America's Guantanamo Files Haggling with Allies over New Homes for Detainees

US efforts to get allies to accept former prisoners from the detention center at Guantanamo often resembled haggling at a bazaar.
Foto: Brennan Linsley/ APWhy was Germany being so intractable? Dan Fried even traveled to Berlin to hand deliver proposals from Washington -- and was snubbed. Every attempt by the US special envoy to coerce Germany into taking Guantanamo detainees seemed predestined to fail. German Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schäuble was "very skeptical," US Ambassador Philip Murphy cabled back home in frustration.
The Americans had similar problems with several countries. In September 2009, US President Barack Obama was keen to finally fulfill his promise to close the Guantanamo detention center on Cuba and send all the remaining prisoners to destinations around the globe. But nobody wanted them -- neither his countrymen nor his allies. And least of all the Germans.
Fried's position was not unlike a merchant in a bazaar, forced to haggle over the conditions under which countries would take prisoners initially considered extremely dangerous but now deemed harmless. He promised a range of attractive enticements: Money, development aid and even political capital like a visit by Obama himself -- or at least an invitation to the White House.
The negotiations were correspondingly lively. Potential recipient countries feigned doubt and provided detailed descriptions of the potential dangers they could face by accepting Islamists. The primary aim, it becomes clear from the US dispatches, was that of driving the price up as high as possible.
'Negative Reaction of the Chinese Government'
Even the Germans joined in the haggling, though Berlin had been particularly strident in calling for the closure of Guantanamo. Wolfgang Schäuble, a member of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats (CDU) and the country's interior minister until late October 2009, repeatedly rejected American overtures.
Berlin was particularly reluctant to take 17 Uighurs, originally from China, despite the fact that 500 of their ethnic brethren already lived in Munich, the largest such community in Europe. The Uighur community in Munich expressed a willingness to accept them into its midst. But Germany wouldn't allow it. Islamists from Guantanamo are too dangerous, Schäuble insisted. In fact, Washington suspected there was another reason: Germany's fear of China, which wanted the men back itself so it could pursue terrorism charges against them. One US dispatch contains the analysis that Germany's "reluctance about Uighurs is due to the expected negative reaction of the Chinese government."
Chinese diplomats told the US State Department in no uncertain terms that Beijing would consider the sending of Uighurs to Germany "a slap in the face." The balance of power had shifted so markedly that the German government would rather risk snubbing its long-established ally in Washington than suffer the wrath of the Communist regime in Beijing.
In December 2009 Fried, expressed his sympathy for Berlin's plight and proposed a different deal: What about a humanitarian case? Could Germany at least take one mentally disturbed Uighur and his care-taker brother?
Security Concerns
Fried hoped for a breakthrough -- and hoped it could be provided by Germany's new interior minister, Thomas de Maizière, likewise of the CDU, who took office following German general elections in September 2009. "In contrast to former Interior Minister Schäuble," a dispatch from last December reads, "current Interior Minister de Maizière has not (and is unlikely to) flouted security concerns about cases in the press." So encouraged was Fried by the new minister that he proposed even more candidates in addition to the Uighur brothers. The new candidates including a Syrian and a Palestinian, the only two Guantanamo detainees ultimately accepted by Berlin, more than six months later.
Even so, Fried's visit to the German Interior Ministry was initially disappointing. Although de Maizière briefly dropped in on Fried's negotiations with an undersecretary, no progress was made on the Uighur brothers. Instead, the report says the Germans merely stressed the importance of "keeping the current discussions and review of the detainees confidential."
Officially, Berlin still had security concerns.
The envoy President Obama sent to the German Chancellery had even less success at his meeting with Christoph Heusgen, Chancellor Angela Merkel's security advisor. "Heusgen was not optimistic that China would demonstrate any understanding for the two humanitarian cases," the relevant dispatch reads. Germany was not eager to "irritate" China by being the only country that takes Uighurs.
'Productive Internal Meetings'
Fried returned home empty-handed. Two months later the Americans made another attempt. On February 8, 2010, Ambassador Murphy asked the German Interior Ministry whether any progress had been made on the matter. "The US request is still being reviewed," de Maizière wrote back formally. "The ministry is having productive internal meetings on the issue." The decision would take a couple more weeks.
Luckily for the sick Uighur, his brother and the US, not all of Washington's allies were pursuing the same obstructionist strategy. Despite being in the midst of trade negotiations with China, tiny Switzerland expressed its willingness to take the two brothers in March. Still, Switzerland has a good reason to be friendly toward Washington: The US was unhappy about the fact that major Swiss banks had helped rich Americans evade taxes.
Originals: The Key Guantanamo Cables
Click on the headlines below to read the full texts...
<<238357>>
12/7/2009 7:28
09BERLIN1548
Embassy Berlin
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
09BERLIN600|09BERLIN625|09STATE50242
VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHRL #1548/01 3410728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070728Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5983
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY RENEWS CONSIDERATION OF GUANTANAMO
REF: A. STATE 50242
*** Maschinell erstellte Kleinschreibung, nur Satzanfaenge gross. ***
C o n f i d e n t i a l berlin 001548
Noforn
sipdis
Department please pass to s/gc michael williams
E.o. 12958: decl: 12/07/2019
Tags: prel, pgov, phum, pter, gm
Subject: germany renews consideration of guantanamo
detainees for resettlement
Ref: a. State 50242
b. Berlin 600
c. Berlin 625
Classified By: Ambassador Philip D. Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C/NF) Summary: In separate December 1 meetings with
Ambassador Dan Fried, Special Envoy for Closure of the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility (S/GC), the Ministry of the
Interior, Foreign Ministry and Chancellery expressed a
willingness to consider seven new cases of Guantanamo
detainees for resettlement as well as three cases that had
already been provided to the former government last spring.
All interlocutors stressed that the MOI is the competent
ministry handling this issue. They also expressed the desire
to be helpful in the spirit of the strong U.S.-German
bilateral relationship. Interior Ministry State Secretary
Beus said that any decision on the cases would likely take up
to two months and agreed with S/E Fried on the following way
forward:
-- the Interior Ministry would be the only ministry
addressing this issue, especially in regard to sharing
information on the detainees;
-- the U.S. and Germany will uphold strict confidentiality
during this review phase and coordinate timing and content of
any public messages;
-- while Germany prefers non-Uighur cases because of expected
tension with China, it will consider the cases of two Uighurs
based on humanitarian grounds;
-- Germany prefers to accept detainees with a connection to
Germany, which S/E Fried explained to be the case with only
one detainee, a Tunisian whose file was previously provided;
-- the German MOI will maintain direct communication with
S/GC at this stage in the process;
-- Germany will decide on the need to interview any
candidates at the end of its review process.
In a later meeting, Chancellery Security Advisor Christoph
Heusgen stressed his confidence in Interior Minister Thomas
de Maiziere to handle this issue, noting de Maiziere's close
relationship with Chancellor Merkel. End summary.
