US-Geheimdepeschen Amerikaner lästern über Chaos-Konzern Gazprom

Gazprom sollte Russland wieder zur Supermacht machen, Manager träumten vom "wertvollsten Unternehmen der Welt". Doch Geheimberichte aus Moskaus US-Botschaft zeichnen ein anderes Bild: Die Amerikaner halten den Megakonzern für chaotisch organisiert - und korrupt.

Gazprom-Zentrale in Moskau: Private Konten und schmutzige Geschäfte?
dpa

Gazprom-Zentrale in Moskau: Private Konten und schmutzige Geschäfte?


Hamburg - Die US-Diplomaten saßen mit einem hochrangigen Gazprom-Vertreter zusammen, endlich, leicht sind die nicht zu erwischen. Also kamen sie gleich zur Sache: Was eigentlich die Geschäftsziele des gigantischen Energieunternehmens seien?

Der Gazprom-Mann gab sich offen. Zunächst einmal, soll er US-Depeschen zufolge doziert haben, müsse sein Konzern die Gasversorgung der Verbraucher und Firmen daheim sicherstellen. Danach gäbe es noch "soziale Verpflichtungen" zu erfüllen, etwa Wohltätigkeitsprojekte im ganzen Land.

Die US-Vertreter hakten nach. Müsse nicht auch Ziel eines Unternehmens sein, seinen Wert für die Aktionäre oder den Marktanteil zu maximieren? Ja, das schon. Aber dem Russen fiel noch ein Punkt ein, und der klang eher nach politischen Ambitionen als nach kühlem Geschäftsmodell: "Maximale Kontrolle über die globalen Energieressourcen", so zitieren ihn die Amerikaner, wolle der Konzern anstreben.

"Gazprom-Vertreter beschreibt die Firma als sozialistischen Monopolisten", berichten die US-Entsandten nach dem Treffen im September 2008 in einem Kabelbericht an Washington.

"Ungeheuer reich, aber ineffizient"

So ist der Tenor vieler geheimer US-Botschaftsberichte über das russische Vorzeige-Unternehmen - und er deckt sich mit kritischen amerikanischen Einschätzungen zur überbordenden Bürokratie und einem mafiaähnlichen politischen System in Russland.

Besonders pointiert fallen die Urteile zu Gazprom aus, das die Russen selbst gern als beste Waffe im Kampf um die verlorene Weltmachtrolle feiern. Noch im Mai 2008 versprach Konzernchef Alexej Miller, Gazprom werde bald das "wertvollste Unternehmen der Welt sein", mit einem Marktwert von einer Billion Dollar. Doch schon knapp ein Jahr später war der Wert in Folge der weltweiten Wirtschaftskrise auf 75 Milliarden geplumpst.

"Gazprom ist so", resümieren die Amerikaner, "wie man sich ein staatliches Monopol vorstellt, das auf ungeheurem Reichtum sitzt." Sie halten den Konzern für "ineffizient, von der Politik bestimmt und korrupt". Akribisch beugen sich die Diplomaten über die Geschäftsfelder des Energiegiganten, dem die gefallenen Gaspreise zu schaffen machten.

Die Nachfrage nach Gas fällt

Ihre Ergebnisse sind ernüchternd, in einem Bericht aus dem Jahr 2009 heißt es: "Weit entfernt von seinen Ambitionen, die 'wertvollste Firma der Welt' zu werden, hat sich Gazproms Schicksal im vorigen Jahr dramatisch umgekehrt. Der Marktwert der Firma, die Produktion und Verkäufe sind alle seit Beginn der Wirtschaftskrise eingebrochen." Die deutlich reduzierten Einnahmen zwängen die Firma zu Einschnitten bei Investitionen, aller politischen Rhetorik zum Trotz.

Die Probleme seien langfristiger Natur, nicht nur krisenbedingt, betonen die US-Diplomaten. Denn die Nachfrage nach Gas falle in Deutschland und Europa, weil dort die industrielle Produktion effektiver geworden sei.

In den Ländern der ehemaligen Sowjetunion winkten ebenfalls kaum neue Absatzmärkte, die Ukraine etwa habe gerade den Ankauf von Gas um die Hälfte reduziert, steht in einer Botschaftsdepesche. Und neue Märkte, wie die USA, von denen Konzernchef Miller gerne schwärmt? "Immer mehr gesättigt", außerdem steige dort die heimische Produktion.

