Obama's War: Petraeus Appointment a Coup with Risks

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Regardless, Petraeus seems to be the better choice for Obama's war. The conflict with the Taliban cannot be won with weapons. The upper hand can only be gained through better communication. The so-called COIN strategy, which is intended to isolate the rebellious Taliban, emphasizes winning the trust of the Afghan people.

It turns the traditional logic of war on its head. The primary goal, as McChrystal kept trying to hammer into the heads of his soldiers, is not the enemy but protecting the civilian population. He argued that this was the only way the West could gain the trust of the Afghans and gradually deprive the Taliban of their support. He ordered his soldiers in the field only to request air support in an absolute emergency and only to take significant risks when their own safety was at stake. The goal, he said, was to gain the support of the people for the idea of a peaceful Afghanistan. It was about diplomacy, about talking instead of dropping bombs.

Petraeus, as the co-author of the manual that establishes the new rules of combat, is at least as familiar with this strategy as McChrystal. The 241-page work augments the tried-and-true principles of guerilla warfare with many suggestions to incorporate "social networks" in local communities. All Petraeus has to do now is to implement his own ideas. And unlike McChrystal, who felt "betrayed" by the US ambassador in Kabul, Petraeus had an excellent working relationship with the US ambassador in Baghdad and demonstrated diplomatic skills during his tenure in Iraq.

Petraeus' Presidential Dreams Unlikely to Materialize

However, the general's potential presidential dreams are unlikely to materialize for the time being. He can hardly run an election campaign from Kabul. Besides, if Petraeus fails in Afghanistan, he will also have failed as a presidential candidate. And if he succeeds, the victory will be mostly President Obama's.

In return, however, Petraeus now holds sway over Obama on such matters as requesting more troops. "His real ambition was to become his era's Carl von Clausewitz or Alfred Thayer Mahan, the dominant military strategist of the 21st century," journalist Jonathan Alter writes in his book "The Promise," the first comprehensive look behind the scenes of the Obama White House.

His approach worked in Iraq. But Afghanistan is not Iraq, which even Petraeus has pointed out again and again. Besides, the new strategy has yet to yield significant positive results. On the contrary, there are growing fears that the West is in the process of losing this war.

The capture of the town of Marja was supposed to become a textbook example of the successful use of the new COIN doctrine. In February, the allies sent 15,000 troops to the town in Helmand Province, a largely agricultural region. Their goal was to liberate the roughly 82,000 inhabits from the Taliban, which had become entrenched there, but the effort was unsuccessful. Even McChrystal later described the tenacious rebel stronghold as a "bleeding ulcer."

A similar operation, but this time with a substantially larger force, was intended to liberate Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city and the spiritual center of the Taliban. But the offensive has been repeatedly postponed. Perhaps it will happen this autumn, or possibly not at all.

How Committed Is America?

In any event, Afghanistan is a long way from peace. In June alone, coalition troops had lost 80 soldiers by last Friday, making it the bloodiest month in a war that has been raging for almost nine years. In the Rolling Stone article, a close advisor to McChrystal is quoted as saying that the mission there is "not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win."

There is also mounting concern among other senior US military leaders over whether America has enough patience for a mission that is as broad and protracted as McChrystal and his successor expect it to be, especially with the prospect of growing American losses in the coming months -- as was the case in Iraq when Petraeus took the reins there, before managing to turn the war around a few months later.

In the controversial Rolling Stones article by author Michael Hastings, soldiers, in particular, openly complain about their situation, mostly about being ordered not to shoot, even in menacing situations, so as to protect innocent civilians. "Does that make any fucking sense?" only soldier asked. "We should just drop a fucking bomb on this place. You sit and ask yourself: What are we doing here?"

But Petraeus supports the strategy, which is why his appointment also holds unmistakable risks for Obama. The president and his commander have signed a pact. "He is now stuck with Petraeus," says Bruce Riedel, co-author of the president's Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. According to Riedel, Obama cannot afford "to have a third commander in Afghanistan during his presidency." It is a pact with many unknown factors. Most of all, it is by no means clear that Petraeus truly agrees with Obama's plan to ring in the end of the unpopular war by next year.

The withdrawal of the additional troops that were sent to Afghanistan will begin in July 2011, Obama announced in a speech on Afghanistan at the United States Military Academy at West Point last December. McChrystal thought it wasn't a good idea. He believed that Obama was sending the wrong signal to America's enemies, and he argued that it could take years for the strategy of winning over the Afghan people to succeed.

How Unified Is Obama's Team?

This is why the question of how unified Obama's Afghanistan team really is after Petraeus's appointment still remains unanswered. Is Defense Secretary Robert Gates truly on his way out, after trying, unsuccessfully, to convince the president to keep McChrystal?

And what will happen to National Security Advisor Jones, who one of McChrystal's men referred to as a "clown?" Although many in Obama's inner circle were outraged over the choice of words, no one could bring himself to defend the retired general against the insult. He hardly plays a role anymore within Obama's team of close advisors.

Holbrooke, the special envoy to Afghanistan -- described as a "wounded animal" in the Rolling Stone story -- is also weakened. In a letter to Ambassador Eikenberry in February, Jones wrote that he shouldn't get so upset about Holbrooke, because he was going to be out of the picture soon, anyway. The memo was leaked and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had to intervene to keep her ally in office. The new unity Obama is now demanding of his staff will not be that easy to achieve.

When Petraeus was called to testify before a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Afghanistan two weeks ago, the chairman asked him how he felt about Obama's withdrawal plan. Did he still support it? Petraeus paused for 10 long seconds before answering. The senators waited. Finally, the general said quietly: "In a perfect world, Mr. Chairman, we have to be very careful with timelines." The purpose of setting a date of July 2011 for the beginning of the withdrawal, he said, was to convey "a message of urgency," but that it "did not imply a race for the exits."

This, unlike his hotheaded predecessor, is the way a diplomatic general speaks.

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• Part 1: Petraeus Appointment a Coup with Risks
• Part 2: Talking Instead of Dropping Bombs