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  Changing Regime Change: US and EU Need a Unified Strategy for Iran

Changing Regime Change US and EU Need a Unified Strategy for Iran

By Henner Fürtig

Part 2: Time for Concerted Action

The US administration's desire for regime change in Tehran -- alongside its open retention of the option of military intervention if Iran continues with nuclear armament -- increased pressure on the European Union to at least take part in sanctions in order to prevent "the worst" from happening. However, because this ran counter to the previous European approach there has been no build-up of pressure by the European Union that would satisfy US expectations. Iran has benefited from this divergence.

In June 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported doubts about the peaceful direction of the Iranian nuclear program, and several months later the EU-3 group (Germany , France, and Britain) finally succeeded in wrenching an agreement out of Tehran. Iran agreed to stop enriching uranium and sign the 1970 Additional Protocol of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in return for the promise of a far-reaching expansion of relations. The feeling of triumph in European capitals about the victory of their soft power method did not last very long: Iran did not keep to the agreement.

Similar efforts by the EU-3 in November 2004 and May 2005 also failed. The Iranian leadership believed it could afford this posture because Washington had just concluded a problematic nuclear deal with India, and both China and Russia made it clear to the UN Security Council that they did not share the US assessment of the danger emanating from the Iranian nuclear program. In this constellation the Europeans suddenly found themselves in the weakest position. And because this was detrimental to the position of the United States in the Security Council, the Bush administration changed course in July 2008 and sent Under Secretary of State William Burns to Geneva for direct talks with the Iranian chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili. The participation of the EU-3 as well as China and Russia in the negotiations only reduced the sensation fractionally, but it did pave the first steps for the future.

Change in Strategy

For this start to develop into something stable, both the United States and the European Union must change their strategies toward Iran. While Washington has to extend its range of instruments to include political and diplomatic tools, the European Union would be well advised to attach a significantly higher degree of obligation to its offers. The credibility of any change in strategy, however, will stand or fall depending on whether the new US administration undertakes to strike regime change in Iran from the foreign policy agenda. The example of Libya has shown that this would considerably help the realization of other ambitions-and may even be needed to make some of them possible at all. In addition, President Obama's administration should end the rhetoric of a preventive military attack, a "special operation," or surgical air strikes against Iran. North Korea's dictator Kim Jong-il first budged on the nuclear question when he no longer had to face a daily bombardment of military threats from the United States. But the change in US policy on Iran would only be complete if Obama were to signal a new start in bilateral relations to the Iranian leadership. This way he would gain a large degree of legitimacy that would enable him to call for stronger action toward Iran from the Europeans.

In June 2008 the European Union agreed on additional sanctions against Iran. Because of Tehran's continued refusal to halt uranium enrichment, Brussels imposed sanctions on corporations and individuals thought to be involved in the nuclear and missile program. Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najar, head of the Iranian nuclear energy body Golamresa Aghasadeh, and other individuals were forbidden from entering the European Union. Furthermore, the European Union froze the assets of Bank Melli, the largest state credit institution in Iran and one through which a large proportion of business transactions between Europe and Iran were conducted. The angry reactions of the Iranian leadership show that the Europeans' tenacity was not only unexpected but also had a definite effect.

So far, neither the Iran policies of the Americans nor the Europeans have been cogent. There is still no Western answer to the challenge of the Iranian Revolution. It is not just that Europe or individual European states lack the prerequisites to do this, but that the Iranian perception of the West is so fixated on America that a U-turn or new ordering of relations without the cooperation of the United States is virtually unthinkable. Ultimately, the Iran crisis can only be addressed through concerted transatlantic action.

To read the footnotes accompanying this article, please visit the IP Web site.

Henner Fürtig is a research associate at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg.

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