US Dispatches from Beijing 'True Democracy' Within China's Politburo?

Hu Jintao strives for consensus, except when it comes to Tibet, according to US diplomatic dispatches from Beijing.
Foto: VIVEK PRAKASH/ REUTERSIs there any place in dictatorial China where votes are taken and discussions held -- rather than orders given and decrees issued? Indeed there is. And it is where one would least expect it: In the heart of Chinese power.
If one is to believe US diplomatic sources in Beijing, "true democracy" prevails in the Politburo of all places, within that little-known group of top apparatchiks consisting of 24 men and one woman.
No one outside China's ruling cadre knows who at the top of China's power structure decides what and why. No one knows who thinks what, who is allied with whom and who really has influence. Public debates are rare. But by talking to leading functionaries, experts from the US Embassy in Beijing managed to get a glimpse inside of China's inner circle.
The newly revealed US embassy dispatches provide surprising details. Hardly any decisions, no matter how sensitive they might be, are decreed by head of state Hu Jintao or head of government Wen Jiabao. Decisions instead tend to be taken collectively by top Communist party functionaries. When vital policy issues, such as relations with Taiwan or North Korea, are up for decision, all 25 Politburo members are involved. Lesser issues are resolved by the nine-member standing committee.
'A Consensus System'
The committee, though, does not decide by vote, according to cables sent from US diplomats back to Washington. Instead, issues are weighed up and discussed for as long as it takes to arrive at a consensus. In the decision making process, to be sure, Hu Jintao's "views carry the greatest weight," US diplomats quote a source with access to the inner power circle as saying. "It is a consensus system," the source said, "in which members can exercise veto power."
It is a system that ensures that none of the Communist party functionaries becomes too powerful. But it is a principle, US diplomats have been told, that doesn't apply to one particularly touchy issue: that of the Dalai Lama and Tibet. On that subject, China's president and Communist party head Hu Jintao "is firmly in charge."
In his eyes, the Dalai Lama is a traitor and a separatist. Rebels are to be severely punished or re-educated -- a view that Hu himself applied during his time as Communist party chief in Tibet from 1988 to 1992. Those who would prefer a milder approach risk their careers, US diplomats have been told.
Originals: The Key China Politburo Cables
Click on the headlines below to read the full texts...
XXXXXX: Redacted by the editors.
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SUBJECT: WU YI INTERVENES AS DR. GAO CASE LAYS BARE
REF: BEIJING 1063 AND PREVIOUS
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Tags: phum, prel, pgov, ch
Subject: wu yi intervenes as dr. Gao case lays bare
center-local discord
Ref: beijing 1063 and previous
Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) Vice Premier Wu Yi personally intervened in
the case of Dr. Gao Yaojie in order to break an
impasse between the Central Government and Henan
Province authorities, xxxxx unusually
candid comments, along with other observations from
MFA staffers, reveal a glimpse into central-local
dissonance and how tough political problems get solved
in China. xxxxx complained that Provincial Party
Secretaries are using their considerable clout to
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increasingly weigh in with Central authorities on
issues that affect foreign policy. In Dr. Gao's case,
well-connected Henan Province Party Secretary Xu
Guangchun wanted to prevent the doctor from publicly
embarrassing the province, which would threaten Xu's
own promotion prospects. In the end, only
intervention from the highest levels of China's
Government induced Henan authorities to relent.xxxxx
officials stressed to us China's desire that Dr.
Gao's visit to the United States not be "politicized."
End Summary.
Candid Talk in an Informal Setting
----------------------------------
2. (C) Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi topped the
cast of several dozen MFA attendees at the
Ambassador's Lunar New Year dinner reception February
28. Keen for insights into what prompted the policy
switch whereby Henan Province authorities released Dr.
Gao from house arrest, Poloffs asked MFA officers at
various levels for their reading of how we reached the
positive outcome. Dr. Gao arrived in New York
February 26 and is scheduled to receive an award at a
Vital Voices Global Partnership event in Washington on
March 14. She has told the foreign press that
intervention from high-level Central leaders (as well
as international pressure) likely caused the local
government in Henan Province to release her from house
arrest and allow her to travel abroad.
