It's suddenly in the air, the U word that politicians don't like to use, because it is so limiting and comes with so many obligations: ultimatum.
According to information leaked last week by the British government, through newspapers such as The Guardian, if Iran does not abandon its efforts to produce weapons-grade nuclear material by November, Great Britain will join the United States in bringing the case before the UN Security Council. The foreign ministry in Paris has leaked similar statements. The Europeans' yearlong negotiations with the mullah regime are threatening to fall apart.
Even German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, known until now for an especially understanding position toward Tehran, has used uncharacteristically direct language to warn the leadership of the Islamic Republic against a "fatal miscalculation" and "dramatic deterioration" of the situation. Europe, according to Fischer, will no longer act as a "protective shield" if Tehran continues its uranium enrichment program.
London, Paris and Berlin are preparing for a possible escalation on the diplomatic front, while some Americans are thinking about a new war.
The neoconservative prophets who drove George W. Bush into the Iraq war are divided. Political science professor Francis Fukuyama, for example, has recognized the Baghdad campaign as a terrible mistake and is practicing mea culpa. Others are campaigning for a new adventure – in the direction of Iran. Norman Podhoretz, the most influential godfather of the neocons, claims that Tehran is building a nuclear weapon and must be called to account. In his view, a military response to the mullah state is now just a question of timing: "At this point, I would advise against attacking Iran, although I wouldn't be upset if that were to happen." When this will take place – next week, next month, next year – is left for the listener to decide.
Is there already a military "October surprise" in the works, as well-known columnist William Pfaff has suggested? What role could have been played by a spy allegedly brought into the Pentagon (the FBI suspects he was placed there by the Israelis)? Is the screenplay for the escalation being written in Washington, or mainly in Tel Aviv and Teheran, perhaps even, involuntarily, by the United Nations and its International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) in Vienna?
Israel is currently the only state in the Middle East that has nuclear weapons. According to international experts, the country became a nuclear power in 1967 and today has an estimated 100 to 200 deployable nuclear weapons. Politicians in Tel Aviv simply point to a principle that has applied for decades: not to be "the first to introduce" the weapon. The Israelis believe that it is crucial to the survival of the Jewish state that no other Middle Eastern country get its hands on this vastly destructive weapon. When Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, tried to produce material for nuclear weapons in 1981, Menachem Begin sent out bombers, in a highly secretive operation, reducing the Osirak reactor near Baghdad to rubble.
The dictator's continued efforts to build a nuclear weapon were brought to a halt in 1991 with the Gulf War and the IAEA inspectors. After Saddam was overthrown, the inspectors were able to identify and destroy all relevant facilities. Unlike the small laboratories used to make chemical or biological weapons, a complex nuclear program is difficult to hide. This is why the nuclear experts in Vienna were so taken aback when, two years ago, leading US politicians painted the disastrous picture of a "mushroom cloud over New York," in an effort to justify the war against Iraq.
Politicians in Israel felt vindicated by the campaign against Baghdad. After all, Saddam had repeatedly threatened the "Zionists." However, Israeli politicians have long believed that Iran is more dangerous. In recent months, Tel Aviv's accusations against Tehran have become increasingly pointed and warlike.
Meir Dagan, the head of the Israeli overseas intelligence service, the Mossad, calls Iran's nuclear program "the biggest threat to Israel since the nation was founded." Defense minister Schaul Mofas says that Israel will "under no circumstances tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian hands." His counterpart in Tehran, Ali Shamkhani, is no less belligerent. "We will not hesitate to launch a preventive attack against the Dimona nuclear reactor, to put a stop to a Zionist offensive."
A dangerous crisis is beginning to escalate, one that the leading EU countries have been trying to prevent, but with mixed results. In October 2003, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France and Germany, during a joint visit to Tehran, managed to convince the mullah regime to sign the supplementary protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (though it has yet to be ratified by the Iranian parliament), which would give the IAEA's inspectors more comprehensive access to nuclear facilities, even without advance notice.
But despite the Iranian leadership's repeated claims that it only intends to use nuclear power for the peaceful purpose of generating electricity, suspicions remain and irritations are even becoming more prevalent. The Iranians have, at times, barred the inspectors from entering the country, given incomplete responses to questions and concealed important details, and withdrawn from a nuclear agreement with the Europeans. Late last week, in response to pressure, they offered last-minute concessions – but only on paper, and only until they are revoked again.