Interior Ministry is Key
------------------------
2. (C/NF) Based on a schedule recommended by the
Chancellery, S/E Fried and Ambassador Murphy met first with
Interior Ministry State Secretary Beus and expressed
appreciation for the new government's willingness to consider
resettling detainees. S/E Fried reviewed the numerous
European countries which had accepted or pledged to resettle
detainees at this point, noting that progress has been made
but more is needed. He noted he would only be passing along
detainee dossiers to the MOI and discussing case specifics
with the MOI, and not with other Government ministries, per
earlier requests from the government. S/E Fried handed over
the dossiers of seven detainees: two Egyptians, two Syrians,
a Libyan, and two Palestinians. He explained that if the MOI
has questions or requires additional information, it can do
so through established liaison channels and additionally
offered for a German team to visit Guantanamo to conduct
interviews with detainees under consideration. While
recognizing Germany's preference for non-Uighur detainees,
S/E Fried raised two Uighur cases for consideration based on
humanitarian grounds, one who has psychological problems and
the other, his brother, who serves as a caregiver. He also
acknowledged the German interest in detainees who have some
connection to Germany, noting the one Tunisian case whose
file had been conveyed last spring as the single detainee
with those ties to Germany. In total, S/E Fried requested
that Germany consider 10 detainee cases for resettlement,
three cases already conveyed and seven new cases.
3. (C/NF) State Secretary Beus expressed his ministry's
willingness to consider all the cases, including the Uighurs,
and said that his experts would review the files as soon as
possible. Shortly after he began, Interior Minister Thomas
de Maiziere dropped in to stress his desire to be of help.
Continuing, Beus underlined the importance of keeping the
current discussions and review of the detainees confidential,
to which S/E Fried strongly agreed. Beus underlined
Germany's preference for detainees who have some ties to
Germany, noting that this connection would provide the
government with a "plausible" explanation for accepting
certain detainees when faced with the argument that the U.S.
should be resettling them. Beus said that he would be
willing to consider the two Uighur cases on humanitarian
grounds, but noted that they would present special
difficulties because of the diplomatic row which would likely
ensue. Beus also highlighted that even if the federal
government agrees to accept any detainees, it must then find
a German state willing to accept them. He also said that
German services would naturally keep an eye on any resettle
detainees within reasonable resource means.
4. (C/NF) Beus also expressed strong interest in
coordinating the timing and content of any public message on
Germany's consideration of and decision on resettling
detainees to prevent political pressure from those who oppose
the move, but regardless the government will advocate in
public in favor of taking detainees if they come to a
positive decision. He added that being able to say to the
public that the U.S. has also accepted detainees or otherwise
explain why the U.S. is not doing so would also be helpful.
S/E Fried expressed his readiness to coordinate and noted
that the U.S. has admitted and plans to admit the more
dangerous detainees for legal proceedings.
Process and Timeframe
---------------------
5. (C/NF) Beus said that he and his experts would review the
files and determine if additional information is needed. He
agreed that additional information would go through
intelligence channels and expressed his preference to
communicate directly with S/E Fried on any matters at this
stage of the process. He said that they would decide whether
interviews are necessary when the experts have completed
their review of the information. He estimated that a
decision on taking detainees would take one-to-two months.
MFA Plays Peripheral Role
-------------------------
6. (C/NF) It was clear from the later meeting with MFA State
Secretary Wolf Born that the Foreign Office would not be a
major decision-maker as on this issue. S/E Fried reviewed in
general terms the cases of detainees that we are asking the
MOI to consider and also highlighted the humanitarian nature
of the two Uighur cases, which Born noted. Born said that
Foreign Minister Westerwelle wants to be "positive," but
added that it is the MOI which is the "competent" ministry on
this issue. Born mainly asked questions about the numbers of
detainees still at Guantanamo, U.S. plans for addressing the
various groups, and the possible closing date, all of which
S/E Fried discussed with him.
Chancellery Confirms Reticence about Uighurs
--------------------------------------------
7. (C/NF) In the last meeting, Chancellery Security and
Foreign Policy Advisor Christoph Heusgen expressed
appreciation that S/E Fried had proceeded along the lines
that the MOI and Chancellery had requested through Ambassador
Murphy. Heusgen appeared to be already fully briefed on S/E
Fried's earlier meeting that day with Beus. He told S/E
Fried that if Germany were to take any Uighurs, it would be
best to do so in combination with other European countries to
prevent China from focusing its opposition on any one
country. Heusgen was not optimistic that China would
demonstrate any understanding for the two humanitarian cases.
Heusgen inquired as to whether any alternatives for the
Uighurs exists. S/E Fried explained possible options, while
highlighting the difficulty of resettling the two individuals
he is asking Germany to consider.
Comment
-------
8. (C/NF) The new government, now in place since October 29,
appears willing to renew consideration of resettling GTMO
detainees and has expressed a clear desire to be of help. In
contrast to former Interior Minister Schaeuble, current MOI
de Maiziere has not (and is unlikely to) flouted security
concerns about cases in the press, nor indicated that Germany
would be hardpressed to accept any detainees put forth for
security reasons. Nor has de Maiziere indicated that the
fact that the U.S. itself has not resettled detainees
presents an insurmountable roadblock, although Beus indicated
that U.S. resettlement would help Germany's PR efforts to
resettle. All interlocutors expressed a strong interest in
keeping the matter confidential and coordinating the timing
and content of any public message. Beus projected sincerity
and realism, noting that even if the federal government
agrees, it must still identify a state that is willing to
resettle the detainees. While all interlocutors did not
outright reject the two Uighur cases, Heusgen made clear that
the prospect of being the only European country to irritate
China by accepting Uighurs would make it difficult, although
it is unclear whether Germany would take part in any broader
European decision to resettle Uighurs.
9. (SBU) There has to date been no mention in the press of
S/E Fried's visit.
10. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/E Dan Fried.
Murphy
XXXXXX: Redacted by the editors.
<<156299>>
6/2/2008 8:59
08TIRANA411
Embassy Tirana
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INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 3273
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0001
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1239
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RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0053
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RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1235
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3518
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2403
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, AL
SUBJECT: UIGHURS (AND OTHERS) IN ALBANIA
REF: 05/08/2008 KOTHEIMER-THIEDE E-MAILS
*** Maschinell erstellte Kleinschreibung, nur Satzanfaenge gross. ***
Unclas section 01 of 06 tirana 000411
Sensitive
sipdis
E.o. 12958: n/a
Tags: pref, phum, prel, al
Subject: uighurs (and others) in albania
Ref: 05/08/2008 kotheimer-thiede e-mails
-------
summary
-------
1. (SBU) The Government of Albania accepted eight former
Guantanamo detainees as refugees -- five Uighurs, and one
each Algerian, Egyptian, and Uzbek. All the refugees now
live XXXXX in apartments
rented for them by the GOA. The GOA is providing language
and vocational training. It pays the refugees a monthly
stipend. The former detainees have faced some bureaucratic
hurdles in documentation and receipt of assistance. The GOA
has appointed a social worker to assist them, but his powers
are limited These benefits ermanent housing, jobs, and documentation
which allows travel. They, their lawyers, and the ICRC have
contacted the Embassy. Poloffs met with two of the refugees
on May 21. END SUMMARY.
