'Operation Scorched Earth' A US Hand in Yemen's Civil War
Yemeni soldiers take up a position against Houthi rebels in 2009 in this picture provided by the Yemeni army. US dispatches make it clear that the fight could not continue without US support.
Foto: A2800 epa The Yemeni Army/ dpaHis Excellency Ali Abdullah Saleh, the first and so far only president of the Republic of Yemen, ruler over 23 million inhabitants and 50 million firearms, is not a good man to have as an enemy -- but having him as a friend is even worse. In Yemen he is called "The Boss."
Since 2004, the boss has been fighting a ruthless war against the Houthi rebels in the north. They are Shiites -- and politically marginalized. In August 2009, this conflict entered a new phase when the Yemeni army launched a new offensive designed to wipe out all Houthi resistance. The president categorically rejects negotiations with the rebels: "The war will never stop no matter how much money or martyrs it costs," he said a year ago.
Saleh appears indifferent to the ravages of the war, the civilian casualties, the streams of refugees and the devastating damage to the region's infrastructure. He is pouring an increasing number of weapons into the battle against the Houthi stronghold of Sadah, and sending in an increasing number of soldiers into his deadlocked conflict with the rebels. He is also paying less and less attention to the fight against the terror group known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
"We are fighting on behalf of you, the Americans, and Israel," he said in a conversation with the US ambassador, according to one of the tens of thousands of US diplomatic dispatches that have now been made public by WikiLeaks. Saleh maintains that the war against the Houthis is actually a proxy war between Iran and the US. The Americans, however, feel that the Yemeni president is fighting a senseless war, a viewpoint that is made crystal clear by hundreds of reports that the US Embassy in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa has sent to Washington over the past few years. Nevertheless, the Americans play a role in the war. The internal embassy documents show that Saleh has mis-appropriated the American anti-terror aid for his own purposes -- a situation which has made it necessary for the US military to secretly hunt down al-Qaida terrorists on their own.
Dares Not Enter His Office
Yemen is a country in freefall, on the way to becoming a second Afghanistan or Somalia -- an alarming situation given its close proximity to the world's largest oil reserves.
It was from Yemen that terrorists airmailed two parcel bombs addressed to targets in the US. The packages were intercepted in late October in Dubai and the UK. Evidence indicates that al-Qaida was behind the plot. Yemen was also where the "underwear bomber" was outfitted with plastic explosives intended to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight in December 2009. Al-Qaida leaders are moving their operations from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Yemen: Nasir al-Wuhayshi, for example, Osama bin Laden's private secretary and confidant. In the province of Abyan, where the jihadist Tariq al-Fadhli calls the shots, not even the provincial governor dares enter his own office.
ORIGINAL: The Key Yemen Cables
Click on the headline below to read the full text...
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<<224857>>
09.12.2009 14:11
09SANAA1662
Embassy Sanaa
SECRET//NOFORN
09SANAA1628|09SANAA876|09STATE86584
VZCZCXRO4184
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHYN #1662/01 2551411
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121411Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2751
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0694
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
TAGS: PINR, PREL, PGOV, ECON, ENRG, EIND, IR, YM
SUBJECT: IRAN IN YEMEN: TEHRAN'S SHADOW LOOMS LARGE, BUT
REF: A. STATE 86584
S e c r e t section 01 of 04 sanaa 001662
Noforn
sipdis
Dept for nea/arp amacdonald, nea/ir cdejuana, inr smoffatt
nsc for kmagsaman
E.o. 12958: decl: 09/07/2019
Tags: pinr, prel, pgov, econ, enrg, eind, ir, ym
Subject: iran in yemen: tehran's shadow looms large, but
footprint is small (c-ne9-01257)
Ref: a. State 86584
b. Sanaa 1628
c. Sanaa 876
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Despite repeated ROYG accusations of
Tehran's material and financial support to the Houthi rebels
in Sa'ada and increasingly belligerent media exchanges
between Yemen and Iran, Iranian influence in Yemen has thus
far been limited to informal religious ties between Yemeni
and Iranian scholars and negligible Iranian investment in the
energy and development sectors. While Iran has good
strategic reasons to involve itself in Yemeni affairs -
including Yemen's proximity to Saudi Arabia and the presence
of a large Zaydi Shiite population ) the only visible
Iranian involvement remains the Iranian media's proxy battle
with Saudi and Yemeni outlets over support for the Houthis.
Significant gaps exist in post's knowledge of Iranian
activities in Yemen due to the sensitivity of the subject and
post's very limited access to events in Sa'ada. Post
believes that while documented influence is limited, Iran's
strategic interests in Yemen merit close monitoring in the
future. END SUMMARY.
Iran-royg relations
-------------------
2. (S/NF) After two high-profile Iranian official visits to
Sana'a in early 2009, the formal bilateral relationship has
rapidly deteriorated as a result of renewed fighting in
Sa'ada governorate. Iran maintains an embassy in Sana'a
headed by Ambassador Mahmoud Zada. According to DATT
sources, Iran is not providing any military training to the
Yemenis, and there have been no announced military sales
between the two countries in recent years. Iranian Speaker
of Parliament Ali Larijani visited Yemen in May 2009 to
discuss Iranian investment in Yemen's energy and
infrastructure sectors and the bilateral relationship.
During Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's June
visit to Sana'a, his second in two years, both nations
maintained at least a public appearance of normal bilateral
cooperation. Mottaki told local media at the time, "Iran is
pursuing an honest and friendly approach towards Yemen. Iran
wants progress, security and prosperity for Yemen."
3. (S/NF) With the August onset of the sixth war in Sa'ada,
however, the ROYG has reverted to its previous position that
Iran is intent on meddling in Yemen's internal affairs.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Chief of Protocol Abdullah
al-Radhi, who spent over a decade in Tehran as a student and
diplomat, including a tour as Yemen's ambassador to Iran,
echoed the near-unanimous attitude of ROYG officials when he
told the DCM on August 23 that he believes Iran wants a
strong political card to play in Yemen similar to Hizballah
in Lebanon. He said that Yemen tried to normalize the
relationship with the visits of Larijani and Mottaki, but
Yemen "cannot accept" Iranian attempts to convert the Yemeni
Zaydis to Twelver Shiism. (Note: The ROYG views Zaydi
Shiites as less extremist and closer in practice to Sunnis
than the Twelver Shiism predominant in Iran. End Note.)
Radhi also said that the Iranians are still upset about
Yemen,s support for Iraq during and since the first Gulf War.
Iran and the houthis
--------------------
4. (S/NF) Although the ROYG maintains that Iran is providing
material and financial support to the Houthi rebels in
Sa'ada, little evidence has surfaced to date that supports
this claim. President Saleh told General Petraeus in a July
26 meeting that the National Security Bureau (NSB) had a DVD
showing Houthi rebels training with Hizballah uniforms and
tactics. (Note: In a follow-up conversation, NSB Deputy
Director Ammar Saleh claimed no knowledge of the DVD. End
Note.) In an August 17 meeting, Saleh told Senator McCain
that Iran was working against Yemeni stability because it
believed that a weakened Yemen would hurt the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia, both traditional enemies of Iran. In the same
meeting, NSB Director Ali Mohammed al-Ansi claimed that the
ROYG had arrested two separate "networks" of Iranians in
Yemen on charges of espionage in connection with the Houthis
and that one of the accused admitted to providing $100,000
every month to the Houthis on behalf of the Iranian
Sanaa 00001662 002 of 004
government. Ansi told Deputy National Security Advisor John
Brennan on September 6 that the ROYG was unable to share the
evidence from this case because it was still in the courts.
(Comment: Since the outbreak of hostilities in 2004, the ROYG
has used many different arguments, including the Houthis'
alleged ties to Iran and Hezballah, to attempt to convince
the USG to declare the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). In 2008, the ROYG gave post a dossier of
information purporting to show ties between the Houthis and
Iran. Post passed on the file to the inter-agency community
in Washington. Analysts agreed that the information did not
proove Iranian involvement in Sa'ada. End Note.)
5. (S/NF) ROYG spokesman Hassan al-Lawzi has repeated
statements throughout the three weeks of fighting in Sa'ada
accusing Iran of supporting the Houthi rebels. On September
1, Foreign Minister Abubakir al-Qirbi publicly warned Iran
that interference in the Sa'ada conflict would have a
negative impact on bilateral relations and that, if such
interference continued, Yemen could be forced to make "hard
decisions," according to media reports. Qirbi also lodged an
official complaint with the Iranian Embassy in Sana'a
detailing Yemen's displeasure with Iranian support for the
Houthis. Director for External Financial Relations at the
Ministry of Finance Fouad al-Kohlani told PolOff on August 19
that the Houthis' level of organizational sophistication and
military successes against government forces indicate a
higher level of financial resources than the Houthis could
attain on their own. He speculated that because of its
strategic interest in gaining a foothold near Saudi Arabia,
Iran was likely the Houthis' financial backer. The Iranians,
for their part, continue to deny any interference in Sa'ada.
On August 23, the Iranian Embassy in Bahrain stated that Iran
had no connections to events in Yemen and "supports any
movement that works to unify the ranks of the Yemeni people,"
according to Bahraini media. The Iranian Embassy in Sana'a
repeated these statements on September 7, Yemeni media
reported.
6. (S/NF) Media reports on August 22 cited ROYG officials
claiming to have uncovered six storehouses of Houthi-owned,
Iranian-made weapons ) including machine guns, short-range
rockets and ammunition ) near Sa'ada City. In xxxxxxxxxxxx told the OMC Chief that a limited
number of weapons "of Iranian manufacture" were found in the
area, but would not provide information on the quantity or
type, and avoided a direct request from EmbOffs to view the
weapons. In June, ROYG military contacts told the DATT that
relations between the two countries were "strained" because
of Iran's support for the Houthis, and denied that the ROYG
was either communicating or in cooperation with Iranian ships
conducting counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden.
(Note: GRPO reporting confirms ROYG refusals to allow Iranian
vessels access to Aden harbor, reportedly over ROYG concern
that Iran was using Eritrea to ship weapons to the Houthis.
