Investigation in Afghanistan: New Allegations against German Officer who Ordered Kunduz Air Strike

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During that fateful night, Klein and his air controller were sitting in their command post at the dimly lit Tactical Operations Center. They were in contact with an Afghan informant, considered reliable, who had reported that the people gathered around the trucks were all Taliban. In addition, the two Germans were looking at blurred video images transmitted by the fighter jets in real time to a "Rover 3" device.

The Rover 3, which resembles a conventional laptop, is not the latest model. Its black-and-white images are not clear enough for individuals' weapons to be easily identified. "You can still see a bazooka quite clearly," says an officer familiar with the Rover 3, "but not an ordinary Kalashnikov."

Because of these shortcomings, Klein's predecessor had already requested the "significantly more powerful Rover 4 system" last year, according to a Bundeswehr report. The device was "urgently needed" for forces located in main conflict areas such as Kunduz, Brigadier General Jörg Vollmer, the commander of German troops in northern Afghanistan, wrote in August, just 10 days before the attack.

Because of the "complexity of the software," Rover operators should be trained at home in Germany instead of waiting until after their arrival in Afghanistan, according to a confidential memo written in October 2008. "This includes making the system available and approving it for training purposes in Germany," the memo continues. But in the past the US Air Force has only made the necessary aircraft available in Germany in exceptional cases.

'New Thinking'

An even more serious concern has been the relatively poor coordination between Germans and Americans, even on strategic matters. The NATO ambassadors of the 28 member states met last week at NATO headquarters in Brussels to listen to a report by General Stanley McChrystal, who has been commander of the ISAF stabilization forces in Afghanistan since June. In the half-hour report, transmitted by video link, the US general explained the strategy with which he intends to fight the insurgency in Afghanistan.

McChrystal, who called for "new thinking," said that the conflict could only be won by winning over the civilian population, and not "simply by killing insurgents." Under the new strategy, McChrystal said, the allied forces were to reduce their emphasis on air strikes and do their utmost to avoid civilian casualties.

His words sent a chill down the spines of the German diplomats and senior military officials attending the meeting, as they thought of Colonel Klein and the new tactics German forces had adopted. German troops are now belatedly doing what the Americans and other allies have wanted them to do for years, as they begin taking the fight to the Taliban and showing less concern for civilian casualties.

"An immediate and extensive improvement of the situation throughout Kunduz province cannot be achieved with the current contingent of German forces," Brigadier General Vollmer writes in his progress report. To defeat the Taliban, Vollmer continues, more troops, armored vehicles and combat helicopters are needed. "The influence of the insurgents cannot be significantly reduced with conventional forces and the current approach."

Danger Zones

The Germans could soon have the opportunity to test their new strategy in areas other than the relatively secure north. In the 70 pages of his 60-day progress report distributed on Thursday to members of the NATO Council, McChrystal calls for more troops in Afghanistan, although he argues that improving the allies' commitment to civilian reconstruction is even more important.

McChrystal now wants to divide Afghanistan into regional danger zones, classified as 1, 2 or 3 depending on the level of threat, which would diminish the importance of the current division into four geographic zones (north, south, east and west). In addition, McChrystal's plan calls for limiting the NATO effort to hot spots in the future. The plan is to secure the peace in 15 to 20 critical provinces, partly through massive military deployments but also through even greater civilian efforts.

To be able to implement this strategy, however, McChrystal would have to eliminate the current restrictions on where troops can be deployed. "This will soon lead to calls for German soldiers to begin fighting in the south," fears a senior German officer. Up until now, German forces have been restricted to the less violent north of the country.

For McChrystal, setting clear goals for Afghan security forces is even more critical. Under his new plan, the size of the Afghan national army would be increased to about 250,000 troops and that of the Afghan police to 160,000 officers by 2013.

In setting these parameters, the American general squarely disagrees with the opinion of German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung. More than two weeks ago, Jung announced that Afghanistan would be capable of providing its own security with a military force of 134,000 troops and the same number of police officers. McChrystal's new strategy, however, will likely trigger new demands on the Germans to provide significantly more trainers and resources.

List of Deficiencies

But the Germans should first of all focus on providing better training and equipment for their own soldiers. It's not just the Rover devices which leave something to be desired. General Vollmer's classified report provides a sharp contrast to Defense Minister Jung's claims that the soldiers in Afghanistan are properly equipped and trained. According to an earlier SPIEGEL report on equipment deficiencies, Jung's press spokesman, Thomas Raabe, "proudly" reiterated in late August "that we have very good equipment." Unfortunately, this is inconsistent with the general's experience, judging by the long list of deficiencies he submitted in August.

On sunny days, the temperature inside a "Marder" armored personnel carrier can reach 80 degrees Celsius (176 degrees Fahrenheit). Even soldiers who are used to saunas cannot tolerate such temperatures for more than half an hour, say doctors. The Marder has been used in Afghanistan for close to three years, yet it still lacks air-conditioning.

Despite military officials' claims to the contrary, German armored vehicles have many deficiencies. Between January and July alone, a total of 38 German vehicles have "broken down or been destroyed" -- and they have not been properly replaced. This, Vollmer writes, has "diminished operational capabilities, particularly in the Kunduz region."

In the Kunduz area, according to the brigadier general, "incidents relevant to security," such as attacks with explosives, suicide bombings and gun battles, "have reached an unprecedented level." This has prompted Vollmer to call for better training of German troops at home. For infantry troops, this means improving training in such areas as "attack preparedness" and "response," "searching urban areas and buildings," "ambush situations" and "gun battles."

The realities in Afghanistan stand in sharp contrast to Jung's claims. According to the German defense minister, the Bundeswehr's mission is to protect, assist, act as an intermediary and -- last of all -- fight.

ULRIKE DEMMER, DIRK KURBJUWEIT, MARCEL ROSENBACH, ALEXANDER SZANDAR

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• Part 1: New Allegations against German Officer who Ordered Kunduz Air Strike
• Part 2: German Army Not Properly Equipped