------------------------------
current status of the refugees
------------------------------
2. (U) As is publicly known, the GOA has hosted eight
former detainees since their release from Guantanamo. Five
Uighurs arrived in Albania in May 2006. An Uzbek, Algerian
and Egyptian arrived in November of that year. The former
detainees have acquired refugee status XXXXX. Most
have studied Albanian,
and some speak it with some comfort. The Uzbek speaks
excellent English; one Uighur and the Algerian may also speak
English. The GOA has begun a second course of Albanian
language studies for all but the Egyptian, who has requested
an Albanian-Arabic speaker for a teacher. The UNHCR has
agreed to try to find such an individual. Three Uighurs are
taking vocational training as auto mechanics. Two refugees
are regular participants in the XXXXX,
which has a Russian-speaking "club" where they have been
welcomed.
3. (U) One Uighur, the Algerian and the Uzbek are studying
at XXXXX. According
to the Uzbek at a May 21 meeting with Poloffs, the studies of
all three individuals are funded by friends or relatives
outside Albania. The GOA found apartments for the refugees,
who all live in the same building, according to the ICRC.
The GOA recently increased the monthly stipend to the
refugees to 40,000 lek (about $510), which is their allotment
to pay for phone and electricity charges, rent, and all
expenses. (The increase resulted from the increased cost of
living.) The eighth refugee, a Uighur, was able to travel to
Sweden, where he has a sister, and has sought asylum there
according to local media reports. The GOA also appointed a
social worker, Mr. XXXXX, to help the refugees integrate.
Similar benefits are not available to other refugees in
Albania.
4. (SBU) The Egyptian, who has a Sudanese family, is,
according to ICRC representatives, the most challenging case
with a "complicated personality." In a December 2007 meeting
with XXXXX, the ICRC XXXXX
Tirana 00000411 002 of 006
who leads efforts for the detainees, was concerned
that the Egyptian might be unstable. In May 2008, XXXXX
had a longer conversation with the refugee through a
translator and found his condition improved. However, the
Egyptian has few local contacts outside the mosque and is not
seeking work. (Note: XXXXX is not a medical
professional. He has long experience in refugee work and
seeks to be objective. He speaks Russian and Arabic and so
can interact directly with some of the refugees.)
----------------
outside interest
----------------
5. (SBU) The ICRC has helped with reintegration since May
2006, originally visiting approximately every two months with
a small team, including professional Uighur and Arabic
translators. Alternate visits were without interpretation.
We learned of ICRC's involvement and met XXXXX in
December 2007; we saw him again in May 2008. ICRC shares the
findings of its visits with Albanian authorities and the
UNHCR in Albania. The ICRC's interest in the refugees was to
facilitate initial steps of integration into host country
society. XXXXX told us the ICRC would be closing its
Macedonia office. He may remain through 2008, and if so he
would visit the refugees again. However, ICRC contact with
the refugees will decline under any circumstances.
6. (SBU) Post has also been contacted by various lawyers
for the refugees. Asked by some of them to find an
appropriate USG contact point, we learned from Department
(ref) that post should not engage directly with the lawyers.
We shared the Department of Justice contact provided by
Department and informed them of our inability to continue
direct contacts. We have also heard sporadically from
journalists interested in the case and from private citizens
who want to help the refugees. We have been unable to
provide much assistance or information in these cases.
ICRC's XXXXX was pleased to learn of the lawyers'
interest as he said they would be a more appropriate contact
for the refugees now that "ICRC had reached the limits of
mediation." He said the Center for Constitutional Rights in
the U.S. was an organization that had taken interest in
Guantanamo detainees and had helped to collect funds for some
of those in Albania, as well.
----------------------------
from the refugees themselves
----------------------------
7. (SBU) Recently, some of the refugees sought contact with
the Embassy. They showed up unannounced three times asking
to see someone and spoke with the A/RSO. Post was unable to
accommodate the unscheduled demands for a meeting. A/RSO
asked the refugees to put their concerns in writing. (The
text of the letter from the refugees, dated April 21, follows
at para 18.) When they returned and seemed unwilling to
leave, he explained that they could not simply loiter outside
the Embassy; doing so could prompt removal for security
reasons. The Uzbek (XXXXX) then called Pol-Econ section
chief, who met him and one of the Uighurs (XXXXX)
together with Post's Human Rights Officer on May 21.
8. (U) The Uzbek translated for his Uighur companion. Both
were polite and seemed reasonably cheerful, all things
considered. They complained repeatedly of the unhelpful
attitude displayed by the Ministry of Interior's (MOI)
Refugee Director, XXXXX. One complaint was that when
individuals from Europe had arrived to see them and offered
help, XXXXX prevented contact on the ruse that the refugees
did not speak English, but assured the would-be benefactors
that the refugees were well. They said XXXXX had provided
Tirana 00000411 003 of 006
no assistance, made their lives much more difficult and
refused to forward their complaints. They said Mr. XXXXX,
the social worker, was only allowed to bring them their
money, but had no power to resolve their concerns. They
added that the UNHCR shared their frustration with XXXXX,
but told them they were unable to do anything about her.
9. (U) The refugees told us that before departing
Guantanamo, they were told "in two months (from arrival in
Albania), you will have a house, a job, money, documents.
You will have everything." XXXXX added that he asked how
much money he would have and was told he would have enough to
stand on his own two feet. They said they were not asking
for anything for the four and a half years in Guantanamo, but
wanted help to face the future. The charge of terrorism has
made it impossible for them to find jobs or marry, they said.
They referred repeatedly to a "promise from the State
Department" and "an agreement between the U.S. and Albania."
They said that the previous refugee director told them "you
will have more than others and you will have all in the
agreement." (Note: The lawyers have used similar phrasing
in contacts with Embassy.)
10. (U) In the meeting, the refugees pressed three main
concerns: permanent housing, documents that would allow
travel, and jobs. The Uighur also said having their families
or being able to marry would be important. He said one
Uighur had tried to marry twice. The Albanian women's
fathers had rejected him, one for being a terrorist and the
other for having no home to offer. XXXXX said if they had no
homes, they would have to camp in front of the Embassy. (We
discouraged that as an option.) They also referred to the
possibility of starting their own restaurant, but noted the
extremely high cost of buying or investing in a property to
do so. The monthly stipend is not enough for rent,
electricity, food, and savings on top of that, they
explained. XXXXX complained that, despite the fact that he
has not been using electricity in the warm weather, the GOA
still charged $120/month for electricity. (The refugees
attempt to reduce their electricity use in order to have more
money left for other things; what is not spent on electricity
goes to them.) He said when they complained, they were told
that meter readers simply make up amounts to charge
customers. We noted this was unfortunately a common Albanian
experience.
