Georgian soldiers after returning to Tbilisi from the Iraq war on August 11: Saakashvili "an obvious gambler"
SPIEGEL: Mr. Schröder, who is at fault for the Caucasus war?
Gerhard Schröder: The hostilities undoubtedly have their historic causes, as well, and the conflict has had several historic precursors. But the moment that triggered the current armed hostilities was the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia. This should not be glossed over.
SPIEGEL: You see no partial fault on Moscow's part, no lack of proportionality in the actions of the Russian military?
SPIEGEL: Do you believe that the American military advisors stationed in Tbilisi encouraged Georgia to launch its attack?
Schröder: I wouldn't go that far. But everyone knows that these US military advisors in Georgia exist -- a deployment that I've never considered particularly intelligent. And it would have been strange if these experts had not had any information. Either they were extremely unprofessional or they were truly fooled, which is hard to imagine.
SPIEGEL: The US government claims that it warned Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili against taking military action. But wasn't the whole thing only too convenient for Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin?
Schröder: These are speculations in which I prefer not to participate. I assume that no one in the Moscow leadership has an interest in military conflicts. There are enough internal problems in Russia that need to be solved. For instance, corruption and abuse of authority must be addressed. Russia has plenty of deficits, an issue I've addressed many a time. President (Dmitry) Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin are addressing these problems -- together, by the way, in friendship and mutual respect, not in competition with one another, as journalistic fortune-tellers often imply.
SPIEGEL: That may well be, but something else is now at stake: Russia has never overcome the loss of its superpower status, and in recent years it has felt cornered and humiliated by NATO. During the wars in the Balkans, the Iraq invasion by the "Coalition of the Willing" under Washington's leadership, the Kosovo declaration of independence ...
Schröder: ... don't forget the development of an American missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic ...
SPIEGEL: ... the Kremlin has been forced to look on. Isn't it possible that an economically and militarily strengthened Moscow now sees US friend Saakashvili as the best possible opportunity to retaliate against the West? And that Putin wants to assert imperial claims?
Schröder: In my view, there have indeed been serious mistakes made by the West in its policy toward Russia. Can we conclude that this bears some relationship to the recent events in the Caucasus, as Russia's response, so to speak, to the Georgian provocation? I think it's wrong to combine these two notions.
SPIEGEL: You don't share the newly erupted fear among many in the West of a "Russian threat?"
Schröder: No, not at all. There is a perception of Russia in the West that has very little to do with reality.
SPIEGEL: Could the new, highly self-confident leadership duo in Moscow feel that the West needs them more than they need the West?
Schröder: It is a mutual dependency. There is not a single critical problem in world politics or the global economy that could be solved without Russia -- not the nuclear conflict with Iran, the North Korea question and certainly not bringing peace to the Middle East. The set of problems relating to the climate can also only be addressed universally. Incidentally, Moscow ratified the Kyoto Protocol to fight global warming, while we are still waiting for Washington to do so. And when it comes to energy policy, only dreamers can pursue the idea that Western Europe could become independent of Russian oil and natural gas. On the other hand, the Russians need reliable buyers for their energy shipments.
SPIEGEL: You see no reason, in light of the harsh actions in the Caucasus, to terminate the special German-Russian "strategic partnership," or at least to put it on ice?
Schröder: No. I don't see why this concept should be jeopardized because of Georgia. Mutual dependencies also create mutual securities. I am also opposed to criticism of Russian investments in Germany. Who should have a problem with Mr. (Alexei) Mordashov investing in the (tourism company) TUI, Mr. (Oleg) Deripaska owning 10 percent of (the construction company) Hochtief or another oligarch owning a share of the fashion house Escada? I would like to see more and not less investment in the German economy. Historically speaking, such economic integration has proven to be politically beneficial.
SPIEGEL: Now you sound like (former US Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger. Have you always thought this way?
Schröder: Certainly not in my Young Socialist days. But ever since I became professionally involved in foreign policy as chancellor, this sober approach has always been my preference -- and it's certainly the most reasonable one.
Schröder: I do not believe that Russia is pursuing a policy of annexation. And I also do not believe that there can be a return to the status quo ante in South Ossetia or Abkhazia. It's out of the question. In my opinion, this has less to do with supposed Russian expansionist interests than with the wishes of the civilian population.
SPIEGEL: Should Germany participate militarily in a peacekeeping force in the Caucasus?
Schröder: The German foreign minister has long been involved in the search for political solutions through his shuttle diplomacy, and he has astutely said that if the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were to play a role in coordination with the parties to the conflict, Germany could not be uninvolved. However, if there is a mission without express Russian consent, I do not want to see any German soldiers stationed there. This is simply a matter of our shared history.
SPIEGEL: Does Georgia belong in NATO?
Schröder: I thought that the German government -- and I certainly wish to compliment Ms. Merkel and Mr. Steinmeier in this regard -- together with the French government, took the smart approach at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April ...
SPIEGEL: ... because they opposed the Americans' and the Eastern Europeans' desire for fast acceptance of Georgia and Ukraine, and instead shelved the issue with what amounted to vague promises.
Schröder: Imagine if we were forced to intervene militarily on behalf of Georgia as a NATO country, on behalf of an obvious gambler, which is clearly the way one ought to characterize Saakashvili. Georgia and Ukraine must first resolve their domestic political problems, and they are still a long way off. I see the chances of Georgian accession becoming even more remote as a result of the recent events in the Caucasus and, in this connection, I have great difficulties following the rather ostentatious promises made by the NATO secretary general a few days ago.
SPIEGEL: The Republican presidential candidate, John McCain, followed up by saying: "Today we're all Georgians."
Schröder: I am not.
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