In its most recent IAEA report, which will be presented this Monday and discussed by the council of governors, the UN agency criticizes Tehran's excuses – using diplomatic but clear language. One of the examples cited in the report is the centrifuge program that the Iranians had kept under wraps for so long. Another is the fact that some of the samples taken by inspectors are contaminated with highly enriched uranium. An especially problematic issue for the UN inspectors is the fact that Tehran has approved and, in recent months, begun testing the conversion of 37 tons of concentrated uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride, which, according to former UN inspector David Albright, can yield material "for about five basic nuclear weapons."
IAEA Director Mohammed al-Baradei has repeatedly stated that there is still no "smoking gun" to prove, without a doubt, that Tehran is pursuing a prohibited nuclear weapons program: "We are not God. We cannot read minds." The Egyptian is searching for a political solution. He wants to avoid Iran taking the North Korean approach and completely withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, thereby exempting itself from all international inspections.
In contrast, Undersecretary of State John Bolton, known as a hawk, is pushing for decisions: "The case should have been taken to the UN Security Council long ago. Iran's excuses are nothing but a farce. Tehran already burns off enough gas each year to produce the electricity that would be generated by four nuclear power plants." US Secretary of State Powell is also demanding economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic.
Even many of Baradei's neutral expects, who tend to be skeptical when it comes to US accusations, are convinced that the Iranian leadership is not investing billions because it cares about the country's energy supply. Would such efforts necessitate experimenting with plutonium, dealing on the black market, and lying to UN inspectors? Tehran had expressly promised the Europeans that it would discontinue all uranium enrichment activities. In early August, Khameni & Co. withdrew from this treaty and antagonized the negotiators from Paris, London and Berlin with fluoride production.
In closed meetings with IAEA inspectors, representatives of the Iranian government have apparently suggested that they should not be prohibited from activities permissible for "the great and the small Satan," the United States and Israel.
While the second highest-ranking judge of the Islamic Republic and chief thinker of the conservatives, Mohammad Larijani, openly spoke of the "Iranian right to nuclear weapons," President Mohammed Chatami only recently stated that his government guarantees that Iran does "not intend to become a nuclear power." The unique political structure of the theocracy makes it appear possible that the radicals could conceal a nuclear weapons program from Chatami. The president's liberal team represents more of an opposition movement within the state than a true government. The core of the Iranian constitution is the principle of Welajat-e-Fakih ("Dominance of the religious legal scholars"), which confers a great deal of power upon an aggressive council of theologians.
Trickery, camouflage and deception. Setting aside all ideological differences among those in power in Tehran, this seems to have been the undeclared motto of the Iranian nuclear program from the very beginning.
It was established by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, who came to power in 1953 following a CIA-backed coup and, in the 1970s, with help from Siemens, had a huge nuclear power plant built in the desert at Bushir, not far from the Persian Gulf. At the time, CIA agents assumed that the US ally on the peacock throne wasn't playing by the rules and was trying to build a nuclear warhead. Following the Shah's ouster and the triumphant takeover by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, things remained quiet on the nuclear front for many years. Religious fanatic Khomeini was too busy with his revolution and later with his war against Baghdad. The reactor at Bushir was heavily damaged in six Iraqi attacks.
After Khomeini's death and the enthronement of Ayatollah Khameni in 1989, Tehran entered into significant arms treaties with Moscow. In 1995, the Russians agreed to rebuild Bushir. Time and again, the CIA was fed more or less dubious reports that the ayatollahs were secretly attempting to buy material suitable for building a nuclear weapon on the black market in Russia or Kazakhstan. The accusations were never resolved.
Today, we know that Tehran did in fact purchase top-secret centrifuges and construction plans, but from a different source. According to new reports by the IAEA, Abdul Kadir Khan, Pakistan's "father of the nuclear weapon," was forced to admit, earlier this year, to his dealings on the black market, allegedly operating under his own steam.
At some point in the mid-90s, when the first shipments arrived in Tehran, and when the Mossad was receiving reports of completely new, secret nuclear weapons facilities, Lawrence "Larry" Franklin may have begun his mission. Franklin is the supposed secret agent all of Washington is talking about these days, the man whom the FBI, despite furious denials from Tel Aviv, suspects of having ferreted out secrets for Israel, one of the US' closest allies. A spy who came in from the heat, so to speak.
According to his colleagues, Franklin, a father of five, comes across as more of a bureaucrat, an unassuming analyst of Middle East politics, which is his official position at the Pentagon. However, Franklin also took on a few interesting overseas trips "on the side." After learning Farsi, Franklin was transferred from the Pentagon's Russia desk to its group of Iran specialists. In December 2001, he secretly met with Iranian businessman Manucher Ghorbanifar in Paris. Even since the infamous Iran Contra secret weapons deals of the 1980s, Ghorbanifar has been known in Washington for having especially strong contacts with Tehran's militant dissidents.