End Note.) According to xxxxx, however, the
Houthis do not need to receive weapons from outside of Yemen
because they can easily capture or purchase them from the
Yemeni military. xxxxx, who communicates on a daily basis with Houthis and
other Sa'ada residents, agreed that the Houthis' weapons came
from the Yemeni military ) either through capture or
abandonment on the battlefield or via black-market arms deals
by corrupt military commanders - and not from an external
source such as Iran.
7. (S/NF) The general consensus among civil society is that
Iranian government influence in Sa'ada is minimal, but the
Houthis might receive some financial support from Iranian
groups or individuals. xxxxxxxxxxxx, told PolOff on August 26 that Iran had not been
involved historically in the conflict in Sa'ada, but with
changingdomestic circumstances in Iran, might have become
involved in the latest round of fighting. He addd, however,
that he has no knowledge of any Iranian nationals in Sa'ada
in recent years. (Note: The ROYG used to grant Iranians
living in Yemen hajj visas to travel overland to Mecca, but
stopped issuing the visas some time ago because the ROYG was
uncomfortable about Iranians traveling through Sa'ada into
Saudi Arabia. End Note.) xxxxx speculated that Iranian groups are likely giving
Sanaa 00001662 003 of 004
money to the Houthis, but he does not know to what extent.
With that money, the Houthis buy weapons from corrupt
elements of the Yemeni armed forces that sell weapons and
munitions, xxxxxxxxxxxx. Civil society actors, however,
were also unable to provide any concrete evidence of the
involvement of any Iranian nationals in Sa'ada.
8. (S/NF) To date, Iran's most visible involvement in the
sixth war in Sa'ada has been the Iranian media's proxy battle
with Saudi and Yemeni outlets over Iranian support for the
Houthi rebels (Ref B). Continuing a tradition that dates
back to the earliest stages of the Sa'ada conflict, the ROYG
has accused Iran of financially and materially supporting the
Houthi rebels. For its part, Iran ) through state media
outlets including English-language Press TV and
Arabic-language al-Alam TV ) has claimed that Saudi Arabia
is directly involved in the military campaign against the
Houthis. The Sa'ada conflict has thus become a propaganda
war between Yemen, eager to enlist the support of its Sunni
Arab neighbors and the U.S., and Iran, allegedly seeking to
nurture a Shi'a proxy force on the Arabian Peninsula. On
August 24, Iranian al-Alam TV quoted rebel leader Yahya
al-Houthi as denying Iranian support for the Houthis.
Iranian media have consistently shown video footage intended
to embarrass the ROYG, including images of alleged soldiers
fleeing the fighting and Houthis dancing on top of abandoned
ROYG armored vehicles.
Iran and the south
------------------
9. (S/NF) Little evidence ) or even debate ) exists
regarding Iran's role with the Southern Movement. The
southern secessionist movement, which is formally a secular
organization that has among its ranks former Sunni jihadists,
has, to date, no established connections with either the
Houthis or Iran.xxxxx, told PolOff in May and July that the movement
had repeatedly rejected offers of collaboration with the
Houthis. xxxxx told PolOff on September 6 that the
movement's leaders wanted to continue peacefully advocating
for separation, rather than affiliating themselves with the
Houthis or external actors willing to advocate violence such
as Iran. Some limited evidence, on the other hand, indicates
that Iran might be a more willing partner with southerners
fed up with the current regime. According to DATT contacts,
the ROYG asked the then-Iranian military attache to leave
Yemen in 2008, purportedly because he had attempted to make
contact with separatists in the southern governorates. He
has not been replaced. xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the Iranian Ambassador in Muscat had been
instructed to "study the south of Yemen," especially
Hadramout and Shabwa governorates.
Iran's soft power in yemen
---------------------------
10. (S/NF) Perceived Iranian influence in other arenas is
limited to informal religious ties between Yemeni and Iranian
scholars and negligible Iranian investment in the energy and
development sectors. Despite Yemen's 40% Zaydi Shiite
population, religiously-based interaction between Yemen and
the world's largest Shi'a country is limited, perhaps because
the form of Shiism Zaydis practice hews closer to Sunni Islam
than the Twelver Shiism of Iran. xxxxxxxxxxxx,
told the DCM on August 23 that he believes there is a lot of
"coordination on Yemen" between Qom and Najjaf, with 40-50
Yemenis studying Islam in Najjaf, and some (NFI) studying in
Qom as well. (Note: Given that Yemen has over 9 million
Zaydis, it appears that the number of religious students
studying in Iraq and Iran combined is very small. End Note.)
11. (S/NF) Iranian direct investment in the Yemeni economy
is negligible,xxxxxxxxxxxx.
The only recent significant Iranian commercial activity in
Yemen involves the ROYG,s tortuous experience hiring the
Tehran-based Parsian HV Substations Development Company to
build the substation of the Marib 1 power plant (Ref C).
