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The Kremlin Minutes

Diary of a Collapsing Superpower

By Christian Neef

Part 3

By this time, anyone who had the opportunity to pay an official visit to Moscow was eager to make the pilgrimage. During talks at the Kremlin negotiating table, with its trademark green tablecloth, the Germans flattered the new party leader, feeding him information, maneuvering and persevering. And everything that was said at these meetings was recorded and eventually found its way into an archive.

One of Gorbachev's visitors was Johannes Rau, the premier of the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, who planned to run for chancellor in Germany's 1987 elections. "If you visit us next year," he told the Russian leader, "I may be at a different address." Other visitors to the Kremlin included Lothar Späth, the premier of the state of Baden-Württemberg, Egon Bahr, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Martin Bangemann, the leader of the Free Democratic Party (FDP).

Hans-Jochen Vogel, the head of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), was especially adept at the game of flattery ("Thatcher made a point of telling me that there are only two men she likes outside Great Britain: Gorbachev and (former German Chancellor Helmut) Schmidt." Then Bavarian premier Franz Josef Strauss paid his respects in December 1987, when he told Gorbachev: "I was in the USSR once before, as an officer in the German army (under Hitler) -- in Lvov, Kharkov and Rostov."). Strauss and the Kremlin leader embarked on a lengthy conversation about Marxism and world revolution, and Strauss ended the meeting by inviting Gorbachev to visit him at home ("You will definitely like Bavaria -- it's a bit like Georgia or the region around Stavropol"). Gorbachev, who had a weakness for sharp-edged personalities, later described Strauss as a "very interesting conversation partner" and a "realist" -- the kind of praise he otherwise reserved for Margaret Thatcher.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl finally visited Moscow in October 1988. The icy relationship was beginning to thaw.

Kohl's appearance in Moscow was the beginning of the end for Honecker. For years, Gorbachev had noted with mistrust that the East German leader was pursuing his own policy toward the West and was trying to distance himself from the Russians in the process. In a report about reactions in Western Europe to the German chancellor's Moscow visit, Chernyayev made a point of warning Gorbachev against giving Honecker too much information about his policies toward Germany. "We pursue our policy, which is by no means identical to Honecker's." ( Click here for a related excerpt: "Why Commit Ourselves?")

Kohl was astute enough to take advantage of the growing differences between the Russians and the East Germans, repeatedly complaining about the stubborn East German leader and portraying himself as Gorbachev's true German counterpart. When the Soviet Communist Party leader visited Bonn in June 1989, Kohl told Gorbachev:

Honecker shows no interest whatsoever in any changes or reforms. You wouldn't believe the reaction we had here when the East German government banned the sale of the Soviet magazine Sputnik. Everyone was laughing. But I was less than amused. I can tell you quite frankly that we now understand Moscow far better and feel much closer to it than Berlin. But I will not do anything to destabilize the situation.

Two days later, Kohl said:

I say to you quite openly that Honecker leaves me no peace. His wife has just called upon the East German youth to defend the achievements of socialism against external enemies, with weapons in hand, if necessary. It is completely obvious that these external enemies are those socialist countries that are introducing reforms. Most of all, of course, Poland and Hungary.

Gorbachev, the great tactician, sidestepped Kohl's comments. By that time the fall of the Berlin Wall was less than five months away.

It was Oct. 5, 1989, a Thursday. Anatoly Chernyayev made an entry into his diary that day, and it too is stored in the archives, under Fund No. 2, Directory 2. In it, he writes:

M.S. (Gorbachev) is flying to East Germany tomorrow, for the country's 40th anniversary. He is completely indifferent. He has already called twice today to tell me that the text of his speech must be polished, down to the last letter. It will be scrutinized very closely. "I will not utter a single word of support for Honecker. I support the republic and the revolution." Twenty thousand people took to the streets in Dresden today, and just as many in Leipzig yesterday.

Gorbachev, reluctant as he was, made the trip to Berlin. Honecker, who had just recovered from a serious illness, greeted him at Berlin's Schönefeld Airport with a kiss on the cheek. But the state visit that followed was anything but ordinary, from a ghostly torchlight procession along the city's Unter den Linden boulevard to Gorbachev's meeting with Honecker at Niederschönhausen palace and the Russian-German dialogue before the members of the SED's politburo, made all the more difficult because of its odd disconnect from the realities of the day. Indeed, in a confidential conversation with Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti only a few days later, Gorbachev described the East Germans as "yesterday's politicians."

Gorbachev flew home, deeply troubled. Although no one could predict what would happen in East Germany, it was already clear that the Russians would be sucked in. But two days after Gorbachev's Berlin visit, it was clear to the Russians that German reunification was at the top of the agenda. On Oct. 9, Chernyayev wrote in his diary:

All of Europe is enthusiastic about M.S. in Berlin. And many are whispering to us: It's a good thing that the USSR, albeit discreetly, has voiced its opposition to a current "German reunification." (Gorbachev advisor) Sagladin has just traveled throughout France. He sent encoded telegrams back to Moscow. Everyone, from (French President Francois) Mitterand to the mayors, is saying: No one needs a unified Germany. In a conversation with M.S., Thatcher suddenly said: "Off the record, I am decidedly against a unified Germany. But I cannot state this at home or within NATO." In other words, they want us to be the ones to prevent it from happening.

By this point, Gorbachev no longer trusted his new friend Helmut Kohl, whom he suspected of attempting to force things to a head in East Germany without consulting the Russians. He sensed a concern in the West, especially among the Americans, "that the Soviet Union is becoming the godfather of German reunification," as Gorbachev complained to former chancellor Willy Brandt, the honorary chairman of Germany's Social Democrats, when Brandt visited Moscow a short time later. Brandt responded: "Reunification signifies a return to the past, which, first of all, is not possible and, second, cannot be our goal."

Meanwhile, time was rushing on -- much faster, in fact, than the Russians imagined behind their Kremlin walls. Experts on Germany had long since set their sights on the Berlin Wall. But did the composure of Egon Krenz, the since-toppled Honecker's successor, eliminate the need to bring down the Wall? During his first official visit to the Kremlin on Nov. 1, Krenz told Gorbachev:

We are taking steps against a mass breakthrough in the Berlin Wall. There will be police there. If there are attempts to break through to West Berlin, we will have an extremely difficult situation, and we will be forced to declare a state of emergency. However, I do not believe it will come to that.

But the Russians weren't so sure and were unwilling to depend on Krenz. In a meeting of the Soviet Politburo on Nov. 3, Gorbachev asked KGB leader Vladimir Kryuchkov how much longer Krenz could last, given the ongoing demonstrations in Berlin. Kryuchkov had no answer. It was then that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the man with the "sense for new things," made an outrageous suggestion. "We should," the minister said, "demolish the Wall ourselves." ( Click here for a related excerpt: "We Should Demolish the Wall Ourselves")