Hands Off the Bundeswehr: The Path Forward for the German Army

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It is clear that the Bundeswehr must also play its role in consolidating Germany's budget. But it is irresponsible to reduce the Bundeswehr to 150,000 troops for reasons of economy. It makes more sense to reduce the number of professional soldiers by no more than 20,000, thereby making it possible to maintain a force of at least 180,000 professional soldiers in the long term. The German army must have at least six full-time, operational brigades. This makes it possible to conduct, together with our allies, two campaigns at the same time.

In this new Bundeswehr, the relative proportions of the three branches of the military must be revised. In particular, the experience gained from missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan in recent years has shown that our army is too small to bear the brunt of the missions, that the air force is somewhat too large and consumes too much money, and that the navy ought to concentrate on a limited number of tasks.

Germany should now strongly lobby for European countries to adopt an approach based on the division of labor when it comes to structuring their armed forces. To that end, we already introduced a comprehensive initiative in 1998, but it failed because there was not enough pressure to cut costs and because national militaries wanted to protect their vested interests. But it is completely unacceptable today that almost every country still indulges in the traditional idea that it must maintain the entire spectrum of land, air and naval forces.

Shared Responsibility

In light of the need to economize across Europe, the time has now come to combine Europe's defense activities. Our European partners have also increasingly realized that in an alliance like the European Union or NATO, it is not necessary for each member to have everything, and that when the members are seen as an aggregate, many things are done in duplicate and triplicate -- even though there are still shortcomings elsewhere, for example in terms of specific capabilities. With its political strategy to develop the Bundeswehr, Germany must ensure that we remain capable of forming part of an alliance. The new Bundeswehr must reflect its European role and its shared responsibility for the fate of Europe.

The goal is not to optimize the Bundeswehr for Afghanistan. However, we must at least correct the equipment deficits that still constitute a deadly burden on the mission in Afghanistan. Our troops in combat need the capability to have a real-time picture of the situation. They need firepower, military engineers and military police, as well as armored combat and transport vehicles and, most of all, helicopters that are fit for use.

It is possible to spend more on the necessary equipment and to economize nonetheless. Some acquisitions that are not as urgent will have to wait, and when it comes to personnel, reduction and regeneration must go hand in hand. We don't need nine separate commands, three branches of the military service, the Joint Medical Service, a new armed forces base and six troop offices. Instead, we need a two-column Bundeswehr, with a unified command responsible for operations and a Bundeswehr command to provide the necessary capabilities on land, on the water and in the air.

Historic Change of Course

In essence, German defense policy today faces, for the third time, a historic change of course and must therefore address several tasks.

First, we need a new consensus on how Germany intends to protect its vital security interests without claiming a special role for itself. The restrictions placed on the German armed forces' deployments in Afghanistan and in the Horn of Africa have had a devastating effect on our reputation within the alliance and in Europe. An operational alliance of European armed forces will only exist if all participants are prepared to engage in the same missions and face the same risks.

The Bundeswehr must rid itself of its fixation on Afghanistan. Instead, a political strategy should be developed for a speedy withdrawal. The future of Afghanistan is mainly a regional problem, which has to be solved regionally by the relevant parties.

We must now take appropriate action based on this fact, or else a time will come when almost all of our soldiers will associate the military with Afghanistan missions and ultimately believe that this is what Germany's military was intended to do. Germany's Basic Law stipulates that the federal government "shall establish armed forces for purposes of defense." We cannot allow this constitutional imperative to be forgotten because of Afghanistan.

Volker Rühe, 67, was German defense minister from 1992 to 1998 and is a member of the conservative Christian Democratic Union. Retired Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser, 71, was head of the policy and planning staff within the Defense Ministry during the same period.

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• Part 1: The Path Forward for the German Army
• Part 2: A Division of Labor for Europe's Armies