ROYG officials at all levels told EconOff that the decision
to hire the Iranian firm was purely political, rather than
economic, stemming from a desire in 2005 to expand relations
with Iran. The delays caused by the technical incompetence
Sanaa 00001662 004 of 004
of the Iranian firm have resulted in hundreds of millions of
U.S. dollars in foregone savings from switching away from
expensive diesel and towards natural gas in the power sector.
(Comment: Post believes Iranian commercial activity will
remain limited in Yemen, absent future politically-driven
bilateral trade missions. End Comment.) The Iranian
government funds two hospitals in Sana'a that are among the
better medical facilities in the capital. The management of
the hospitals is Iranian, but the staff is largely local.
Comment
-------
12. (S/NF) Yemen's formal relationship with Iran is by all
accounts relatively fragile, and has continued to deteriorate
in recent months. Since the start of the Sa'ada conflict in
2004, Yemen has looked to pin the Houthis' strength and
resilience in fighting the ROYG on the Iranians. Despite
Yemen's seemingly heartfelt concerns that Iran is backing the
Houthi rebels and the ROYG's desire to convince its powerful
friends (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) of Iran's nefarious
intentions in Yemen, it has to date been unable to produce
any concrete evidence of what it says is wide-scale meddling.
It is post's firm belief that if Yemen had any concrete
evidence that the Houthis had connections to either Hizballah
or Iran, it would have produced it immediately; the lack of
such evidence likely indicates that the ROYG lacks any real
proof of such links. On the other hand, Iran has clear
strategic interests in gaining a foothold in Yemen (Sa'ada)
and developing a proxy ally in the Houthis similar to
Hizballah in Lebanon. Post believes that, while it is worth
keeping an eye on Iranian activities in Yemen, Tehran's reach
to date is limited. END COMMENT.
Seche
XXXXXX: Redacted by the editors.
<<240360>>
12/17/2009 12:54
09SANAA2230
Embassy Sanaa
SECRET//NOFORN
09SANAA1669|09SANAA1995|09SANAA2079
VZCZCXRO9119
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
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FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3405
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
TAGS: PTER, MOPS, PINS, MASS, PGOV, YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN'S COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT STRETCHED THIN BY
REF: A. SANAA 01995
S e c r e t section 01 of 02 sanaa 002230
Sipdis
noforn
Dept for nea/arp amacdonald and inr jyaphe
E.o. 12958: decl: 12/01/2019
Tags: pter, mops, pins, mass, pgov, ym
Subject: yemen's counter terrorism unit stretched thin by
war against houthis
Ref: a. Sanaa 01995
b. Sanaa 02079
c. Sanaa 01669
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. As the sixth war against the Houthis
continues to squeeze Yemen's conventional military, the ROYG
has looked to its U.S. and U.K.-funded and trained
counterterrorism forces to provide some relief to battered
army forces. The Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) - trained to
detect small terrorist cells and investigate and prevent
terror attacks on civilian targets - is a poor tactical
choice for use against a long-term domestic insurgency. The
ROYG, desperate to defeat the Houthis at any cost, has
largely ignored USG concerns regarding deployment of the CTU
to Sa'ada. The CTU has been unable to go after genuine
terrorist targets like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) while it has been tied down in Sa'ada. CTU
involvement in a ROYG operation against AQAP on the morning
of December 17 is a welcome return to its core mission,
although it remains to be seen if this was any more than a
one-off occurrence. END SUMMARY.
Signs of royg desperation in sa'ada
-----------------------------------
2. (C) As the sixth war in Sa'ada, now in its fifth month,
drags on in a tit-for-tat struggle between ROYG military
forces and Houthi rebels, the ROYG has attempted to use its
elite CT forces to provide needed extra muscle.xxxxx,
told PolOff in late November xxxxxxxxxxxx forces were
being pulled into the Sa'ada conflict because of the
perception that the CTU is made up of "super-men that can
solve any problem and defeat anybody." (Note: CTU forces
were initially sent to Sa'ada in July to investigate the
kidnapping of a group of Western aid workers. Post assesses
that the CTU was drawn into the Houthi conflict in early
September. End Note.) Such a misperception of the CTU's
capabilities and mission was hurting the unit, xxxxxxxxxxxx.
During the U.S.-Yemen Joint Staff Talks hosted in Sana'a
November 8-11, xxxxx publicly impressed upon Brigadier
General Ali Dahan of the Yemen Special Operations Forces
(YSOF), another elite military unit also involved in CT
operations, and other senior Ministry of Defense (MOD)
leadership the severity of the situation in Sa'ada and the
toll it was taking on the CTU. xxxxxxxxxxxx told Dahan, "You may not
be feeling the hurt of this war, but the CTU is fighting in
Sa'ada and is taking casualties." (COMMENT: xxxxxxxxxxxx while the CTU
was being deployed in Sa'ada. xxxxxxxxxxxx believes the YSOF should be
doing more in Sa'ada, which would allow the CTU to return to
its primary mission. END COMMENT.)
3. (S/NF) Increasingly desperate to defeat the Houthis, the
ROYG continues to insist that fighting the Houthis is a
legitimate component of CT operations, thus justifying the
use of CTU forces in Sa'ada. xxxxxxxxxxxx, "The war
against the Houthis is not a distraction from the CT fight.