11. (U) At the close of the meeting, the refugees pressed
us for when they would receive a reply from State. While we
promised to convey their concerns, we urged them not to wait
for a reply before beginning to consider how they might best
get their lives in order.
---------------
icrc evaluation
---------------
12. (SBU) XXXXX was somewhat concerned with the
refugees' situation in December 2007. He was frustrated by
an apparent unwillingness by the MOI -- XXXXX, who had
previously been helpful -- to meet,
despite repeated attempts well in advance of his visit to set
an appointment. The refugees were having considerable
difficulty determining where to get their identification
documentation renewed. They believed they were being
overcharged for electricity and could not get receipts for
electricity payments made by the GOA on their behalf. There
were delays in delivery of their monthly stipends. In
subsequent meetings with the GOA, we urged them to live up to
their obligations to these and all refugees, noting that as
well as the moral obligation, embarrassing articles about GOA
treatment of the refugees could be distracting in the (then)
Tirana 00000411 004 of 006
run-up to a potential NATO invitation. We urged the GOA to
meet its responsibilities to important international NGOs
such as the ICRC. We also advised XXXXX to utilize the
ICRC's own contacts in the MOD and MFA (from other projects
and responsibilities) to facilitate the contacts it needed.
13. (SBU) In May 2008, XXXXX reported no further
difficulties making contact with GOA officials. He
characterized the refugees as "reasonably well off." Their
situation was "definitely not about life and death, or strong
suffering." He said there would likely be periodic bouts of
depression and concern; this is not uncommon in similar
situations. He said depression in refugees can come in
waves. Physically, they were well and had adjusted.
XXXXX said he understood the refugees to be deeply
worried about their future. They feared they may end up
sleeping in the streets. Most, he believed, were more or
less willing to integrate. He confirmed (nonjudgmentally)
that the refugees expect assistance from U.S. authorities.
14. (SBU) The refugees had outlined for XXXXX
essentially the same three concerns they did with us. They
want to be able to travel. ICRC had explained, as we did,
that the problem was not strictly one of documentation;
nonetheless, the refugees pressed the ICRC for U.S. help to
obtain expedited Albanian citizenship. XXXXX said that
according to the UNHCR, acquiring Albanian citizenship is
normally a five-year process, unless a person marries an
Albanian. In the case of marriage, the process is reduced to
three years. The refugees had asked the GOA to give them
houses. While with Poloffs the request was for more general
employment, with ICRC they particularly focused on help
getting a restaurant.
15. (SBU) XXXXX noted that this last request indicated
some thought, initiative, and willingness to integrate.
While neither ICRC, UNHCR, nor the GOA (nor, presumably, the
USG) is able to give them money to buy a restaurant, if the
lawyers could tap into private interest and work through a
group like the Center for Constitutional Rights, it might be
possible to raise funds to help the refugees, he mused.
XXXXX observed that when information about the refugees
is shared, the reaction of most people (Albanians and others)
is one of sympathy.
-------
comment
-------
16. (SBU) As ICRC noted, the refugees are not at this time
destitute or suffering. Their monthly stipend is fairly
comfortable by Albanian standards. The bureaucratic hurdles
they have encountered are not uncommon for any Albanian, but
the refugees are at a disadvantage culturally and
linguistically to face them. A poor Albanian might have a
family network for support, live at home, or have a house
with room to grow or raise some supplemental food.
17. (SBU) Post does not have the human or financial
resources to provide full-time social work assistance to the
eight refugees, although we can follow their condition
periodically as a human rights issue. In some of the
communications we have had with private citizens (usually by
e-mail), we have noticed a desire to help these individuals.
Department may want to consider whether to encourage the
lawyers, together with the Center for Constitutional Rights,
to develop a fundraising/support network for the detainees.
(The Center for Constitutional Rights can, according to ICRC,
facilitate delivery of money or goods.) While there are
potentially negative PR considerations to such an idea, the
unfavorable PR from media attention to unhappy refugees also
Tirana 00000411 005 of 006
could be a bar to other countries we may want to consider
future resettlement. The prospect of eight ex-detainees
camping at the Embassy's front door, being dragged away by
the Albanian police, is another PR nightmare to be avoided.
------------------------
letter from the refugees
------------------------
18. (U) Begin text, letter to Embassy from refugees:
April 21, 2008 Tirana
American Consulate:
We, XXXXX, XXXXX, XXXXX, and
XXXXX, four of us, have been in Albania for two years by
the arrangement of the United States of America. You told us
in Guantanimo (sic) that by two months in Albania you would
help arrange passports, housing and find us work. As of
today Albania has not given us passports (with the documents
that they did give us we are unable to even venture out from
our present place). As for housing they gave us a place to
live for two years. After two years have passed it is still
not settled where we will live.
We told all this to the Albania interior ministry. We told
them if they could not give us work then please give us some
finances so we can start our own business and make a living.
The person there named XXXXX told us that their country
doesn't have any welfare money. So six months ago we gave a
written request to the UNHCR asking for money to open up a
restaurant. At that time XXXXX (UNHCR worker) said they
would help us. But now XXXXX says it takes a lot of money
to open a restaurant and that by themselves they cannot get
enough funds. He told us to write to the American Consulate
and request help, saying he would talk with you also to get
some help.
XXXXX, from the Albania interior ministry, said that they
will only give us rent and money to live on for two years,
and then we are on our own.
To the Head of the Consul:
We originally put great hope in America and Albania, but now
we haven't obtained anything. On the contrary, XXXXX
from the Albania interior ministry has falsely told everyone
that we eight people are doing well. The groups that would
help us have all disappeared and have withheld the things
that would help us. Every month the money we get to live on
comes late. If we don't phone them asking for it for one or
two days they don't bring it.
If after two years Albania doesn't give us the opportunity to
make a living or give us a stable home, where will we live,
what will we eat then? XXXXX has not given us enough funds
to study language and she says that they don't have money.
Three of us ) XXXXX, XXXXX, and XXXXX
have asked for funds to open a restaurant.
If the UNHCR and you do not help us with the things necessary
to live, passports and funds to open a restaurant we will be
unable to make a living because to rent an place for one
month costs from $200-300. Electricity and water are at
least $60. With only $40 left how can we survive?
Dear sir/madam, being taken to Guantanimo (sic) has destroyed
our lives. Although in the end we were acquitted of any
wrong, we still have not been given the opportunity to live a
Tirana 00000411 006 of 006
normal life. On the contrary our lives are turned upside
down by people's prejudices.
So we are asking the American government and the American
Consul to give us the opportunity to live peacefully. Please
help us straighten out our lives. If the United States of
America and Albania are unwilling to help us with getting a
home, passports and work, please move us to a better country.
