, a deliberate "confrontation of two world views."
A hegemonic system, explained Villepin, will always be perceived as unjust. If, according to Villepin, the power systematically appears to prevail while disregarding the rule of law, and if the views of the people are not taken into account, the forces of chaos will be strengthened, anti-Western ideologies will blossom, and the war of cultures will ultimately become reality.
In the face of the American challenge, the Europeans even demonstrated a willingness to compromise on the issue of upcoming EU reforms at the special summit in Athens. Should the bloc, in response to external pressures, succeed in its efforts to stabilize as a political union -- and Fischer, upon taking office at the end of next year as Europe's first foreign minister, might even be prepared to contribute to such a goal -- emancipation from the dominant power, the United States, would almost inevitably lead to alienation. After all, Washington is already treating Europe, its former protectorate, as a troublesome competitor.
For some time, the US has been trying to create friction among European countries. Nevertheless, the Bush administration cannot depend on the permanent loyalty of the EU's Eastern European newcomers. "They will conform and will not repeat certain mistakes," assures Expansion Commissioner Günter Verheugen, concluding with a threat: "After all, they know where their markets are and where their money will be coming from in the near future."
The United States has also long since lost its attraction to NATO, the trans-Atlantic security alliance. The superpower is not pleased by the fact that its decisions must be approved by an organization soon to comprise 25 member states, as the principle of consensus still prevails within NATO. Why should the United States, as more and more US politicians are asking, wish to remain a force in Europe when the European states that were once Warsaw Pact members now enjoy freedom and a higher standard of living within the enlarged EU?
In Brussels, concerns are now being raised that the Bush administration could also acquire a taste for economic application of those unilateral practices which -- in its opinion -- it so successfully applied in the realms of foreign policy and military action in Iraq. American Jeffrey Garten, Dean of the Yale School of Management, suspects that in the future his president will be less likely to view trade and international financial policy as a means of creating prosperity throughout the world, but rather as "instruments of an even bolder foreign policy," a policy that will especially impact the rebellious Europeans.
In fact, last week in Brussels a high-ranking diplomat from Washington made no secret of this intention. He made it clear to his European counterparts that the politics of the strong dollar have become a relic of the past, and that the United States would make a concerted effort to manipulate the dollar exchange rate in a downward direction. The intended consequence is that European exporters would lose market share in the United States as the exchange rate would bring up the cost of their products, while US corporations would improve their positions in Europe. With this approach, the Americans will reduce their large trade budget deficit, which has grown to about five percent of the US gross national product. And it was certainly not without some derision that the emissary from the Potomac told his anti-war partners: "This will be Europe's invisible contribution to our Iraq costs."
Even government economies are slowly beginning to fear the gap between America's expenditures and its income, which has been bridged with Asian and European funds. Financing structures are rapidly deteriorating, while the proportion of debt attributable to short-term debt is growing.
Foreign Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and his colleague Chris Patten, who is in charge of the Commission's foreign policy, are already concerned that Washington may continue to insist on international treaties to guarantee free world trade. Even before the war in Iraq, Bush was outraged that an international court of arbitration in Geneva had declared that the protective tariffs for US steel manufacturers and subsidies for US exporters are illegal. Now he would be in position to put a stop to further liberalization of global trade. In fact, the Europeans have even provided him with an argument for a US shift to greater protectionism: They themselves absolutely refuse to give up their own farm subsidies.
To counteract possible barriers to trade, Lamy and Patten placed an ad in the International Herald Tribune calling for trans-Atlantic cooperation, and have voiced their support of common transatlantic interests. In a foreboding tone, the ad states that both sides have the "responsibility of guaranteeing international leadership." After all, according to the ad, it was not too long ago that today's dominant power, the United States, "emerged from the ribs of Europe."
Ultimately, the Europeans will only be taken seriously in Washington if they are able to unify and run a common European thread within their domestic foreign policies. This will be the principal task faced by the new European foreign minister, whose position was approved by the heads of state meeting in Athens. He is to be a member of the EU Commission and at the same time serve as the permanent chair of the council of EU foreign ministers. Moreover, if he introduces a foreign policy initiative together with the Commission, it will no longer be possible for a single member state to block such decisions with its veto. From now on, the majority rule will also apply in foreign policy. But without a respectable military power that can protect European interests worldwide, such a foreign policy will not prevail.
In any event, says Fischer, the Europeans have an opportunity to come closer together. "The shock of the Iraq War," says the foreign minister, can "also present an opportunity."
Whether America will immediately plunge itself into new adventures has not yet been decided. Initial demonstrations against the conquerors of Baghdad suggest that it could take some time before Saddam's defeated realm receives a constitution that can serve as a model to its neighbors.
In addition, there is an unwritten rule that American presidents should not wage war during the year preceding their reelection. Does this also apply to Bush? He is constantly confronted with the fate of his father, whose popularity melted away as soon as the more mundane problems of the economy and the trade deficit caught up with him. As a wartime president, Bush Junior is also at the peak of his popularity. Should he risk this standing in Washington's relentless political environment, or is a third war the alternative?
By Ralf Beste, Winfried Didzoleit, Hans Hoyng, Olaf Ihlau, Uwe Klussmann, Dirk Koch, Romain Leick, Andreas Lorenz and Gerhard Spörl.
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© DER SPIEGEL 17/2003
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