International


The Gadhafi Cables: US Diplomats Struggle with an Eccentric Despot

By Juliane von Mittelstaedt

For American diplomats, Libya is a notorious hardship post. With his quirky habits, hard bargaining, whiny sons and Ukrainian nurses, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi is far from easy to deal with -- and a master of political extortion.

Photo Gallery: Libya’s Eccentric Master of Political Hardball
Fotos
REUTERS

The "Great Leader" likes to wear jogging pants along with well-worn slippers and a shirt bearing a silhouette of Africa. He often fasts on Mondays and Thursdays, and he usually lives in a simple house rather than the kind of Bedouin-style tent often associated with him.

The floors in this house are creaky, the white walls are bare, and the household servants wear street clothes. Indeed, in private, 68-year-old Moammar Gadhafi -- the colonel, the leader of the Libyan revolution and the author of the literary debut entitled "The Village, the Village, the Earth, the Earth and the Suicide of the Astronauts" -- is a very unassuming fellow.

Still -- at least as the Americans see him -- Gadhafi is also a man plagued by paranoia, anxiety and neuroses, a man who only trusts his closest advisers, a man whose pride is easily wounded and a man who will suffer no criticism. Indeed, for the Americans, Gadhafi is a despot who lost touch with reality long ago and whose only information about the broader world comes from what his aides tell him.

Whenever he feels like it, Gadhafi opens or closes his country's oil spigot, be it to penalize countries for insubordinate behavior or to cover special expenses. In 2009, for example, he let 100,000 extra barrels of oil flow in order to pay for the party he held to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the "revolution" -- a luxurious gala complete with Spanish flamenco dancers and bands from New Zealand.


This is the picture that emerges from 599 reports sent from the US Embassy and liaison office in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, to Washington between December 2004 and February 2010. And most of them have something to do with the "Great Leader" himself.

In one dispatch, Ambassador Gene Cretz comments: "While it is tempting to dismiss his many eccentricities as signs of instability, Qadhafi* is a complicated individual who has managed to stay in power for forty years through a skillful balancing of interests and realpolitik methods."

The American diplomats in Tripoli monitoring Gadhafi and his clan are occasionally amused, but more often their mood is one of concern. They have to tread a fine line between wanting to protect the interests of American oil companies and being expected to pressure the Libyan regime to observe human rights. But, as was shown by the attempted "human rights dialogue" in September 2009, the latter of these appears to be somewhat of a compulsory but vain exercise in the domain of diplomacy with despots. When the talks concluded, the Libyans simply declared that the country had no need for a civil society, anyway.

Americans dispatched to Libya report in great detail on Gadhafi's peculiarities, the airs and graces of his sons and the degree to which his advisers fear his wrath. For example, they closely monitored how wounded pride led him to take two Swiss citizens hostage and humiliate the Swiss government, how he almost forced Canada to its knees by threatening to nationalize the assets of PetroCanada and how he more or less compelled the British to extradite Abdel Baset al-Megrahi, the only man convicted of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over the Scottish town of Lockerbie, killing 270 people, most of them Americans.

As one dispatch explained: "The British ambassador expressed relief that Megrahi likely would be returned to Libya under the compassionate release program. He noted that a refusal of Megrahi's request could have had disastrous implications for British interests in Libya. 'They could have cut us off at the knees, just like the Swiss.'"

A Shrewd Negotiator

Indeed, when it comes to the business of political extortion, Gadhafi is a master. One of the best examples of this comes from the fall of 2009, when a highly secretive US mission went bust. The plan involved transporting 5.2 kilograms (11.5 pounds) of highly enriched uranium from Libya's Tajura nuclear research center to Russia in accordance with Libya's commitment to abandon its atomic program.

The Libyan government initially agreed to have the uranium taken away, but Gadhafi abruptly pulled the emergency brake after the Russian plane had already landed. After waiting it out for a few days, the team from Rosatom, Russia's state-run nuclear company, chose to fly back empty-handed on November 25.

In one report on the affair, the Americans wrote: "The 5.2 kilograms of of HEU (highly enriched uranium) are stored in seven five-ton casks, which Department of Energy experts said are 'highly transportable'."

The report went on to say that the problem needed to be solved within one month's time because, after that, the uranium's temperature "could reach such a level to cause cracking on the casks and release of radioactive material." The report then warned officials back in Washington that: "Given the highly transportable nature of the highly enriched uranium and the shoddy security at Tajoura, any mention of this issue in the press could pose serious security concerns."

ORIGINALS: The Key Libyan Cables
Click on the headlines below to read the full texts...
When it came to the negotiating table, having poorly safeguarded barrels of uranium just standing around put Libya in a position of strength over the Americans. After a couple days, Saif al-Islam, one Gadhafi's several sons, spilled the beans on why the mission had been aborted. As he put it, Libya prevented the uranium from being carted away because, in short, it was "fed up" with the slow pace of bilateral engagement.

According to the American diplomatic documents, however, the longer version goes something more like this: "Saif claimed that Libya had not received the 'compensation' it was promised in exchange for an end to its weapons of mass destruction programs. … Libya sought a high-level reaffirmation of the United States' commitment to the bilateral relationship, in the form of a message to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, in order to move forward on the highly enriched uranium shipment. … He said the that the fact that the centrifuges were sent to the United States and are still there, rather than under IAEA (the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency) surveillance and control was a 'big insult to the Leader.'"

But the centrifuges that Libya had handed over in exchange for being taken off America's list of state sponsors of terrorism had already been scrapped long ago.

What then followed was a kind of diplomatic horse-trading: On Dec. 3, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton telephoned Libyan Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa and promised that steps would be taken to improve their cooperation. Less than two weeks later, on Dec. 14, Saif al-Islam handed the Americans a wish list of military hardware, including helicopters, "Tiger" all-terrain armored vehicles and upgrades for M113 armored personnel carriers. What's more, he asked for the US government to "bless the sale" to purchase "SCALP" cruise missiles from the French. On Dec. 21, the green light was finally given to transport the uranium out of Libya.

Protocol Headaches

Diplomacy in Libya is extremely challenging work. The Libyans only rarely carry out the Americans' wishes -- and only half-heartedly so. It often happens that they make promises to do something and then suddenly renege on that deal. For example, the Americans ask the Libyans to sign trade and investment agreements as well as to engage in a dialogue about human rights while trying to sweeten the deal by offering a possible meeting with Barack Obama. But, time and again, Gadhafi's quirks have torpedoed their attempts.

One diplomatic dispatch described the situation in these terms: "Kusa* noted that the U.S. must treat Libya differently from other Arab nations specifying that we could not treat Colonel Qadhafi the same way we treat Ben Ali in Tunisia or Mubarak in Egypt, given his unique background and experience. He commented that a man of Qadhafi's 'caliber' could not be placed on equal footing with the King of Jordan or other traditional Arab rulers. ... Kusa advised that a deep, correct understanding of Qadhafi's visions and aspirations would be of more benefit to the U.S. regionally than would be engagement with other Arab statesmen."

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