We are appealing to the American Consulate because the
government of Albania only does what the American government
tells them to do. We've come to understand this very
clearly. They will not help us on their own. From now on we
will not talk with XXXXX at the Interior Ministry
because it doesn't help and we are tired of it. Now we are
seeking the American Consulate to help us.
Sincerely
/s/
XXXXX
End text.
Withers
Other countries were also cooperative -- sometimes even just offering suggestions. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, for example, related a brainstorm of his to John Brennan, Obama's chief counter-terrorism advisor. One could implant chips into the former detainees containing information about them and allowing them to be tracked. The system worked with horses and falcons, the king was quoted as saying in a dispatch. Brennan indicated that such a procedure would likely encounter legal difficulties in the US. "Horses don't have good lawyers," Brennan told him.
US envoy Fried openly reported back to his government about which countries were willing to take former Guantanamo detainees -- and, more importantly, at what price.
Bulgaria, for example: The Interior Ministry in Sofia expressed willingness to accept two men, albeit on condition that the US got rid of visa requirements for Bulgarian tourists and businessmen and helped with relocation expenses. Fried proposed "a symbolic amount in the neighborhood of $50,000 - $80,000 per detainee."
A Rehabilitation Center for Ex-Detainees
The Maldives also wanted to know what financial benefits a deal with the US would bring. Fried told politicians in the Indian Ocean archipelago that other states had received $25,000 to $85,000 per detainee to cover "temporary living expenses and other costs." The Maldives could expect something toward the upper end of the range, he said.
Yemen, of all places, proved better at bartering. The country is home to many new members of al-Qaida and the homeland of 112 suspected Jihadis held at Guantanamo.
Yemen said it needed a decent rehabilitation center before if could take back the men. After all, officials argued, the former detainees had to be reintegrated into society after their protracted incarceration. "How many dollars is the US going to bring?" Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh asked, according to a dispatch from Sept. 15, 2009. The US offered him $500,000 "as an initial investment currently available fort he crafting of a rehabilitation program." But, as Obama's chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, reported, even that wasn't enough for the Yemenis. President Saleh "signaled that rehabilitation is not his concern but rather 'the US's problem.'"
While President Obama was coming under ever greater domestic pressure for postponing the fulfillment of his promise to shut Guantanamo, his diplomats were despairing at the increasingly outrageous demands from around the globe. "One of our major tasks in 2010 will ... be to manage expectations," one dispatch reads.
Indeed, even Slovenian Foreign Minister Samuel Zbogar was asking Washington "what substantively Slovenia could do to secure a meeting for Prime Minister Borut Pahor with President Obama." Was the going rate one handshake with Obama per detainee? Or does one have to take two? Of course America's diplomats didn't want to discourage the minister, so they gently suggested Slovenia become more involved in Afghanistan and in the Guantanamo issue. Internally, however, the policy was clear: Slovenia's "top bilateral priority -- a meeting between PM Pahor and President Obama -- may be out of reach, even if they do everything we ask of them."
A House, a Job and Money
Almost 600 of the 800 or so detainees at Guantanamo Bay have now been released and sent to a variety of countries worldwide. Every one of them, Washington hopes, will ease the burden on the US government, and should thus be given a new identity, a job and an opportunity to lead a normal family life in his host country.
Unfortunately, this hope is not always fulfilled, as staff at the US embassy in Albania reported. Several Uighurs from Guantanamo arrived in the Albanian capital, Tirana, as early as May 2006. Since then there has been nothing but trouble -- not because the men are dangerous, but simply because the State Department is allegedly breaking its promises.
Originals: The Key Guantanamo Cables
Click on the headlines below to read the full texts...
<<238357>>
12/7/2009 7:28
09BERLIN1548
Embassy Berlin
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
09BERLIN600|09BERLIN625|09STATE50242
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #1548/01 3410728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070728Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5983
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY RENEWS CONSIDERATION OF GUANTANAMO
REF: A. STATE 50242
*** Maschinell erstellte Kleinschreibung, nur Satzanfaenge gross. ***
C o n f i d e n t i a l berlin 001548
Noforn
sipdis
Department please pass to s/gc michael williams
E.o. 12958: decl: 12/07/2019
Tags: prel, pgov, phum, pter, gm
Subject: germany renews consideration of guantanamo
detainees for resettlement
Ref: a. State 50242
b. Berlin 600
c. Berlin 625
Classified By: Ambassador Philip D. Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C/NF) Summary: In separate December 1 meetings with
Ambassador Dan Fried, Special Envoy for Closure of the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility (S/GC), the Ministry of the
Interior, Foreign Ministry and Chancellery expressed a
willingness to consider seven new cases of Guantanamo
detainees for resettlement as well as three cases that had
already been provided to the former government last spring.
All interlocutors stressed that the MOI is the competent
ministry handling this issue. They also expressed the desire
to be helpful in the spirit of the strong U.S.-German
bilateral relationship. Interior Ministry State Secretary
Beus said that any decision on the cases would likely take up
to two months and agreed with S/E Fried on the following way
forward:
-- the Interior Ministry would be the only ministry
addressing this issue, especially in regard to sharing
information on the detainees;
-- the U.S. and Germany will uphold strict confidentiality
during this review phase and coordinate timing and content of
any public messages;
-- while Germany prefers non-Uighur cases because of expected
tension with China, it will consider the cases of two Uighurs
based on humanitarian grounds;
-- Germany prefers to accept detainees with a connection to
Germany, which S/E Fried explained to be the case with only
one detainee, a Tunisian whose file was previously provided;
-- the German MOI will maintain direct communication with
S/GC at this stage in the process;
-- Germany will decide on the need to interview any
candidates at the end of its review process.
In a later meeting, Chancellery Security Advisor Christoph
Heusgen stressed his confidence in Interior Minister Thomas
de Maiziere to handle this issue, noting de Maiziere's close
relationship with Chancellor Merkel. End summary.
Interior Ministry is Key
------------------------
2. (C/NF) Based on a schedule recommended by the
Chancellery, S/E Fried and Ambassador Murphy met first with
Interior Ministry State Secretary Beus and expressed
appreciation for the new government's willingness to consider
resettling detainees. S/E Fried reviewed the numerous
European countries which had accepted or pledged to resettle
detainees at this point, noting that progress has been made
but more is needed. He noted he would only be passing along
detainee dossiers to the MOI and discussing case specifics
with the MOI, and not with other Government ministries, per
earlier requests from the government. S/E Fried handed over
the dossiers of seven detainees: two Egyptians, two Syrians,
a Libyan, and two Palestinians. He explained that if the MOI
has questions or requires additional information, it can do
so through established liaison channels and additionally
offered for a German team to visit Guantanamo to conduct
interviews with detainees under consideration. While
recognizing Germany's preference for non-Uighur detainees,
S/E Fried raised two Uighur cases for consideration based on
humanitarian grounds, one who has psychological problems and
the other, his brother, who serves as a caregiver. He also
acknowledged the German interest in detainees who have some
connection to Germany, noting the one Tunisian case whose
file had been conveyed last spring as the single detainee
with those ties to Germany. In total, S/E Fried requested
that Germany consider 10 detainee cases for resettlement,
three cases already conveyed and seven new cases.
