By Alexander Rahr
In the 1990s Russia accepted the terms laid down by the West in the initial Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Struggling economically, it regarded the European Union as a source of stability. Today Moscow has other priorities. Instead of settling for a junior partnership with the West, it demands equality in its relations with the European Union. President Medvedev has called for a new security dialogue with all of Europe, one that aims to create an "umbrella organization" encompassing all existing European institutions. Russia is eager to make "eternal peace" with NATO and the European Union, but it wants to incorporate the two organizations into an expanded alliance in which Russia and the West act in concert to stabilize the European continent.
Whereas the United States, the states of Central Europe, and a number of Western European states reject such a security dialogue, the French president signaled to Medvedev that he was willing to talk. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic, which has just assumed the Council presidency, appears to be distancing itself from Sarkozy. As the new Council president, Prague intends to improve relations between the West and the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. It also wants to make these states an ambitious offer of affiliation with the European Union. Given the way the new eastern partnerships are structured, they can be interpreted as an attempt by the European Union to squeeze Russia out of its old turf in the west and south. If Commonwealth of Independent States members accept the broadened offer of partnership with the European Union, they can count on generous support from the West for the democratic transformation and integration processes.
The eastern partnerships also contain a new EU energy security package for all neighboring states that are dependent on Russian energy. This amounts to an open show of solidarity with the countries that feel threatened by an "imperialist" Russia. In contrast to the French, the Czechs might once again lean toward a policy of containment vis-à-vis Moscow. This would "punish" Russia for its annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Following the Czechs, the rotating presidency will fall to the Swedes in 2009 and to the Poles in 2011. Stockholm has signaled its support of the Central European position on Russia. The Ostpolitik of the Central Europeans, which differs from the traditional Russia-centered policy of the French and Germans, could place new obstacles in the way of good relations with the Kremlin.
10 Concrete Points for Cooperation
In response to Medvedev's desire for dialogue, the European Union should move beyond a revamped Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and seek new forms of cooperation with Russia in the following fields-whereby cooperation with the United States is possible in some cases:
Russia has been hit particularly hard by the global financial crisis and, as a consequence, seems to be reorienting its foreign policy toward the West. The Kremlin has officially backed away from its initial plan to install an anti-missile defense system in the Kalingrad region. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Putin pled for greater cooperation between Russia and the other leading industrial nations in addressing the economic crisis. It could well be that Russia will now lack the resources for ambitious military and industrial projects. Thus, for Moscow, a strategic partnership between the United States and the European Union is not only pragmatic; it is also in Russia's national interests.
Alexander Rahr is director of the Russia/Eurasia Program at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
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