US-Berichte zum Irak Hauruck-Einmarsch in ein unbekanntes Land
Warum erlitten die USA im Irak ein solches Desaster? 6000 Geheimberichte der Botschaft in Bagdad enthüllen, was schieflief. Die Amerikaner schätzten die Probleme zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten völlig falsch ein - und ließen sich von Iran ausbooten, das mächtige Iraker mit eigenwilligen Methoden umgarnte.
Seit 14 Jahren gibt es in Bagdad keine US-Botschaft mehr, als die USA und der Irak am 30. Juni 2004 wieder diplomatische Beziehungen aufnehmen. Es sei ihm "eine große Ehre", Botschafter John Negroponte zu akkreditieren, schreibt Iraks Außenminister Hoschjar Sebari seinem US-Kollegen Colin Powell an diesem Tag: "Ich sehe einer Entwicklung freundlicher und konstruktiver Beziehungen zwischen unseren beiden Nationen entgegen."
Doch es sind bizarre Umstände, unter denen diese Beziehungen beginnen, das ist schon an der Liegenschaft zu erkennen, die sich die Amerikaner aussuchen. Sie lassen sich im Palast des gestürzten Diktators Saddam Hussein nieder, dem Protzbau am Tigrisknie von Bagdad.
Grandios wie die von Saddam hinterlassenen Statuen sind die Pläne, mit denen die US-Diplomaten einziehen. Aber spärlich ist ihre Ahnung von dem, was ihnen jetzt bevorsteht: "Freundlich" und "konstruktiv" ist das Verhältnis nicht, das Amerika mit dem befreiten Irak unterhält. Fünf Botschafter und ein Heer von Analysten und Referenten wird das State Department in nur fünf Jahren verschleißen - und woran die Amerikaner dort scheitern, das zeigen jetzt mehr als 5500 geheime oder vertrauliche Depeschen der Botschaft Bagdad.
<<158199>> 6/14/2008 6:50 08BAGHDAD1784 Embassy Baghdad SECRET//NOFORN
O 140650Z JUN 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7781 INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY CIA WASHDC PRIORITY DIA WASHDC PRIORITY IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY 0063 JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY MNF-I HUMINT OPS BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY REO BASRAH PRIORITY 2333 REO HILLAH PRIORITY 2275 REO KIRKUK PRIORITY 2272 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2// PRIORITY USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE PRIORITY TAGS: IZ, IR, PREL, PGOV, PINR SUBJECT: PM MALIKI RECOUNTS HIS JUNE 7-9 VISIT TO TEHRAN
S e c r e t baghdad 001784
E.o. 12958: decl: 06/12/2018 Tags: iz, ir, prel, pgov, pinr Subject: pm maliki recounts his june 7-9 visit to tehran
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's June 7-9 visit to Tehran featured meetings with all of Iran's senior leadership, but Maliki told S/I Ambassador Satterfield that he went to visit Supreme Leader Khamenei, agreeing to the other meetings solely out of protocol. The Ministers of Defense, Finance, Water Resources, and Electricity joined the Prime Minister for the visit. Maliki noted that Khamenei was strongly opposed to SOFA/SFA agreement on both political and religious grounds, but had suggested that it was Maliki's decision to make. Maliki claimed he confronted the Iranians about lethal assistance to extremist groups. While Supreme Leader Khamenei denied this support, he did pledge to look into issue of Iranian weapons entering Iraq and to speak with Muqtada al-Sadr about SG activities. IRGC-QF Commander Soleimani told PM that Iranian lethal assistance had stopped as promised, but Al Maliki was dismissive of Soleimani,s assurances. Minister of Defense al-Mufraji concluded an MOU to resolve lingering issues from the Iran-Iraq War period. Septel reporting will address economic and other aspects of visit, as well as local and regional media reaction. End summary.
2. (S/NF) Iraqi PM Maliki and MOD Abd al-Qadr al-Mufraji briefed S/I Satterfield and PM MinCouns Ries June 11 on the PM's just concluded visit to Iran. Prime Minister Maliki had been accompanied on the trip by Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir Mufraji, Minister of Water Resources Abd al-Latif Al-Rashid, and Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr al-Zubaydi. Maliki told Satterfield that his purpose in going to Iran was to see Khamene,i. He agreed to see others, including Ahmadinejad and some ministers under pressure from his staff who argued it was necessary for protocol, but he considered these other meetings irrelevant.