It is the CT fight." xxxxx Despite the injection
of CTU forces into the fight three months ago, the Sa'ada war
drags on and, according to xxxxxxxxxxxx is taking
"heavy casualties" due to their lack of training for this
type of warfare. At the urging of CTU leadership, the
Supreme Security Council agreed to move all CTU forces (two
platoons) out of Sa'ada on December 9. xxxxx confirmed that
the MOI Regional Commander ordered elements of the CTU,
believed to be one platoon, to remain in Sa'ada until Sa'ada
City is cleared of Houthi fighters.
Ct operations constrained due to sa'ada war
-------------------------------------------
4. (S/NF) Following the return of one platoon to Sana'a, the
CTU undertook its first CT operation against AQAP in four
months on the morning of December 17. However, according to
xxxxx deployment to Sa'ada has hurt the CTU's readiness
capabilities. Ideally, the unit is primed for rapid response
to any CT threat in and around Sana'a within 10 minutes. The
Sanaa 00002230 002 of 002
CTU is broken into four platoons which rotate every two
weeks: one on leave, a second in training, a third on
standby, and a fourth as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). With
one platoon in Sa'ada, and another on active duty in Sana'a,
the CTU has no surge capacity.xxxxxxxxxxxx the CTU's
training and operational cycle has been disrupted by the
Sa'ada war. "Since August, the QRF has been in Sa'ada,
taking heavy casualties because they have been engaged in
heavy fighting. We have only had a chance to send a relief
team twice since the latest conflict started." He said that
the use of USG-provided armored vehicles and humvees has
"been fundamental in preventing casualties." (NOTE: Post has
repeatedly questioned ROYG use of U.S. military equipment and
U.S.-trained forces intended to combat AQAP in the war
against the Houthi rebels. END NOTE.)
5. (S/NF) The CTU was established just six years ago at the
urging of the USG and has received substantial funding and
training from U.S. special operations forces and British
conventional army trainers. Their training has focused on
detecting and neutralizing the AQAP threat, not fighting a
long-term, domestic insurgency. In particular, the CTU is
predominantly trained for CT "direct action missions" in
which they isolate an AQAP cell and capture its members based
on specific intelligence. Referring to the guerilla warfare
tactics the Houthis have been using xxxxxxxxxxxx U.S. training in
"unconventional warfare" and tactics used by the U.S. forces
in "asymmetric warfare" of the type encountered in the
mountains of Afghanistan, suggesting the CTU expects to
continue to use its forces in Sa'ada.
Comment
-------
6. (S/NF) Bogged down in a seemingly unwinnable war that
pits conventional forces against determined rebels, the ROYG
has resorted to using its specialized CT units. Untrained to
fight this type of conflict, the overstretched CTU has
reportedly sustained significant casualties, missed training
opportunities and been derailed from its principal mission:
to combat AQAP. While U.S. concerns over diversion of troops
and equipment have been acknowledged, they have clearly not
resulted in a significant change of ROYG focus from the
Houthis to AQAP. CTU deployment to Sa'ada, while a
distraction, is not a crushing blow to all potential CT
activities, as demonstrated by the December 17 CT operation.
However, it remains to be seen if this indicates a balancing
of priorities between the Houthi conflict and AQAP, or if it
is simply a momentary return to the CTU's primary mission.
End comment.
Seche
XXXXXX: Redacted by the editors.
<<241752>>
12/28/2009 10:44
09SANAA2279
Embassy Sanaa
CONFIDENTIAL
09RIYADH1617|09SANAA1611|09SANAA1617|09SANAA2227
VZCZCXRO6290
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHYN #2279/01 3621044
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281044Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3462
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, SA, IR, YE
SUBJECT: YEMENI TRIBAL LEADER: FOR SALEH, SAUDI INVOLVEMENT
REF: A. RIYADH 1617
C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 02 sanaa 002279
Sipdis
Dept for nea/arp andrew macdonald
E.o. 12958: decl: 12/28/2019
Tags: pgov, prel, pinr, sa, ir, ye
Subject: yemeni tribal leader: for saleh, saudi involvement
in sa'ada comes not a moment too soon
Ref: a. Riyadh 1617
b. Sanaa 2227
c. Sanaa 1617
d. Sanaa 1611
Classified By: CDA Angie Bryan for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saleh believes the Saudi
Government's military actions in Sa'ada will alleviate
mounting domestic political pressure on him to demonstrate
progress against the Houthi rebels, according to xxxxxxxxxxxx told EconOff that Saleh
views Saudi involvement in the war, and the concomitant
increase in direct Saudi budget support to the ROYG, as an
incentive to prolong the ROYG's campaign in Sa'ada. xxxxx
also claimed that members of the Saudi Special Office for
Yemen Affairs, in contrast to the Saudi Government's official
support for the ROYG, are privately very skeptical of Saleh's
claims regarding Iranian assistance for the Houthi rebels.
The long absence from Saudi Arabia of Crown Prince Sultan, a
Saleh skeptic who normally heads the Special Office, has
meant that the Yemen file has largely been in the hands of
King Abdullah, a firm supporter of Saleh, according to xxxxx
End summary.