Das größte Problem bleibt nach dem Urteil der US-Diplomaten aber die Organisation des verzweigten Unternehmens selbst. "Gazprom ist keine wettbewerbsfähige Weltfirma", heißt es in einer Einschätzung, obwohl es die weltgrößten Gasreserven besitze. "Gazprom ist Nachfolger des sowjetischen Gasministeriums, und so operiert es auch noch."

Spitzenmanager zeigt Vorliebe für Eishockey

Die Anzeichen dafür sind nicht zu übersehen. Von einem Informanten haben die Amerikaner erfahren, dass der Partner einer internationalen Buchhaltungsfirma volle zwei Jahre aufwenden musste, um sich einen Überblick über Gazproms weit verzweigte Beteiligungen zu verschaffen. Teile des Imperiums sind etwa eine von Russlands größten Banken, eine wichtige russische Medienfirma und ein Baukonzern.

Wortlaut: Die wichtigsten Depeschen zu Gazprom
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10. Juni 2009, Moskau: "Zu viele politische Vorgaben"
XXXXXX: Von der Redaktion geschwärzt. Wichtige Hinweise zu den Depeschen...

<<228530>>

10.06.2009 11:02

09MOSCOW2528

Embassy Moscow

CONFIDENTIAL

09MOSCOW367|09MOSCOW403|09MOSCOW971

VZCZCXYZ0000

PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2528/01 2791102

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 061102Z OCT 09

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4993

INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

TAGS: EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, RS

SUBJECT: GAZPROM'S REVERSAL OF FORTUNE, PART ONE

REF: A. MOSCOW 971

C o n f i d e n t i a l moscow 002528

Sipdis

Dept for eur/rus, eeb/esc/iec gallogly and wright, s/eee

morningstar

doe for hegburg, ekimoff

doc for jbrougher

nsc for mmcfaul

E.o. 12958: decl: 10/05/2019

Tags: epet, enrg, econ, prel, rs

Subject: gazprom's reversal of fortune, part one

Ref: a. Moscow 971

b. Moscow 403

c. Moscow 367

Classified By: Econ MC Matthias J. Mitman for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

1. (U) This is the first of a two-part report on the new

economic realities facing Gazprom, Russia's state-owned gas

sector giant.

-------

summary

-------

2. (SBU) Far from reaching its ambitions of becoming "the

most valuable company in the world," Gazprom's fortunes have

reversed dramatically in the past year. The company's market

value, production, and sales have all plummeted since the

onset of the economic crisis. With dramatically reduced

cash-flow, the company has been forced to cut back on capital

expenditures and its ambitions, despite political rhetoric to

the contrary. However, as we will examine in part two of

this report, Gazprom's problems are likely longer term. End

summary.

------------------------------------

massive reversal in major indicators

------------------------------------

3. (U) Major indicators of Gazprom's performance have all

reversed course dramatically in the past year. (Note:

Figures in this report are taken from Gazprom reports,

statements, and presentations, unless otherwise indicated.

End note.)

Market capitalization --

4. (U) At its peak in May 2008, Gazprom's market valuation,

based on the small percentage of its shares that trade

publicly, was over $350 billion, and company president Alexey

Miller declared Gazprom would become "the most valuable

company in the world." Miller suggested Gazprom's market

capitalization would reach $1 trillion in the near future.

By May 2009, in the midst of the global economic and

financial crisis, the company's market capitalization had

dropped to its recent low of approximately $75 billion, but

has since rebounded to approximately $120 billion.

Production --

5. (U) Gazprom's gas production peaked in 2006, at 556

billion cubic meters (bcm). In 2008, it was 550 bcm. In the

first seven months of 2009, however, Gazprom's production was

down almost 25% over the same period in 2008. As of

September 2009, Gazprom expects 2009 production to reach just

474 bcm, and many analysts believe that figure to be overly

optimistic. In a September note on Gazprom, investment bank

Troika Dialog predicted Gazprom would have difficulty even

reaching 460 bcm. On the low end, some analysts estimate

Gazprom could produce just 450 bcm or less in 2009 -- a 100

bcm or more decline from its peak production. Even this

massive drop in production is masked to some degree by the

halt in gas imports from Turkmenistan since April (ref A).