SOFA/SFA: Iran Unalterably Opposed, But PM Must Decide --------------------------------------------- ---------
3. (S/NF) Khamenei, he said, was unalterably opposed to the SOFA/SFA on political and religious grounds. Nonetheless, Khamenei reminded Maliki of his exile in Iran as a member of the anti-Saddam opposition. The Iranian government had never stood in his way then when he sought to attend conferences in Western countries. Likewise, Khamenei concluded, Maliki would need to make his own decision on this matter, leaving the impression that it was "on the PM,s head" regarding his choice to continue negotiations with the U.S. The Iranians said the SOFA/SFA would ultimately prove damaging to Iraq, as the Americans would use Iraq as a platform to attack other countries in the region. Maliki said he countered that Iraq "had no choice" but to seek continued assistance from the U.S., as Iraq needed U.S. support to develop its armed forces and thus achieve greater stability and security in the country. The PM said he had made a measured, "logical" presentation to Khamene,i and to IRGC-QF head Soleimani ) but had not moved them, although other Iranians with whom the delegation met had shown greater understanding. Amused, the PM said he had challenged Khamene,i to "give us 17 of the Ilyushins Saddam sent to Iran" if Iran really wanted to be such a good friend to Iraq. There had been no response.
PM Presses on Iranian Arms and Sadrist "Gangs" --------------------------------------------- -
4. (S/NF) The Prime Minister portrayed himself as taking a very tough stance with the Iranians on their support for Shia extremists in Iraq. He said he told Khamenei that relations with Iran could be quite positive if Iran ceased interfering in Iraq's internal affairs. Iran's support for JAM "Special Groups" was "hurting the image of Iran among Iraq,s Shia population" and Iran needed to change its behaviors. The PM said he had brushed aside discussion of the one billion USD soft loan Iran was offering (see septel on discussion with Finance Minister Jabr) and other economic issues saying that only what Iran did on the problem of the Sadrist &gangs8 counted. He pointed to the trouble they caused, between Iraq and Iran and amongst the Shia in Iraq as well and asked why the Iranians were persisting in providing support for these groups.
5. (S/NF) Maliki said that he had presented "Iraqi evidence) not U.S.-provided evidence" to Soleimani and Khamenei on Iranian training and equipping of the JAM Special Groups. Confessions by JAM personnel "and others," photos of weapons ("I told them labels said made in Iran, and other "Iraqi" information had all been laid out to the Iranian leader. Unlike on past occasions, Maliki said the Iranian response had not/not been denial. Soleimani had asserted that the training and weapons supply must have been done "without authorization" and would be investigated. The Supreme Leader had sworn "by every oath he knew" (Maliki said he attached no credibility whatsoever to all this) that he had issued a fatwa against any activities that could harm the security of Iraq. Therefore, he was shocked, shocked to learn that "someone must be violating my orders" and would investigate what had happened. He also undertook to talk to Moqtada al-Sadr about the activities of the Special Groups. Commenting on the relationship between Soleimani and Khamene,i, Maliki said that it was a "mistake" to see Soleimani as an independent actor. "He follows Khamenei,s line completely and without Khamene,i he would be nothing."
Basrah Campaign: The "Magic Key" --------------------------------
6. (S/NF) The PM characterized his campaign in Basrah as the "magic key" which changed the dynamic with the Sadrists and, he implied, with the Iranians. The GOI,s successes in Basrah and Sadr City had created an image of a stable, capable government that others should respect. The PM said he had read through with Khamene,i and Soleimani the "14 points" that constituted the GOI,s conditions put forward in Basrah and Sadr City to the JAM. He had made clear to the Iranians that if the JAM abided by the GOI,s demands a peaceful resolution ) which ultimately would have to be the "dissolution of the JAM as a military force" ) would be possible. But if the JAM continued to challenge the authority of the state, Maliki said he had told the Iranian leader that the GOI "would strike, would strike, would strike" at the groups involved until they were "destroyed." "If Iran is helping them, then Iran must understand we will not exercise restraint." Maliki said the Iranians claimed to support the GOI,s position and would press Sadr to announce his intentions publicly. The PM said that he had declined to meet Moqtada al-Sadr while in Iran (although others in his party had attempted and failed to make contact). He did this deliberately to avoid the perception that he was willing to negotiate.