3. (C/NF) State Secretary Beus expressed his ministry's
willingness to consider all the cases, including the Uighurs,
and said that his experts would review the files as soon as
possible. Shortly after he began, Interior Minister Thomas
de Maiziere dropped in to stress his desire to be of help.
Continuing, Beus underlined the importance of keeping the
current discussions and review of the detainees confidential,
to which S/E Fried strongly agreed. Beus underlined
Germany's preference for detainees who have some ties to
Germany, noting that this connection would provide the
government with a "plausible" explanation for accepting
certain detainees when faced with the argument that the U.S.
should be resettling them. Beus said that he would be
willing to consider the two Uighur cases on humanitarian
grounds, but noted that they would present special
difficulties because of the diplomatic row which would likely
ensue. Beus also highlighted that even if the federal
government agrees to accept any detainees, it must then find
a German state willing to accept them. He also said that
German services would naturally keep an eye on any resettle
detainees within reasonable resource means.
4. (C/NF) Beus also expressed strong interest in
coordinating the timing and content of any public message on
Germany's consideration of and decision on resettling
detainees to prevent political pressure from those who oppose
the move, but regardless the government will advocate in
public in favor of taking detainees if they come to a
positive decision. He added that being able to say to the
public that the U.S. has also accepted detainees or otherwise
explain why the U.S. is not doing so would also be helpful.
S/E Fried expressed his readiness to coordinate and noted
that the U.S. has admitted and plans to admit the more
dangerous detainees for legal proceedings.
Process and Timeframe
---------------------
5. (C/NF) Beus said that he and his experts would review the
files and determine if additional information is needed. He
agreed that additional information would go through
intelligence channels and expressed his preference to
communicate directly with S/E Fried on any matters at this
stage of the process. He said that they would decide whether
interviews are necessary when the experts have completed
their review of the information. He estimated that a
decision on taking detainees would take one-to-two months.
MFA Plays Peripheral Role
-------------------------
6. (C/NF) It was clear from the later meeting with MFA State
Secretary Wolf Born that the Foreign Office would not be a
major decision-maker as on this issue. S/E Fried reviewed in
general terms the cases of detainees that we are asking the
MOI to consider and also highlighted the humanitarian nature
of the two Uighur cases, which Born noted. Born said that
Foreign Minister Westerwelle wants to be "positive," but
added that it is the MOI which is the "competent" ministry on
this issue. Born mainly asked questions about the numbers of
detainees still at Guantanamo, U.S. plans for addressing the
various groups, and the possible closing date, all of which
S/E Fried discussed with him.
Chancellery Confirms Reticence about Uighurs
--------------------------------------------
7. (C/NF) In the last meeting, Chancellery Security and
Foreign Policy Advisor Christoph Heusgen expressed
appreciation that S/E Fried had proceeded along the lines
that the MOI and Chancellery had requested through Ambassador
Murphy. Heusgen appeared to be already fully briefed on S/E
Fried's earlier meeting that day with Beus. He told S/E
Fried that if Germany were to take any Uighurs, it would be
best to do so in combination with other European countries to
prevent China from focusing its opposition on any one
country. Heusgen was not optimistic that China would
demonstrate any understanding for the two humanitarian cases.
Heusgen inquired as to whether any alternatives for the
Uighurs exists. S/E Fried explained possible options, while
highlighting the difficulty of resettling the two individuals
he is asking Germany to consider.
Comment
-------
8. (C/NF) The new government, now in place since October 29,
appears willing to renew consideration of resettling GTMO
detainees and has expressed a clear desire to be of help. In
contrast to former Interior Minister Schaeuble, current MOI
de Maiziere has not (and is unlikely to) flouted security
concerns about cases in the press, nor indicated that Germany
would be hardpressed to accept any detainees put forth for
security reasons. Nor has de Maiziere indicated that the
fact that the U.S. itself has not resettled detainees
presents an insurmountable roadblock, although Beus indicated
that U.S. resettlement would help Germany's PR efforts to
resettle. All interlocutors expressed a strong interest in
keeping the matter confidential and coordinating the timing
and content of any public message. Beus projected sincerity
and realism, noting that even if the federal government
agrees, it must still identify a state that is willing to
resettle the detainees. While all interlocutors did not
outright reject the two Uighur cases, Heusgen made clear that
the prospect of being the only European country to irritate
China by accepting Uighurs would make it difficult, although
it is unclear whether Germany would take part in any broader
European decision to resettle Uighurs.
9. (SBU) There has to date been no mention in the press of
S/E Fried's visit.
10. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/E Dan Fried.
Murphy
XXXXXX: Redacted by the editors.
<<156299>>
6/2/2008 8:59
08TIRANA411
Embassy Tirana
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
VZCZCXRO8548
PP RUEHPOD
DE RUEHTI #0411/01 1540859
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020859Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TIRANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7128
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 3273
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0001
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1239
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0072
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0053
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0792
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1235
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0295
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 0069
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5752
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0722
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 4501
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 3265
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0929
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0759
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA 3750
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3518
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2403
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, AL
SUBJECT: UIGHURS (AND OTHERS) IN ALBANIA
REF: 05/08/2008 KOTHEIMER-THIEDE E-MAILS
*** Maschinell erstellte Kleinschreibung, nur Satzanfaenge gross. ***
Unclas section 01 of 06 tirana 000411
Sensitive
sipdis
E.o. 12958: n/a
Tags: pref, phum, prel, al
Subject: uighurs (and others) in albania
Ref: 05/08/2008 kotheimer-thiede e-mails
-------
summary
-------
1. (SBU) The Government of Albania accepted eight former
Guantanamo detainees as refugees -- five Uighurs, and one
each Algerian, Egyptian, and Uzbek. All the refugees now
live XXXXX in apartments
rented for them by the GOA. The GOA is providing language
and vocational training. It pays the refugees a monthly
stipend. The former detainees have faced some bureaucratic
hurdles in documentation and receipt of assistance. The GOA
has appointed a social worker to assist them, but his powers
are limited These benefits ermanent housing, jobs, and documentation
which allows travel. They, their lawyers, and the ICRC have
contacted the Embassy. Poloffs met with two of the refugees
on May 21. END SUMMARY.
------------------------------
current status of the refugees
------------------------------
2. (U) As is publicly known, the GOA has hosted eight
former detainees since their release from Guantanamo. Five
Uighurs arrived in Albania in May 2006. An Uzbek, Algerian
and Egyptian arrived in November of that year. The former
detainees have acquired refugee status XXXXX. Most
have studied Albanian,
and some speak it with some comfort. The Uzbek speaks
excellent English; one Uighur and the Algerian may also speak
English. The GOA has begun a second course of Albanian
language studies for all but the Egyptian, who has requested
an Albanian-Arabic speaker for a teacher. The UNHCR has
agreed to try to find such an individual. Three Uighurs are
taking vocational training as auto mechanics. Two refugees
are regular participants in the XXXXX,
which has a Russian-speaking "club" where they have been
welcomed.