In 2008, Gazprom imported 42 bcm from Turkmenistan, nearly

all of which was re-exported to Ukraine. Having halted these

imports, Gazprom itself is supplying the Ukrainian market out

of Russian production.

Revenues --

6. (U) The Russian Customs Service reports that Russian gas

export revenues were down 50% in the first 7 months of 2009,

compared to the same period in 2008, a decline of almost $20

billion. While Gazprom's official results for 2009 will not

be published until well into 2010, a back-of-the-envelope

calculation using Gazprom's own projections for average price

and volumes of exports to Europe in 2009 (ref C) indicates

the company might receive about $30 billion less from exports

to Europe in 2009 than in 2008. This represents a loss of

about 2% of Russian GDP and is in line with estimates from

various analysts. (Note: Given the relative significance of

export sales to Europe (excluding FSU), the relative

reliability of the figures, and to avoid exchange rate

complications, we focus only on export revenues here.

According to its recent bond prospectus, Gazprom's exports

are divided into sales to the FSU, and to Europe. Sales to

the FSU and Europe represent 16% and 63%, respectively, of

its sales by revenue -- meaning exports represent 79% of

Gazprom's revenues. End note.)

Domestic sales --

7. (U) Gazprom's domestic sales are not down as dramatically

as one would expect given the economic crisis, due primarily

to artificially low domestic prices, which prop up demand.

While Gazprom has not yet reported official results for the

first half of 2009 (1H09), various analysts predict a drop of

about 10% in gas volumes to the domestic market.

Export volumes --

8. (U) Gazprom's overall exports peaked in 2008 at 281 bcm.

Gazprom's sales to the FSU peaked in 2007, at 101 bcm,

dropping slightly to 97 bcm in 2008. Sales to the rest of

Europe peaked in 2008, at 184 bcm. (Note: Interim

statements regarding 2009 sales often do not coincide in

definition with audited annual reports. Thus 1H09 sales

estimates only give an indication of the trend and are not an

exact comparison with 2008 figures. Gazprom has not yet

released official results for 1H09 and only released first

quarter (1Q09) results on August 26. End note.) Through

1H09, Gazprom has said it shipped about 33% less gas to

European customers than in 1H08. In a recent statement, the

company said its exports to the FSU in 1H09 dropped 54%

compared to 1H08. A weighted average of those estimates

indicates overall exports shrunk by about 40% 1H09.

9. (U) As Gazprom and many analysts point out, however, 2H09

should be much better for Gazprom exports as many European

customers restrained purchases in 1H09, knowing that prices

-- which are tied to oil prices with a six to nine month lag

-- would drop dramatically in 3Q09. Furthermore, export

volumes in 2H08 were already dropping rapidly due to the

economic crisis and high gas prices that were reaching their

peak in 4Q08. Results for 1H09 were also significantly

affected by the 21 day gas cutoff to Ukraine and 10 day

cutoff to Europe in January. That said, 2009 will still be a

dismal year for Gazprom export volumes.

---------------

forced cutbacks

---------------

10. (C) Facing financial realities, Gazprom recently cut its

capital expenditure budget by $7.5 billion, or about 25%,

including cuts to Shtokman and Yamal development. However,

Gazprom and GOR leadership continue to take the tack that

"everything is fine" (ref B). One attendee at the recent

gathering of the "Valdai" group of international Russia

experts told us that Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller told the group

that the company's plans for the Nord Stream and South Stream

gas pipelines, and for the development of the Shtokman and

Yamal gas fields are "all on track."

11. (C)xxxxxxxxxxxx told us recently that

Miller's and other GOR leaders' public statements on Gazprom

should be ignored. xxxxxxxxxxxx said these leaders understand well

that Gazprom is in trouble but they just don't know what to

do about it.

12. (C) According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, Gazprom simply doesn't have the

money to move forward on all its so-called "priorities," and

it will need to choose which are most important, while facing

insatiable political demands on its revenue streams. xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us

recently that he believes Gazprom has "a heck of a lot of

cost-cutting capacity" still available, but that the company

has too many political constraints preventing it from taking

the most necessary and painful measures. Furthermore, he

figures the company needs to spend about $5 to $8 billion a

year just to maintain its aging system and that these costs

will rise in the future. xxxxxxxxxxxx is thus also very

skeptical of Gazprom's other major commitments such as South

Stream and Shtokman.