Saleh relieved by saudi involvement, but still overwhelmed
--------------------------------------------- -------------
2. (C) In the past month, President Saleh has told a number
of his top advisors that continued direct Saudi involvement
in the Houthi conflict will alleviate domestic political
pressure on the ROYG to produce tangible gains against the
Houthis, according to xxxxxxxxxxxx. Saleh also views continued Saudi
involvement as the key to keeping the tap of Saudi budget
support open (Saudi monetary support for ROYG military
operations will be reported septel). The greater financial
incentives attached to direct Saudi participation in the
conflict mean Saleh now has an incentive to prolong the
conflict rather than seek a mediated solution. (Comment:
xxxxx comments on Saleh's thinking support similar accounts
from other Post contacts reported in REF B. xxxxxxxxxxxx. The chummy relationship between
xxxxx that EconOff also attended. End
Comment.)
3. (C) Like other Saleh watchers (REF C), xxxxx characterizes
the multitude of threats facing Saleh as qualitatively
different and more threatening to the regime's stability than
those during any other time in Yemen's history. "Saleh is
overwhelmed, exhausted by the war, and more and more
intolerant of internal criticism. Saudi involvement comes at
just the right time for him" xxxxx said. Largely
unprecedented criticism of Saleh's leadership within the
rarified circle of Saleh's closest advisors has increased in
recent months, even including longtime Saleh loyalists such
as xxxxxxxxxxxx, according to xxxxx
These names add to the growing chorus of Saleh loyalists that have shed their
traditional aversion to disparaging the man they call "The
Boss" (REF D).
Saudis divided on confidence in saleh's sa'ada claims
--------------------------------------------- --------
4. (C) Members of the Saudi Government's Special Office for
Yemen Affairs, a committee normally headed by Crown Prince
Sultan, are privately skeptical of Saleh's claims of Iranian
involvement and of his desire to regionalize the Sa'ada
conflict, according to xxxxx told
EconOff on December 14 xxxxx that Saleh was providing false or exaggerated
information on Iranian assistance to the Houthis in order to
enlist direct Saudi involvement and regionalize the conflict.
xxxxx said that xxxxx told him that "we know
Saleh is lying about Iran, but there's nothing we can do
about it now."
Sanaa 00002279 002 of 002
5. (C) The prolonged absence from Saudi Arabia of Special
Office chairman Crown Prince Sultan (REF A), who xxxxx claims
is also highly skeptical of Saleh, left the Yemen file in the
hands of King Abdullah, who has greater confidence in Saleh's
motives and leadership abilities. Committee members have
kept their doubts about Saleh's leadership abilities private
since the departure of Crown Prince Sultan, creating a vacuum
of Yemen policy advice in the Saudi Government that resulted
in the decision to intervene directly in the Houthi conflict,
xxxxx. King Abdullah was much more receptive to
Saleh's entreaties for direct Saudi involvement than Crown
Prince Sultan ever would have been, xxxxx.
6. (C) RIYADH COMMENT: We agree with xxxxx observation that
Saudi support is enabling Saleh to weather increased domestic
political pressure and continue his campaign against the
Houthis. However, xxxxx assumption that King Abdullah's
"greater confidence" in Saleh is driving this support may be
flawed. We have seen no evidence that the King has any
particular regard for Saleh beyond exasperation that borders
on disgust. Senior Saudi officials make no secret of their
distaste for Saleh, but see him as the "devil they know."
Aware of his growing weakness, they view their support as
essential to keeping Yemen's problems contained. Further,
contacts say Second Deputy PM and Minister of Interior Prince
Nayif, widely believed to advocate a tougher approach to the
Yemen problem, has been heavily involved in the Yemen file in
Sultan,s absence. Some suggest that the border actions --
while temporarily propping up Saleh -- may be indicative of
Saudi plans to take a harder line towards Yemen in the longer
term. END RIYADH COMMENT.
7. (U) Embassy Riyadh has cleared this cable.
Bryan
The country is difficult to control due to its many clans and rugged mountainous regions. The US has sought to increase the anti-terror capabilities of the Yemeni army by providing significant aid and training. But a large amount of the materiel provided by the Americans has actually been deployed for the war in Sadah -- as have some of the units trained by US specialists. Indeed, the dispatches make it clear that the campaign is one which likely could not be maintained without US support.
Washington is aware of the problem, yet tacitly accepts it. "A concerted US anti-terrorism campaign in Yemen will free Saleh to continue to devote his limited security assets to the ongoing war against Houthi rebels in Saada," reads one of the dispatches. "The net effect, and one we strongly suspect Saleh has calculated, of both the American and Yemeni 'iron fist' unleashed at the same time in Yemen will be a clear message to the southern movement or any other party interested in generating political unrest in the country that a similar fate awaits them."
'Extra Muscle' in the Fight against the Houthis
US Special Forces and British army instructors are in the country and training the Yemenites to combat terror. The US has spent a total of $160 million on this effort since 2002 -- but in December 2009, it became clear that two of the four specially trained anti-terror units were fighting in the war against the Houthis. They had originally been dispatched to Sadah in July specifically to find nine hostages, including a number of Germans. "The Yemeni government has attempted to use its elite counter-terrorism forces to provide needed extra muscle," reads one of the embassy dispatches.
