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12/02/2009

The leadership has increased the pressure once again in recent weeks. It strengthened the feared Revolutionary Guards, or Pasdaran, considered the regime's most loyal supporters, by adding two units to "combat the psychological operations of the enemy." Another new unit was established to monitor opposition Internet sites and combat "insults and the spreading of lies." These units are under the command of the Tehran public prosecutor's office, notorious for its show trials. The country is in a "soft war," said Pasdaran General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, "and the enemy is everywhere." One of the targets of the latest government crackdown was Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi, whose prize was confiscated by authorities.

Popular rage is not directed only at the "vote thief" in the presidential office. Many believe that Ahmadinejad is merely a puppet of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was previously virtually untouchable. He is the strong man, he appoints the highest-ranking judges, and he is in charge of the intelligence services, the armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards and the hated Basij militias. He determines the basic features of government policy and decides on Iran's course in the nuclear conflict.

Willing to Compromise?

But to what extent is this leadership now capable of taking action? Will it accommodate the global community in the nuclear conflict, or does the regime see confrontation with the West as its opportunity to survive?

According to conservative sources in Tehran, President Ahmadinejad was recently quite willing to make a compromise. He apparently hoped that he could spruce up his reputation, heavily tarnished as a result of the election disaster, at least internationally. This, say the Tehran sources, explains why Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili signaled a willingness to make concessions at the historic nuclear summit in Geneva in early October, a meeting at which an Iranian official came face-to-face with a senior representative of the "Great Satan" for the first time since the Iranian revolution. But in Khamenei's eyes, the deal -- uranium outsourcing in return for fuel delivery -- was a non-starter. Ironically, opposition politician Mousavi agrees with him.

A key reason for the Iranian politicians' self-confidence is that they do not believe that Israel would truly risk an attack on Iran. US experts also warn against the bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities. David Albright, head of the Washington think tank ISIS, believes that a "surgical strike" against the nuclear facilities would be completely impossible. According to Albright, no one knows how many nuclear sites Iran has, and the centrifuges in existing facilities like Natanz are apparently installed in tunnels so deep underground that even bunker-busting bombs could not destroy everything.

The Israelis, on the other hand, believe that Iran is merely playing for time. The Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, has long had its capacities directed at Iran, and not just since Netanyahu came into office. Israeli envoys quietly visit European companies that export products to Tehran. When agitated German executives insist that their products are intended purely for civilian purposes, the Israelis produce photos showing the European components installed in one of Iran's nuclear plants.

Chances of Success

"The West approves UN sanctions by day and trades with Tehran by night, and Ahmadinejad takes advantage of this ambivalence," Israeli Trade Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer told SPIEGEL. Ben-Eliezer, a retired general, believes optimistically that Iran can be stopped, but that this would require a total embargo: "Nothing can be allowed in or out."

With the Iranian economy weakened, the regime under internal pressure after the disputed elections and the Russians distancing themselves from Iran, the chances that sanctions will succeed have never been this good, say some diplomats in Tehran.

"The regime in Iran is not irrational," says Intelligence Minister Dan Meridor. According to Meridor, only if possessing the bomb jeopardizes the regime's survival, will Ahmadinejad decide against building the weapon.

Others, however, believe that the timetable of escalation is already as good as fixed, and that the conflict is coming to a head. They believe that tighter sanctions will start in the spring of 2010, followed by air strikes perhaps in the summer of 2010.

Meanwhile, a representative of the Iranian government has already issued precautionary threats: "If the enemy want (sic) to test its bad luck and fire a missile into Iran, before the dust settles, Iran's ballistic missiles will target the heart of Tel Aviv."

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• Part 1: Israel's Patience with Tehran Wearing Thin
• Part 2: Just a Year Away from the Bomb?
• Part 3: 'The Enemy Is Everywhere'