-------

comment

-------

13. (C) Gazprom's capital expenditure cuts reflect an

understanding that, public rhetoric aside, the company can't

spend money it doesn't have. However, Gazprom's longer-run

problems are largely beyond its control and require

fundamental reforms that will be difficult to achieve. In

part two of this report, we examine the constraints to

Gazprom's return to dominance.

Beyrle

10. Juli 2009, Moskau: "Reich, aber korrupt"
XXXXXX: Von der Redaktion geschwärzt. Wichtige Hinweise zu den Depeschen...

<<228749>>

10.07.2009 13:42

09MOSCOW2541

Embassy Moscow

CONFIDENTIAL

09MOSCOW2528|09MOSCOW854|09VLADIVOSTOK110

VZCZCXRO4339

PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR

DE RUEHMO #2541/01 2801342

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 071342Z OCT 09

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5023

INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

TAGS: EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, RS

SUBJECT: GAZPROM'S REVERSAL OF FORTUNE, PART TWO; COMEBACK

REF: A. MOSCOW 2528

C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 moscow 002541

Sipdis

Dept for eur/rus, eeb/esc/iec gallogly and greenstein,

s/eee morningstar

doe for hegburg, ekimoff

doc for jbrougher

nsc for mmcfaul

E.o. 12958: decl: 10/06/2019

Tags: epet, enrg, econ, prel, rs

Subject: gazprom's reversal of fortune, part two; comeback

unlikely

Ref: a. Moscow 2528

b. Vladivostok 110

c. Moscow 854

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

1. (U) This is part two of a two-part cable on the new

economic realities facing Gazprom, Russia's state-owned gas

sector giant.

-------

Summary

-------

2. (C) Gazprom faces many external and internal constraints

to renewed growth, following a dismal year in which all main

indicators of its performance deteriorated dramatically. The

globalizing gas market, a gas glut that shows no signs of

reversal, and politicized management likely mean that Gazprom

will not reach the heights of revenues and power achieved at

its peak in 2008. Unfortunately, the types of reforms (e.g.

privatization) that would result in a more valuable and

productive gas industry are stymied by the GOR's seemingly

firm belief in a state-controlled sector. While Gazprom will

remain a major economic force, its influence on GOR policy

and its relative role in the Russian economy likely will

diminish in the short- and medium-term. End summary.

---------------------------------

external constraints to a rebound

---------------------------------

3. (SBU) Gazprom's current problems (ref A) are not solely

the result of one-off contractions in demand due to the

economic crisis. Gazprom faces a fundamental shift in the

gas demand picture at a time of increasing competition.

Demand stabilization and decline --

4. (SBU) xxxxxxxxxxxx told us recently that Gazprom was simply unprepared

for the inevitable leveling off and current decline in

European gas demand. He explained that Gazprom's management

has only known rapidly rising European demand for Russian gas

as most European countries "gassified" their economies over

the past two decades. He noted that anyone looking at the

trend could have been excused for thinking it would continue

perpetually; but now the period of gassification is over.

According to xxxxxxxxxxxx demand for gas in Germany is

actually in decline, as industrial production in Germany (and

across Europe) has become more efficient and as much of it

has been outsourced.

Competition --

5. (SBU) Gazprom not only faces a demand problem, but also

competition from an increasingly globalized gas market --

"for the next 5 to 10 years, gas will clearly be a buyers

market," said xxxxxxxxxxxx has calculated (using data

from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy) that

Gazprom's share of EU 27 gas imports has dropped steadily

from about 50% in the mid-90s (when gassification increased

demand) to just 34% in 2009. xxxxxxxxxxxx expects Gazprom's share to

decline to about 30% and stabilize at that level. xxxxxxxxxxxx also

calculated that LNG's contribution to EU imports over the

last decade has increased from about 10% to about 20%, a

figure he projected to continue to grow. In addition,

Gazprom will have to cope with massive new volumes of LNG on

the global market from projects already underway in Qatar and

elsewhere (ref C).