The US is displeased -- less because of the civil war than because of the fact that their special forces have been misappropriated and can no longer be used for their intended mission against AQAP.
The same is true of military hardware provided by the US. A high-ranking Yemeni officer leaked to the US diplomat something that President Saleh has denied: that American military equipment -- contrary to official US government policy -- is also being used against the Houthis. The officer urged the Americans to train the anti-terror units in the future in "unconventional warfare" as they did in Afghanistan, "suggesting the counter-terrorism unit expects to continue to use its forces in Saada," the embassy dispatch commented. "While US concerns over diversion of troops and equipment have been acknowledged, they have clearly not resulted in a significant change of Yemeni government focus from the Houthis to AQAP."
Washington has known at least since late December 2009 that President Saleh was deploying American weapons and US-trained troops against the rebels. Nevertheless, the US has recently extended its collaboration with him. At a meeting in January of this year, US General David Petraeus promised the president $150 million for 2010 alone.
'I Promise'
America is also helping Yemen to acquire helicopter gunships. "The US could convince Saudi Arabia and the UAE to supply six helicopters each if the American 'bureaucracy' prevented quick approval, Saleh suggested," according to a US Embassy report on a meeting between Saleh and Petraeus in January of this year. "The general responded that he had already considered Yemen's request for helicopters and was in discussions with Saudi Arabia on the matter." Saleh then assured his American guest: "'We won't use the helicopters in Saada, I promise. Only against al-Qaida.'" Hardly any leader lies as brazenly as the president of Yemen. He lies to the people, the parliament and his allies.
At the top of his list of favorite lies: The Houthis are a new Hezbollah.
He has a range of proof, including a video in which Houthis chant "death to America, death to Israel." There is also a DVD that President Saleh personally presented to General Petraeus in the summer of 2009: It allegedly shows Houthi rebels in Hezbollah uniforms -- but oddly enough the deputy director of the Yemeni intelligence agency NSB has no knowledge of the video, according to the US dispatches. Later that same year, Republican US Senator John McCain, while on a visit to the country, was informed that the intelligence agency had eliminated two Iranian networks in Yemen. Shortly thereafter, Yemeni media reported that six warehouses had been discovered with Iranian machine guns, short-range missiles and ammunition. Proof, though, was not forthcoming. It was classified as top secret, the Yemenis said. Alternately, they claimed it was being used as evidence in a trial.
"Most recently, the Yemeni government has failed to substantiate its extravagant, public claims that an Iranian ship seized in the Red Sea off its coast on Oct. 25 was carrying Iranian military trainers, weapons and explosives destined for the Houthis," reads one dispatch. "In fact, sensitive reporting suggests that the ship was carrying no weapons at all."
US Boots on the Ground in Yemen
An additional dispatch reads: "Since the outbreak of hostilities in 2004, the Yemeni government has used many different arguments, including the Houthis' alleged ties to Iran and Hezbollah, to attempt to convince the US government to declare the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization."
The ambassador doesn't mince words in the dispatch. "It is the embassy's firm belief that if Yemen had any concrete evidence that the Houthis had connections to either Hezbollah or Iran, it would have produced it immediately; the lack of such evidence likely indicates that the Yemeni government lacks any real proof of such links." Tehran's influence, the dispatch reads, "is limited to informal religious ties between Yemeni and Iranian scholars and negligible Iranian investment in the energy and development sectors."
The lie about Iran is nevertheless useful to Saleh. It guarantees support for his anti-Houthi campaign from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of whom are opponents of Iranian hegemony.
The Saudis are aware that Saleh is being disingenuous, but they are pursuing their own objectives: a 10 kilometer (six mile) buffer zone that extends into Yemen territory. When Houthi rebels storm the border, the Saudis use this as a pretext to push into Yemen. President Saleh has nothing against the strategy; on the contrary, he is "thrilled" when the Saudi air force bombs Houthi positions. In return for Saleh's acquiescence, Saudi Arabia provides money and arms.
Following the Arms
In late 2009, in fact, Saudi Arabia announced it was providing Yemen with arms worth $62 million. Furthermore, the Saudis have offered to act as an intermediary for arms deals with the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Slovakia. "It is almost certain that a large amount of the weapons now on offer will find their way into Yemen's thriving grey arms market, or be re-exported, a traditional revenue stream for the Saleh government," reads a particularly pointed embassy dispatch. "From there, it is anyone's guess as to where the weapons will surface, potentially even in the hands of extremist groups bent on attacking Western interests in Yemen -- and ironically, Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries in the Gulf."
On the long term, the US is concerned that Saleh's lie could become a "self-fulfilling prophecy," and a regional war could erupt between Shiites and Sunnis, fueled by propaganda from the Yemeni president: "We can think of few ways to more effectively encourage Iranian meddling in the Houthi rebellion than to have all of Yemen's Sunni neighbors line up to finance and outfit Ali Abdullah Saleh's self-described "Operation Scorched Earth" against his country's Shia minority," reads one of the dispatches.