7. (S/NF) The PM told Satterfield that he had demanded that the Iranians cease referring in public statements to Iraq as an "occupied" country or to MNF-I as an "occupier." Neither was correct and the assertions were damaging to the GOI. The Iranians had promised to act; the PM said, "we,ll see." Finally, the PM said there had been a long conversation on the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), noting that the Iranians were adamant that MEK were committing violent acts in Iran from their base in Iraq. The Iranians said that they knew that the Americans have MEK on the terrorist list, but they also protected them. Maliki reiterated to Satterfield his long-standing request that the U.S. "do something" to end the presence of the MEK in Iraq, which he argued provided a pretext for Iran to engage in its own unhelpful activities.
xxxxxxxxxxxx Offers Views of Visit -----------------------------------
8. (S/NF) In a separate meeting on June 12 xxxxxxxxxxxx that the primary goal of Maliki's visit to Iran earlier this week was to persuade the Iranians to stop arming and training Sadrists. xxxxxxxxxxxx admitted that he was not sure the Iranians got the message: even though the atmospherics were warm, the Iranians claimed that they had already ended their support of Sadrist militants. "I'm not sure they gave the Prime Minister a real commitment to stop," xxxxxxxxxxxx. He assessed that it was too early to tell whether the visit was a success (he deemed it 50/50 for the moment) and said we would need to watch carefully over the next few days to see whether there is any indication of a change in Iranian behavior.
Defense Minister Abdul Qader al-Mufraji ---------------------------------------
9. (S/NF) In a separate meeting June 11, DefMin al-Mufraji offered his views on the visit to Satterfield and Ries. Corroborating the PM,s account of events, Al-Mufraji said the atmosphere of the meetings overall was positive with respect to the strength of the GOI presentation. In his meeting with Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Najjar, he said that he had mirrored the PM,s challenge (above) to Khamene,i for Iran to provide concrete assistance to Iraq,s armed forces ) raising the "Ilyushin" request. The Iranians had not responded.
10. (S/NF) In reference to the purported "defense/security agreement" signed during the visit, al-Mufraji confirmed that the agreement was in fact a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU covered land and sea border issues, (updating border agreements reached in the 1975 Algiers Accord), mine clearance in border regions, and recovery of remains of soldiers from the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. Referring specifically to mine clearance, Al-Mufraji noted that many of the remaining mines were in the mountainous border region, and were slipping down mountains onto the Iraqi side, threatening local farmers and shepherds. The two governments are reportedly planning to establish bilateral working groups to address the various aspects of the MOU.
Einer der ersten Namen, die in den Berichten aus Bagdad auftauchen, ist der eines jungen Schiitenführers, von dem nicht viel mehr bekannt ist, als dass er aus einer Gelehrtendynastie stammt und dass ein Haftbefehl gegen ihn vorliegt: Muktada al-Sadr. Er wird eine der entscheidenden Figuren des Konfessionskriegs sein, auf den das Land zusteuert.
Iraks Regierung im Richtungskonflikt
Was Rubai selbst von Muktada al-Sadr hält, bleibt unklar, auch drei Jahre später noch, als dessen Miliz bereits Tausende ermordet hat. Trotzdem rate er seiner eigenen Regierung und den Koalitionstruppen, nicht "exzessiv kinetisch" gegen die Mahdi-Armee vorzugehen. Das erhöhe die Gefahr "unkontrollierter Gewalt".
Rubai weist die Amerikaner auch früh auf einen Grundkonflikt hin, der alle irakischen Nachkriegsregierungen plagt: Wem sollen sie folgen? Den Amerikanern, die den Irak von Saddam Hussein befreit haben? Oder dem mächtigen Nachbarn Iran - der auch dann noch Nachbar sein wird, wenn die US-Armee längst wieder abgezogen ist?
Für sunnitische Iraker ist die Lage klar: Das schiitische Iran ist der Feind. Aber unter Iraks Schiitenführern, berichtet ihnen Rubai, gebe es zwei Denkschulen: Die einen, die "Moderaten", neigten Amerika zu. Die anderen, die "Konservativen", stünden Iran näher. Ibrahim al-Dschaafari, der erste gewählte Ministerpräsident, gehöre dem zweiten Lager an. Er wünsche sich eine mit Iran abgestimmte Sicherheitsstrategie, also eine direkte Zusammenarbeit der beiden Geheimdienste.
Die USA und Iran sollten den Irak doch zum Anlass nehmen, ihre Differenzen beizulegen, schlägt Rubai vor. Manches stehe dem vielleicht im Wege, räumt er ein - Irans Nuklearprogramm etwa oder die Aktivitäten der iranischen Revolutionswächter im Irak ("eine große Gefahr"). Dass der neue iranische Präsident Mahmud Ahmadinedschad selbst aus den Reihen der Revolutionswächter stamme, so Rubai ironisch, gebe ihm aber vielleicht die nötige "Flexibilität", die "harten Entscheidungen" zu treffen, um das Misstrauen zwischen Washington und Teheran abzubauen. Bei aller Ironie - ein kolossales Fehlurteil.