3. (U) One Uighur, the Algerian and the Uzbek are studying
at XXXXX. According
to the Uzbek at a May 21 meeting with Poloffs, the studies of
all three individuals are funded by friends or relatives
outside Albania. The GOA found apartments for the refugees,
who all live in the same building, according to the ICRC.
The GOA recently increased the monthly stipend to the
refugees to 40,000 lek (about $510), which is their allotment
to pay for phone and electricity charges, rent, and all
expenses. (The increase resulted from the increased cost of
living.) The eighth refugee, a Uighur, was able to travel to
Sweden, where he has a sister, and has sought asylum there
according to local media reports. The GOA also appointed a
social worker, Mr. XXXXX, to help the refugees integrate.
Similar benefits are not available to other refugees in
Albania.
4. (SBU) The Egyptian, who has a Sudanese family, is,
according to ICRC representatives, the most challenging case
with a "complicated personality." In a December 2007 meeting
with XXXXX, the ICRC XXXXX
Tirana 00000411 002 of 006
who leads efforts for the detainees, was concerned
that the Egyptian might be unstable. In May 2008, XXXXX
had a longer conversation with the refugee through a
translator and found his condition improved. However, the
Egyptian has few local contacts outside the mosque and is not
seeking work. (Note: XXXXX is not a medical
professional. He has long experience in refugee work and
seeks to be objective. He speaks Russian and Arabic and so
can interact directly with some of the refugees.)
----------------
outside interest
----------------
5. (SBU) The ICRC has helped with reintegration since May
2006, originally visiting approximately every two months with
a small team, including professional Uighur and Arabic
translators. Alternate visits were without interpretation.
We learned of ICRC's involvement and met XXXXX in
December 2007; we saw him again in May 2008. ICRC shares the
findings of its visits with Albanian authorities and the
UNHCR in Albania. The ICRC's interest in the refugees was to
facilitate initial steps of integration into host country
society. XXXXX told us the ICRC would be closing its
Macedonia office. He may remain through 2008, and if so he
would visit the refugees again. However, ICRC contact with
the refugees will decline under any circumstances.
6. (SBU) Post has also been contacted by various lawyers
for the refugees. Asked by some of them to find an
appropriate USG contact point, we learned from Department
(ref) that post should not engage directly with the lawyers.
We shared the Department of Justice contact provided by
Department and informed them of our inability to continue
direct contacts. We have also heard sporadically from
journalists interested in the case and from private citizens
who want to help the refugees. We have been unable to
provide much assistance or information in these cases.
ICRC's XXXXX was pleased to learn of the lawyers'
interest as he said they would be a more appropriate contact
for the refugees now that "ICRC had reached the limits of
mediation." He said the Center for Constitutional Rights in
the U.S. was an organization that had taken interest in
Guantanamo detainees and had helped to collect funds for some
of those in Albania, as well.
----------------------------
from the refugees themselves
----------------------------
7. (SBU) Recently, some of the refugees sought contact with
the Embassy. They showed up unannounced three times asking
to see someone and spoke with the A/RSO. Post was unable to
accommodate the unscheduled demands for a meeting. A/RSO
asked the refugees to put their concerns in writing. (The
text of the letter from the refugees, dated April 21, follows
at para 18.) When they returned and seemed unwilling to
leave, he explained that they could not simply loiter outside
the Embassy; doing so could prompt removal for security
reasons. The Uzbek (XXXXX) then called Pol-Econ section
chief, who met him and one of the Uighurs (XXXXX)
together with Post's Human Rights Officer on May 21.
8. (U) The Uzbek translated for his Uighur companion. Both
were polite and seemed reasonably cheerful, all things
considered. They complained repeatedly of the unhelpful
attitude displayed by the Ministry of Interior's (MOI)
Refugee Director, XXXXX. One complaint was that when
individuals from Europe had arrived to see them and offered
help, XXXXX prevented contact on the ruse that the refugees
did not speak English, but assured the would-be benefactors
that the refugees were well. They said XXXXX had provided
Tirana 00000411 003 of 006
no assistance, made their lives much more difficult and
refused to forward their complaints. They said Mr. XXXXX,
the social worker, was only allowed to bring them their
money, but had no power to resolve their concerns. They
added that the UNHCR shared their frustration with XXXXX,
but told them they were unable to do anything about her.
9. (U) The refugees told us that before departing
Guantanamo, they were told "in two months (from arrival in
Albania), you will have a house, a job, money, documents.
You will have everything." XXXXX added that he asked how
much money he would have and was told he would have enough to
stand on his own two feet. They said they were not asking
for anything for the four and a half years in Guantanamo, but
wanted help to face the future. The charge of terrorism has
made it impossible for them to find jobs or marry, they said.
They referred repeatedly to a "promise from the State
Department" and "an agreement between the U.S. and Albania."
They said that the previous refugee director told them "you
will have more than others and you will have all in the
agreement." (Note: The lawyers have used similar phrasing
in contacts with Embassy.)
10. (U) In the meeting, the refugees pressed three main
concerns: permanent housing, documents that would allow
travel, and jobs. The Uighur also said having their families
or being able to marry would be important. He said one
Uighur had tried to marry twice. The Albanian women's
fathers had rejected him, one for being a terrorist and the
other for having no home to offer. XXXXX said if they had no
homes, they would have to camp in front of the Embassy. (We
discouraged that as an option.) They also referred to the
possibility of starting their own restaurant, but noted the
extremely high cost of buying or investing in a property to
do so. The monthly stipend is not enough for rent,
electricity, food, and savings on top of that, they
explained. XXXXX complained that, despite the fact that he
has not been using electricity in the warm weather, the GOA
still charged $120/month for electricity. (The refugees
attempt to reduce their electricity use in order to have more
money left for other things; what is not spent on electricity
goes to them.) He said when they complained, they were told
that meter readers simply make up amounts to charge
customers. We noted this was unfortunately a common Albanian
experience.
11. (U) At the close of the meeting, the refugees pressed
us for when they would receive a reply from State. While we
promised to convey their concerns, we urged them not to wait
for a reply before beginning to consider how they might best
get their lives in order.
---------------
icrc evaluation
---------------
12. (SBU) XXXXX was somewhat concerned with the
refugees' situation in December 2007. He was frustrated by
an apparent unwillingness by the MOI -- XXXXX, who had
previously been helpful -- to meet,
despite repeated attempts well in advance of his visit to set
an appointment. The refugees were having considerable
difficulty determining where to get their identification
documentation renewed. They believed they were being
overcharged for electricity and could not get receipts for
electricity payments made by the GOA on their behalf. There
were delays in delivery of their monthly stipends. In
subsequent meetings with the GOA, we urged them to live up to
their obligations to these and all refugees, noting that as
well as the moral obligation, embarrassing articles about GOA
treatment of the refugees could be distracting in the (then)
Tirana 00000411 004 of 006
run-up to a potential NATO invitation. We urged the GOA to
meet its responsibilities to important international NGOs
such as the ICRC. We also advised XXXXX to utilize the
ICRC's own contacts in the MOD and MFA (from other projects
and responsibilities) to facilitate the contacts it needed.