No help from other markets --

6. (C) Gazprom is unlikely to get any relief from its former

Soviet Union(FSU) customers either. Despite the likely rise

to "market prices" for gas sales to the FSU, lower demand

will continue to hurt Gazprom. Ukraine, Gazprom's major

export market outside of non-FSU Europe, earlier signed a

take-or-pay contract which outlines a minimum amount of gas

which Ukraine is obliged to purchase from Russia. Ukraine

Moscow 00002541 002 of 004

has recently indicated it might take as little as 50% of the

52 bcm of gas it had earlier agreed to buy in 2010. Russian

government officials remain concerned over Ukraine's ability

to pay for gas this winter and are already signaling they are

prepared to shut off exports to Ukraine in the event of

non-payment.

7. (SBU) Global markets will also offer little hope for

Gazprom, at least in the medium-term. Gazprom executives

have often expressed the expectation that the company would

become a global gas supplier, perhaps through newly expanded

LNG capacity. However, their preferred future export

destination, the U.S., is looking more and more saturated

every day with ever larger estimates for domestic production.

In a recent meeting with Embassy officials in Sakhalin,

Shell oil representatives stated that no LNG had been shipped

from the Sakhalin II facility to the U.S. due to soft prices

in that market. Much of this LNG has been shipped to Japan

instead.

Domestic market --

8. (SBU) Gazprom often touts future revenue gains from

domestic market price liberalization. However, it neglects

to account for demand elasticity in the wake of sharp

proposed increases in prices. With one of the most energy

intensive economies in the world, future hikes in domestic

gas prices would likely cut domestic demand substantially, as

evidenced in other countries that have implemented rational

pricing. Thus Gazprom's revenue gains from higher domestic

prices would be at least partly offset by lower sales volumes.

External politics --

9. (SBU) In addition to the headwinds from market forces,

Gazprom faces the political and PR difficulties in external

markets that it has largely brought on itself through the gas

cutoffs of 2009 and 2006. Despite some pain in certain

Central and Eastern European countries, Ovchinnikov

explained, the 2009 gas cutoff showed that Europe could get

by without Russian gas. This should bolster EU determination

to minimize its dependence on Russian gas, and to explore new

options to diversify energy supplies.

------------------------------

internal constraints to growth

------------------------------

The Ministry of Gas --

10. (SBU) A Gazprom that behaved more like a competitive

global company would probably find a new path to growth more

quickly. But Gazprom is not a competitive global company,

despite sitting on the world's largest gas reserves. Gazprom

is a legacy of the old Soviet Ministry of Gas and it still

operates much the same way. As a Gazprom executive himself

admitted to us, the company's first two priorities are to

provide reliable and affordable gas to the domestic

population, to "fulfill its social obligations." One contact

with direct information told us it took a senior partner from

a major accounting firm two years of full-time investigation

just to unravel Gazprom's holdings, which include one of

Russia's largest banks, one of Russia's major media

companies, and a major construction company.

Technologically backward --

11. (SBU) Gazprom's legacy and the government's ownership of

the company also mean that it must act in the interests of

its political masters, even at the expense of sound economic

decision-making. From building unneeded pipelines (ref B) to

maintaining employment at some unneeded facilities, Gazprom

declines to solely act on financial and economic grounds. As

a state-controlled monopoly during the flush times of the

past decade, Gazprom had little incentive to develop new

technologies and capabilities long enjoyed by other global

oil and gas companies. Despite management's interest in

expanding Gazprom's LNG capacity, the company has only one

LNG export terminal, which it took over by forcibly becoming

the majority owner in a Shell-led consortium. Rapid

Moscow 00002541 003 of 004

expansion of LNG export capacity is unlikely without the help

of international oil companies (IOCs), who are still trying

to find an acceptable future working model in Russia.

Inability to adapt --

12. (SBU) Gazprom's inability to meet competitive pressures

is apparent in the current European gas market. According to

xxxxxxxxxxxx Gazprom is the only major European supplier that

has had to cut production. xxxxxxxxxxxx blames Gazprom's "self

inflicting wound" of tying gas prices to oil prices. He said

this convention dates back to when gas was a substitute for

fuel oil for heating. xxxxxxxxxxxx explained that this oil

price link has made Gazprom the high-price supplier in

Europe, a situation that is likely to continue into the near

future. xxxxxxxxxxxx said that with European gas demand unlikely to

recover to pre-crisis levels until 2013 and Europe facing

"excess supply" for at least the next decade, Gazprom will

have a very tough time just maintaining market share. A

major oil company senior executive echoed this analysis in a

recent meeting with us, noting "if you are a European

consumer, the last molecule of gas you want to buy is from

Gazprom."