Whatever the Pentagon analyst and the Iranian weapons dealer may have discussed, in October 2001, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon sent a delegation to the United States, accompanied by the chief of the Israeli nuclear program, Gideon Frank. The Israelis had new evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, and urged Washington to take decisive action. At the time, however, Washington was militarily involved in Afghanistan, and the campaign against Iraq had already been decided in secret. The US administration turned down the Israeli request: Tehran was not its most pressing problem.
In August 2002, the opposition National Council of Resistance in Iran went to the press in Washington, providing it with detailed information on secret nuclear facilities that were not reported to the IAEA. Did this political arm of the People’s Mujahiddin, which the US government classifies as a terrorist organization, obtain its information from the Israelis?
The FBI is investigating whether Franklin planned to influence the US government's policies toward Iran in a direction favorable to Israeli interests by feeding classified strategy documents to the 65,000-member American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The pro-Israel lobbyists then allegedly passed on the documents to the Sharon government. AIPAC has denied the accusations. Franklin has not been officially charged yet.
The case remains a mystery. Israel has no need to go behind Washington's back. Never in history has a US president so unreservedly supported an Israeli prime minister as Bush supports his friend Sharon, even when it comes to such violations of international law as the construction of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. With Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, his undersecretary Douglas Feith, and political advisor Richard Perle, all of the Jewish faith, Tel Aviv's right wing presumably already has influential supporters in Washington. In a comment on US foreign policy, the Financial Times, which normally leans toward Bush, recently wrote that "The Israeli tail wags the American dog." But Sharon also mistrusts his friends and, according to his associates, is virtually obsessed with not missing "anything Iranian."
On May 6, the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution calling upon the White House to "take all appropriate steps to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons." If a similar resolution were also approved by the Senate, the administration would be authorized to stage a preventive attack against Tehran. It seems unlikely that a strike against Iranian nuclear sites will occur before the US elections in November. And if there is an attack, it will probably be executed by Israel – with Washington's tacit approval, because Israeli bombers would have to pass through Iraqi air space, which is controlled by US forces.
A study by the American Monterey Institute that describes the goals and possible consequences of a military strike is already making the rounds. According to the study, "300 Russian advisors" still work at Bushir – a risk factor. Experts expect that an attack would focus on the plants at Natan and Arak: "They are partially underground and protected by modern air defense systems." Because the Iranians could strike Israeli cities and further escalate the civil war in Iraq with their "Shahab-3" rockets (range: 1300 kilometers), the Monterey analysts warn against military action. Furthermore, they argue, it would only temporarily prevent the Iranians from building the bomb; Iran, according to the study, has large uranium deposits at Jasd and has the technical capabilities of rebuilding the bombed plants on its own.
If the planned centrifuge program becomes fully operational, the Islamic Republic could quickly become a nuclear power, warns Undersecretary Bolton. In their search for a peaceful solution to the crisis, the duped Europeans have now been joined by the US' opposition Democrats. Presidential candidate John Kerry wants to offer Tehran "a major deal." Under the Kerry plan, Iran would receive fuel for its reactors and be permitted to operate Bushir. To prevent fissile material from being diverted for a nuclear weapon, however, spent fuel rods would be removed from the country under international supervision.
It remains to be seen whether Tehran will agree to such an arrangement. Since Schröder and Chirac visited Sochi the week before last, the Russian president has also joined the Western alliance and wants to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power "at all costs." The current hope is that moderates within the Iranian power structure, who fear isolation, will prevail. Development in Iran is being hampered by high unemployment and a high birth rate. The world's fourth-largest oil exporting nation needs trade if it intends to improve living conditions among its citizens. Nevertheless, the country has increasingly adopted a clerical-conservative orientation in recent months.
The IAEA will present another Iran report in mid-November, when all parties involved will be much closer to a moment of decision. As DER SPIEGEL has learned from sources in the intelligence community, Tehran's leadership is considered a shift in strategy. Through concealed detours, it recently sent a high-ranking diplomat, a man who had previously worked at the Iranian mission to the IAEA in Vienna, to North Korea. An intensification of the arms trade between the two countries, already quite extensive, is being discussed. The Iranians are also interested in learning as much as they can about nuclear issues from Kim Jong Il.
Last year, after years of deception and maneuvering, Pyongyang chose the forward defense, withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and hinted at the existence of deployable warheads. Since then, North Korea has been treated like a de facto nuclear power, even though it has never shown or even tested a nuclear weapon.
ERICH FOLLATH, GEORG MASCOLO
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
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© DER SPIEGEL 38/2004
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