Next on the list of Saleh's favorite untruths is that "there are no American boots on Yemeni soil."
That, at least, is how Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defense Affairs Rashad al-Alimi likes to phrase it. The government is anxious to give the impression that its collaboration with the US is limited to training, technical support and information exchange.
Our Bombs, Not Yours
The US dispatches, however, make it clear that the US, at the invitation of Yemen, have begun to hunt down terrorists in the country and launch air strikes. US fighter jets, for instance, attacked suspected al-Qaida camps in Arhab and in the provinces of Abyan and Shabwa on Dec. 17 and 24, 2009.
Two weeks later, Petraeus met with Saleh: "We'll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours," said the Yemeni president, according to one of the dispatches. Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi then added that he "lied" to the parliament by saying that, while the bombs may have been manufactured in America, they had been used by the Yemeni government.
Saleh's administration has no interest in making public just how much leeway it gives the Americans within the country. It was only when Petraeus suggested positioning US personnel in al-Qaida areas, equipped with information provided by the drones, that the president sidestepped the proposal. "You cannot enter the operation area," Saleh said.
Then Saleh offered one of his typical compromises: US fighter jets and drones could remain on standby outside Yemeni territory -- and thus out of sight -- and attack as soon as al-Qaida targets were reported.
It is an ideal state of affairs for the US. Following criticism of the large numbers of civilian casualties sustained during an attack on Dec. 17 -- a total of 49 civilians, including 18 children, were reportedly killed -- it was noted that the Yemeni government had "weathered the storm of criticism," according to a dispatch. "While the US has escaped the brunt of criticism to date, continued leaks from Washington and international media coverage of American involvement could stir up anti-American resentment in Yemen and test the Yemeni government's professed commitment to going after AQAP."
Civilian Victims
Indeed, that is the third lie on the list: There are no civilian victims.
The Yemeni government does not spare civilians, neither when fighting the Houthis nor when conducting operations against al-Qaida. In the wake of the US attacks on an al-Qaida camp on Dec. 17 and 24 -- an operation that President Saleh explicitly praised -- an embassy official wrote in a dispatch that, "Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi told the ambassador that civilians killed in the air strikes were most likely poor Bedouin from the area providing logistical support to the terrorists and AQAP." Officially, however, the Yemenites deny that there were any civilian casualties, aside from relatives of the al-Qaida fighters.
Large numbers of civilians also died during Saudi air strikes against Houthi rebels in late 2009, apparently because the Yemenites, by all appearances, had purposely provided false target information.
The embassy documents provide details of a conversation between the US ambassador in Riyadh and the deputy defense minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Khalid bin Sultan. "The ambassador highlighted US concerns about providing Saudi Arabia with satellite imagery of the Yemen border area," reads one dispatch. Washington was worried about how the Saudis would use such information.
The ambassador cited Saudi air strikes against a clinic in Yemen. He showed the prince satellite images of bombed-out buildings. "This looks familiar," the prince said, according to the dispatch. "If we had the Predator (drones), maybe we would not have this problem."
"We tried very hard not to hit civilian targets," the prince assured the ambassador. The document reads further: "The Saudis had 130 deaths and the Yemenis lost as many as one thousand. 'Obviously,' Prince Khaled observed, 'some civilians died, though we wish that this did not happen.'"
Whiskey, Not Drugs
According to the Saudis, the attack on the clinic was conducted "based on information received from Yemen that it was being used as an operational base by the Houthis." There were numerous other cases of erroneous target data. In the end, though, the US handed over the satellite images of the border region to the Saudis -- although it knew that these could be used to launch air strikes against Houthi positions.
Given Saleh's brazen lies, why does the US continue to support him? One document provides the answer. "The United States sees no real alternative to supporting Saleh," it reads. As such, the Yemeni president is free to continue playing on the fears of terrorism among his Arab neighbors and the US. He accuses his American allies of being "'hot-blooded and hasty when you need us' but 'cold-blooded and British when we need you.'"
Saleh accuses the US of producing "only words, but no solutions," and by solutions the president means armored vehicles, weapons, fighter jets, and helicopter gunships to be used in operations against Houthis.
Should his demands be rejected, he rants and raves -- as the ambassador noted following a conversation with Saleh -- and accuses the Americans of wanting to keep al-Qaida in the country to justify their presence in the region. "I gave you a green light," Sadeh said according to a dispatch from the US Embassy in Sanaa. "We have given you air, sea and land access, and still you don't want to hit them." Alternately, he threatened to start negotiating with members of al-Qaida.
Afterwards, the dispatch noted that Saleh was once again in "vintage" form: "at times disdainful and dismissive and at others, conciliatory and congenial."
The president even has a sense of humor. Indeed, after four containers from Djibouti filled with explosives -- possibly destined for the rebels -- arrived in Yemen, Saleh ordered the Americans: "Tell (Djiboutian President) Ismail Guelleh that I don't care if he smuggles whiskey into Yemen -- provided it's good whiskey -- but not drugs or weapons."