---------------------------------------

possible tensions, but reforms unlikely

---------------------------------------

13. (SBU) The tough times may be creating (or exacerbating)

tensions within Gazprom and the GOR over the company's

future. Several contacts have told us they have heard of

such tensions. One Russian company executive said he has

heard that xxxxxxxxxxxx has been pushing for dismantling

Gazprom, to at least take away its control over the domestic

gas pipeline system. An executive at a Western company told

us recently that there are two camps within the upper levels

of the GOR on the issue of Gazprom's direction. One camp

favors the current "one national company" approach, while the

other favors competition to spur a more efficient and modern

gas sector. Unfortunately, this executive explained, "the

number one factor" in managing Gazprom from the GOR

perspective is "how to increase government revenues from the

company."

14. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx, brushed off rumors of infighting

at Gazprom as nothing new. xxxxxxxxxxxx said there has always been

infighting at the company because it is such a bureaucratic

behemoth. "Everyone is always looking to make others look

bad in order to move ahead themselves," xxxxxxxxxxxx said. While

xxxxxxxxxxxx acknowledged Gazprom's substantial problems, xxxxxxxxxxxx did

not think any major reforms would be forthcoming.

15. (SBU) Rumors aside, nobody with whom we have talked

believes Gazprom is in any danger of losing its monopoly on

exports or its preferred status within the Russian economy.

Nor is the government likely to give up control of the

company anytime soon. Without such fundamental reforms, it

is difficult to see how Gazprom can transform itself into a

modern corporation in the current environment.

-------

comment

-------

16. (C) Gazprom is what one would expect of a state-owned

monopoly sitting atop huge wealth -- inefficient, politically

driven, and corrupt. For years, with its exports and export

prices rising rapidly, it could easily pretend that all was

well and that the future was bright. That pretense may now

be giving way to the new reality of declining sales, lost

market share, and an inability to maneuver adeptly in the

face of global competition. Although Gazprom will likely

muddle along as a major corporation and major contributor of

jobs and budget funds, its economic contribution will likely

be diminished. While Gazprom can still shut off gas to

Ukraine or to other parts of Europe, each such threat further

undermines the company's credibility as a reliable energy

supplier, and underscores the fact that Gazprom is

Moscow 00002541 004 of 004

politically subordinate to the Kremlin. Gazprom's influence,

both domestic and international, has been directly tied to

its cash flow -- money that funds employment, suppliers,

budgets, charities, foreign ventures, and, surely, many

private bank accounts and dirty deals. Unfortunately for

Gazprom and for the GOR, the massive revenues and profits

that the company produced in 2008 are unlikely to return

anytime soon. End comment.

Beyrle

Experten schätzen, die Firma müsse zudem allein fünf bis acht Milliarden Dollar jedes Jahr aufwenden, um ihre veraltete Infrastruktur in Schuss zu halten - mit steigenden Kosten in der Zukunft. Ein prominenter westlicher Ölmanager berichtet den Amerikanern, dass ein Bohrloch, das in Kanada in zehn Tagen gebohrt werden könne, in Russland doppelt so lange brauche.

Die Treffen mit Top-Firmenvertretern wie Vizekonzernchef Alexander Medwedew verliefen ebenfalls ernüchternd. Der Eishockeyfan beschwerte sich im Gespräch mit US-Diplomaten darüber, dass es noch immer keine Kooperation zwischen der russischen und der amerikanischen Eishockeyliga gebe - und wetterte mit Vorliebe gegen Nachbarn Ukraine, der den Gaskrieg gegen Russland angezettelt habe.

Daher fällt das Fazit der Amerikaner verheerend aus: "Gazprom muss für die Interessen seiner politischen Herren handeln, selbst wenn das auf Kosten guter Geschäftsentscheidungen geht." Der Konzern habe für "viele private Konten" und "schmutzige Geschäfte" Kapital bereitzustellen. Konkrete Belege hierfür bleiben die bekannt gewordenen US-Depeschen jedoch schuldig. Gazprom selbst hat sich gegen Korruptionsvorwürfe stets verwahrt.

