By Daniel Steinvorth and Bernhard Zand
A conviction repeatedly expressed by political scientists and Middle East experts is that democracy needs to take root and grow within these societies and that institutional mechanisms need to be put in place that would help to achieve a balanced accommodation of interests. What this may mean in practice can be seen in those places where democracy, in the Western sense of the term, has developed the furthest.
Countries like Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates appear to be ruled by sheikhs and emirs who don't even pretend to care what their subjects think. At least that's the reputation they have. But that's not altogether true. None of the decisions issued by the palaces in Doha, Masqat, or Abu Dhabi is something the rulers have determined in isolation from the rest of society. They all navigate the choppy waters of political decision-making with the help of a complex steering mechanism that has evolved over centuries and proven to be surprisingly effective even in the age of globalization, the "majlis", an informal council that can parley for nights, weeks, or even months and in the end may not resolve every issue discussed but, as a rule, arrives at compromises that the parties involved can live with.
Paternalism and Islamic Egalitarianism
The oil wealth as well as the ethnic and religious homogeneity of the Gulf states no doubt makes the job of governing them easier, but at the same time there is no lack of potential dangers and conflicts. A dominant neighbor, Saudi Arabia, is under the influence of Wahhabism, an ultraconservative form of Sunni Islam. Across the Persian Gulf they face Iran, a country ruled by Shiites who make no bones about their hegemonial ambitions. Oil production has created immeasurable wealth for some areas and tribes. Without their support others would still be milking camels and diving for pearls to make a living. Rapid and large-scale development has drawn in millions of foreigners, making the native populations minorities in their own countries.
These countries have always been faced with fundamental decisions. Who gets how much of the oil revenues? Where do the Gulf countries stand in the conflict between Washington, upon whom they are dependent for protection, and Tehran, which they need as a trading partner? How far should they go in opening up their societies? As far as the Sheikh of Dubai, who brings in millions of Western tourists? Or as far as the Emirate of Sharjah, where alcohol consumption is prohibited?
None of these decisions is ever made without prior consultation. How this is done is determined in part by the paternalism of tribal society and in part by Islamic egalitarianism. Someone who has an issue he wants resolved either goes to the majlis himself or has an older and more influential cousin speak for him there. Despite efforts to the contrary undertaken by the secular regimes in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, tribal and family connections continue to be a much stronger social glue in Arab societies than political parties or labor unions. The informal nature of these meetings -- dozens of men, all in white dishdashas, nibbling on dates and nuts and sipping tea -- clearly reflects just how flat hierarchies here are.
It would be naive to assume that the fairly democratic discourse that is conducted among tribes and families in the Arab world can achieve the same kinds of things that parties, parliaments, and labor unions are able to get done in the West. The "good governance" status that international organizations attribute to some of the Gulf monarchs is comparatively easy to achieve in a situation (as is currently the case) where they have so much money they hardly know what to do with it. But what happens when resources are limited, the balance of social interests is destroyed after decades of dictatorship and domestic conflict spills out into the streets? Wouldn't parliamentary democracy, the model that has established itself in Europe, the Americas, and parts of Asia, be a better choice in the final analysis?
Many have concluded that lesson that can be learned from Baghdad is that democracy cannot work in the Islamic world, particularly if an attempt is made to impose it from the outside. The fact of the matter is that this conclusion could turn out to be just as wrong as the illusion that the Middle East was going to be just as easy to democratize as Germany and Japan were after 1945.
Hope for a democratic Middle East remains, despite the fact that policies pursued by the Bush administration has made it very difficult for this hope to be sustained. It goes without saying that giving the peoples of the Islamic world a voice in shaping their own destinies will help make their lives easier, the region more predictable, and the West more secure. The extent to which political parties, quirky rules governing proportional representation, annual statements to parliament by monarchs, the existence of superdelegates, or any of the other phenomena manifested by Western democracies would be needed in this connection would best be decided on a case-by-case, country-by-country basis.
Translated from the German by Larry Fischer.
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