13. (SBU) In May 2008, XXXXX reported no further
difficulties making contact with GOA officials. He
characterized the refugees as "reasonably well off." Their
situation was "definitely not about life and death, or strong
suffering." He said there would likely be periodic bouts of
depression and concern; this is not uncommon in similar
situations. He said depression in refugees can come in
waves. Physically, they were well and had adjusted.
XXXXX said he understood the refugees to be deeply
worried about their future. They feared they may end up
sleeping in the streets. Most, he believed, were more or
less willing to integrate. He confirmed (nonjudgmentally)
that the refugees expect assistance from U.S. authorities.
14. (SBU) The refugees had outlined for XXXXX
essentially the same three concerns they did with us. They
want to be able to travel. ICRC had explained, as we did,
that the problem was not strictly one of documentation;
nonetheless, the refugees pressed the ICRC for U.S. help to
obtain expedited Albanian citizenship. XXXXX said that
according to the UNHCR, acquiring Albanian citizenship is
normally a five-year process, unless a person marries an
Albanian. In the case of marriage, the process is reduced to
three years. The refugees had asked the GOA to give them
houses. While with Poloffs the request was for more general
employment, with ICRC they particularly focused on help
getting a restaurant.
15. (SBU) XXXXX noted that this last request indicated
some thought, initiative, and willingness to integrate.
While neither ICRC, UNHCR, nor the GOA (nor, presumably, the
USG) is able to give them money to buy a restaurant, if the
lawyers could tap into private interest and work through a
group like the Center for Constitutional Rights, it might be
possible to raise funds to help the refugees, he mused.
XXXXX observed that when information about the refugees
is shared, the reaction of most people (Albanians and others)
is one of sympathy.
-------
comment
-------
16. (SBU) As ICRC noted, the refugees are not at this time
destitute or suffering. Their monthly stipend is fairly
comfortable by Albanian standards. The bureaucratic hurdles
they have encountered are not uncommon for any Albanian, but
the refugees are at a disadvantage culturally and
linguistically to face them. A poor Albanian might have a
family network for support, live at home, or have a house
with room to grow or raise some supplemental food.
17. (SBU) Post does not have the human or financial
resources to provide full-time social work assistance to the
eight refugees, although we can follow their condition
periodically as a human rights issue. In some of the
communications we have had with private citizens (usually by
e-mail), we have noticed a desire to help these individuals.
Department may want to consider whether to encourage the
lawyers, together with the Center for Constitutional Rights,
to develop a fundraising/support network for the detainees.
(The Center for Constitutional Rights can, according to ICRC,
facilitate delivery of money or goods.) While there are
potentially negative PR considerations to such an idea, the
unfavorable PR from media attention to unhappy refugees also
Tirana 00000411 005 of 006
could be a bar to other countries we may want to consider
future resettlement. The prospect of eight ex-detainees
camping at the Embassy's front door, being dragged away by
the Albanian police, is another PR nightmare to be avoided.
------------------------
letter from the refugees
------------------------
18. (U) Begin text, letter to Embassy from refugees:
April 21, 2008 Tirana
American Consulate:
We, XXXXX, XXXXX, XXXXX, and
XXXXX, four of us, have been in Albania for two years by
the arrangement of the United States of America. You told us
in Guantanimo (sic) that by two months in Albania you would
help arrange passports, housing and find us work. As of
today Albania has not given us passports (with the documents
that they did give us we are unable to even venture out from
our present place). As for housing they gave us a place to
live for two years. After two years have passed it is still
not settled where we will live.
We told all this to the Albania interior ministry. We told
them if they could not give us work then please give us some
finances so we can start our own business and make a living.
The person there named XXXXX told us that their country
doesn't have any welfare money. So six months ago we gave a
written request to the UNHCR asking for money to open up a
restaurant. At that time XXXXX (UNHCR worker) said they
would help us. But now XXXXX says it takes a lot of money
to open a restaurant and that by themselves they cannot get
enough funds. He told us to write to the American Consulate
and request help, saying he would talk with you also to get
some help.
XXXXX, from the Albania interior ministry, said that they
will only give us rent and money to live on for two years,
and then we are on our own.
To the Head of the Consul:
We originally put great hope in America and Albania, but now
we haven't obtained anything. On the contrary, XXXXX
from the Albania interior ministry has falsely told everyone
that we eight people are doing well. The groups that would
help us have all disappeared and have withheld the things
that would help us. Every month the money we get to live on
comes late. If we don't phone them asking for it for one or
two days they don't bring it.
If after two years Albania doesn't give us the opportunity to
make a living or give us a stable home, where will we live,
what will we eat then? XXXXX has not given us enough funds
to study language and she says that they don't have money.
Three of us ) XXXXX, XXXXX, and XXXXX
have asked for funds to open a restaurant.
If the UNHCR and you do not help us with the things necessary
to live, passports and funds to open a restaurant we will be
unable to make a living because to rent an place for one
month costs from $200-300. Electricity and water are at
least $60. With only $40 left how can we survive?
Dear sir/madam, being taken to Guantanimo (sic) has destroyed
our lives. Although in the end we were acquitted of any
wrong, we still have not been given the opportunity to live a
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normal life. On the contrary our lives are turned upside
down by people's prejudices.
So we are asking the American government and the American
Consul to give us the opportunity to live peacefully. Please
help us straighten out our lives. If the United States of
America and Albania are unwilling to help us with getting a
home, passports and work, please move us to a better country.
We are appealing to the American Consulate because the
government of Albania only does what the American government
tells them to do. We've come to understand this very
clearly. They will not help us on their own. From now on we
will not talk with XXXXX at the Interior Ministry
because it doesn't help and we are tired of it. Now we are
seeking the American Consulate to help us.
Sincerely
/s/
XXXXX
End text.
Withers
The Uighurs complained to the US Embassy in Tirana that before leaving Guantanamo they had been told, "in two months (from arrival in Albania), you will have a house, a job, money, documents. You will have everything you need." In fact, it had been impossible for them to find work or permanent accommodation. They couldn't marry either, they said, because Albanian fathers didn't want former Guantanamo detainees as sons-in-law. They also claimed they were being overcharged by the state electricity company.
At their wits end, US diplomats relayed their frustration back to Washington: "Post does not have the human or financial resources to provide full-time social work assistance." They said the situation in Tirana threatened to spiral out of control unless action was taken quickly. "The prospect of eight ex-detainees camping at the Embassy's front door, being dragged away by the Albanian police," the dispatch read, "is another PR nightmare to be avoided."