Ohnehin aber fließe das Gazprom-Geld nicht mehr wie gewohnt, schreiben die Amerikaner. "Bedauerlicherweise für Gazprom und die russische Regierung", heißt es in einem Kabelbericht, "werden die massiven Umsätze und Profite aus dem Jahr 2008 so bald nicht zurückkommen." Gazprom dürfte eine große Firma bleiben, aber mit schrumpfendem wirtschaftlichem Einfluss.

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w.-d.w 05.01.2011
1. Die Boys haben keinen Grund zum lästern
Zitat von sysopGazprom sollte Russland wieder zur Supermacht machen, Manager träumten vom "wertvollsten Unternehmen der Welt". Doch Geheimberichte aus Moskaus US-Botschaft zeichnen ein anderes Bild: Die Amerikaner halten den Megakonzern für chaotisch organisiert - und*korrupt. http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/0,1518,737635,00.html
Wer einmal mit kritischem Blick durch die USA reist, wird schnell feststellen, dass das Land trotz aller (vorwiegend aus Deutschland geklauter) Hochtechnologie in der Breite doch eine ziemlich rückständige Infrastruktur hat. Man könnte auch sagen, es ist ein gigantischer Sanierungsfall.
Spiegeleii 05.01.2011
2. Die
Amerikaner sind eben das Licht der Welt. Alle anderen sind korrupt und chaotisch. Wenn BP mal ein paar Millionen Liter Öl ins Meer bläst ist das nicht chaotisch, es ist eigentlich nichtmal wirklich passiert. Der Russe ist korrupt und dumm, genau wie der Chinese oder Iraner(Iraner sind zusätzlich noch verblendet und böse). Wenn Chinesen den Euro stützen dann steht da immer knallharte Interessenpolitik hinter, ganz anders als wenn westliche Unternehmen investieren. Die machen das in ihrem christlich jüdischen Selbstverständnis nur als Dienst am Menschen. Egal ob Goldman Sachs griechische Bilanzen frisiert oder Monsanto den Haitianern Genmais unterjubelt in ihrer Not, das dient alles der Völkerverständigung und dem Frieden.
endbenutzer 05.01.2011
3. Ohne Worte
Zitat: "..Die Amerikaner halten den Megakonzern für chaotisch organisiert - und korrupt..." Klar! In den USA gibt es so etwas natürlich nicht...
mitbestimmender wähler 05.01.2011
4. Haben die USA mal Probleme was zu durschauen und zu erfahren ?
Zitat von sysopGazprom sollte Russland wieder zur Supermacht machen, Manager träumten vom "wertvollsten Unternehmen der Welt". Doch Geheimberichte aus Moskaus US-Botschaft zeichnen ein anderes Bild: Die Amerikaner halten den Megakonzern für chaotisch organisiert - und*korrupt. http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/0,1518,737635,00.html
Ineffizienter Konzern ? Chaotisch Organisiert? Sieht so aus das Gazprom nicht nach US McKennzieÜberallSystem geführt wir und die Amis mal Probleme damit haben was zu durchschauen und zu erfahren. Na lieber Cowboy ist halt nicht überall Amerika, und funktioniert trotzdem recht gut.
karmamarga 05.01.2011
5. Gazprom ist Russland
Zitat von sysopGazprom sollte Russland wieder zur Supermacht machen, Manager träumten vom "wertvollsten Unternehmen der Welt". Doch Geheimberichte aus Moskaus US-Botschaft zeichnen ein anderes Bild: Die Amerikaner halten den Megakonzern für chaotisch organisiert - und*korrupt. http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/0,1518,737635,00.html
Gazprom stellt 40% der russischen Wirtschaftsleistung dar. Und vor die Wahl gestellt Eon, Bayrische Landesbank usw. oder Gazprom, was gibt es da zu wählen ausser zu jener Überheblichkeit zu greifen, über die der Artikel berichtet? Ich habe übrigens zu einer Zeit die Aktie gekauft, als noch jeder von Russlandinvestitionen abgeraten hat. Warum? Weil bei Gazprom die Arbeiter als Menschen behandelt wurden. Jedenfalls, soweit ich das überschauen konnte aus meinen Quellen. Und als renditeorientierter Anleger aus einem kapitalistischen Land, der die Aktie auch in der Krise gehalten hat, habe ich auch heute noch saftige Gewinne auf die shares. Irgend wann müssen die auch mal richtig Dividenden zahlen.
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