By Christian Neef
Putin, of course, knows this. His outwardly aggressive posture is an attempt to compensate for his inner weakness. This also explains why the Kremlin plans to stage, shortly after Medvedev's inauguration, the first major military parade on Red Square since the end of the Soviet Union -- tanks and missiles included.
Whether it was Josef Stalin, Ivan the Terrible or Czar Alexander, Russia has always been fixated on a single person, the "vozhd," or leader.
The two have been inseparable in public in recent weeks. The current president praises his economic triumphs, while concealing the unsavory sides of his administration. Meanwhile, his protégé inundates the country with liberal rhetoric, talking about freedom, codetermination and the constitutional state that has yet to be established. Medvedev sounds as if he hadn't been a part of the Putin system for years.
No one seems to notice that there is one fatal flaw to this concerted campaign: Putin's success stories and Medvedev's criticism are inherently contradictory. And yet their speeches reveal an essential element of their approach: that both men think within the authoritarian patterns of the old regime. Borrowing on Soviet vocabulary, they say that they have developed a "plan" that will be valid until 2020. During this period, they intend to raise the average life expectancy to 75, quadruple the productivity of labor and transform Russia into one of the world's leading technological powers.
Catching up with the West has been the Russians' chief objective since the days of the czars. What Putin and Medvedev are planning is the continuation of a decades-long social experiment, one in which all obstacles are either eliminated or brought into line early on: parties, political institutions and, of course, the opposition. Putin learned from Gorbachev's defeat that the top-down approach to modernization requires the concentration of power and a functioning authoritarian state. But Gorbachev's glasnost also cleared the way for party infighting, and the state becomes vulnerable when factions develop. Instead of being crushed early on, those internal divisions spilled out into society. The result is a now-exposed power struggle that cripples the state. To ensure that this doesn't happen again, politics ceased to be public when Putin came into office, and the power system became sacred once again.
Most Russians don't care, at least not now. The arrangement will work for as long as the people benefit from the economic boom.
An internal speech by Putin's chief ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, reveals that Russia wants to remain on its special path, which replaces political competition with the Kremlin's obsession with control and security. Last summer Surkov defined the basic principles of Russian politics, and they reveal a frighteningly bizarre worldview. According to Surkov, Russia's political culture is characterized by three unique aspects: the quest to centralize all power functions, to idealize goals in the political struggle and, finally, to personify political institutions. For Surkov, a charismatic personality is more important than a political platform.
Idealism, says Surkov, comes from pragmatism. Russian thought is not based on today's circumstances. Instead, Surkov argues, Russia is searching for its own, special truth.
There are those who see Surkov's words as political poison originating in the ideological primeval mud of the early 20th century. And they have good reason to feel this way. If this quasi-religious conservatism is to be Russia's national doctrine, the next president's supposed liberalism is completely meaningless.
Surkov has also explained the core of Putin's foreign policy. The "current unprecedented pressure from the West" has nothing to do with the deficiencies of Russian democracy, he says. Instead, its goal is to gain control over Russian natural resources, while weakening government institutions, defense capabilities and even Russian sovereignty. Any concessions Moscow makes in international matters would only provoke additional pressure. Russia and the West, Surkov argues, are deeply different cultures. Is this the gospel with which Medvedev hopes to achieve compromise with the West?
This leaves the problem of double leadership, if it even materializes. Where does this certainty that a duo of czars will provide stability come from? Shared leadership has never worked in Russia. When the left-leaning parliament rebelled against Yeltsin in 1993 and declared itself a countervailing power, the president sent in tanks to shoot the members of parliament out of their fortress.
Not allowing any rival outside the Kremlin to become too powerful was also the reason for the replacement of Mikhail Kasyanov, the last prime minister of any stature, in 2004. The combination of a strong premier and a weak head of state has only existed once before in Russian history: when reformer Pyotr Stolypin tried to reshape Russia, under Czar Nikolai II, into a modern European power. Stolypin was murdered as a result, and the czar met his end soon afterwards.
Two centers of power instead of one are a hazard for a country where officials have been raised to leave even the smallest of decisions up to the authorities. Which of the two poles will settle future disputes within the system? And what happens if the muscle flexing in the corridors of the Kremlin is accompanied by social tensions in the country?
Putin and Medvedev have known each other for 17 years, which is why, proponents of the tandem solution like to say, they understand each other so well. Besides, they add, the newcomer is completely loyal to this predecessor. This doesn't necessarily mean anything. Those who have followed Medvedev's career know him as a man who thinks strategically.
Both men are stepping into new territory with the idea of double leadership. In this sense, it truly represents a historic shift. But neither of them knows how the experiment will end. It cannot be ruled out that one of the two will become a victim of this succession procedure, and that Putin will become the gravedigger for his own system.
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
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