Henan Feels the Heat
--------------------
3. (C) xxxxx confirmed Dr. Gao's assertions,
remarking that "top leaders" needed to get involved in
order to overrule Henan Province Party Secretary Xu
Guangchun, xxxxx acknowledged. (Note: Xu, the former
head of the State Administration for Radio, Film and
Television, is reported to have ties to President Hu
Jintao. End note.) xxxxx complained that provincial
Party secretaries have considerable clout and are
increasingly weighing in with the Central Government
on issues that affect foreign policy, diminishing the
authority of the MFA in policymaking. Provincial
leaders do not listen to the MFA, xxxxx commented.
Such was the case with Dr. Gao. xxxxx said neither
xxxxx VFM Yang
Jiechi to EVFM Dai Bingguo to FM Li Zhaoxing -- had
the bureaucratic muscle to fix the problem. Vice
Premier Wu herself had to call the authorities in
Henan and tell them to allow Dr. Gao to travel.
4. (C) Henan officials, including Party Secretary Xu,
were likely concerned that if Dr. Gao traveled to the
United States, she would do or say something to
embarrass the province, which in turn could harm the
officials' potential for promotion, xxxxx commented.
As a general rule these days, personal advancement is
priority No. 1 for local leaders, regardless of their
province. "They are most interested in their own
political position," xxxxx complained. Provincial
leaders do not think about the national interest and,
currently, are focused mainly on making sure that
"nothing bad happens" to dash their promotion
prospects, he said.
Wu Yi's Constant Calls
----------------------
5. (C) xxxxx related that Vice Premier Wu Yi
"ruined" his spring festival holiday break by calling
him constantly for updates. After Henan officials
released the doctor from house arrest on February 16,
Beijing 00001668 002 of 002
the case became even more challenging for the MFA
because Central authorities were worried about Dr. Gao
causing trouble in Beijing on her way to the United
States. Would she hold a press conference? Would the
media film her trip to the Embassy to pick up a visa?
"We needed to follow the issue very closely," xxxxx
related.
6. (C) The MFA was also concerned because "sensitive
people" who might be tempted to "manipulate" the
matter fastened themselves to Dr. Gao during her time
in Beijing. "You know who these people are," xxxxx
claimed. xxxxx
7. (C) Although we have no firm evidence, it appears
probable that Senator Clinton's personal appeal via
letter was a key catalyst behind Vice Premier Wu's
intervention in the case.xxxxx
told Poloff they thought the Senator's letter struck
an appropriate tone. Regardless, Vice Premier Wu's
involvement comes at a time when she is taking on a
high-visibility role in United States-China relations.
xxxxx told the DCM that the Vice Premier called him
xxxxx. She gave xxxxx marching orders to
present her and the Strategic Economic Dialogue in a
proper light, he said. In addition, Vice Premier Wu
took an unusually high-level Chinese delegation to
Beijing airport March 7 to meet briefly with Treasury
Secretary Paulson as he transited on the way to
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Shanghai.
Don't Politicize It
-------------------
8. (C) Further on public aspects of Dr. Gao's case,
MFA International Organizations Deputy Director
General Chen Xu and Office of North American Affairs
Counselor Deng Hongbo both emphasized that China hopes
the doctor will not "politicize" her visit to the
United States by making controversial comments casting
Henan or China in an unflattering light. In response
to Poloffs' observations, xxxxx
at the reception acknowledged that Dr. Gao's transit
was handled in a low-key way and that their worst
fears were not realized during the doctor's Beijing
stopover.
Daring Daily Breaks Silence, Criticizes Locals
--------------------------------------------- -
9. (C) Following her departure, Dr. Gao's travails
were broached for the first time by China's own media.
On February 26, the Southern Metropolitan Daily ran a
daring editorial on the case that criticized "local
and regional leaders" and called for greater openness
about AIDS and other issues of public concern.
However, the editorial has not been widely picked up
on the Internet, and so far, the paper does not appear
to have encountered any negative repercussions.
Randt
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SUBJECT: HU JINTAO IN CHARGE OF TIBET POLICY; LEADERSHIP
REF: A. OSC CPP20080407530001
C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 beijing 001454
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Tags: pgov, phum, prel, koly, ch
Subject: hu jintao in charge of tibet policy; leadership
unified, buoyed and constrained by nationalist sentiment
Ref: a. Osc cpp20080407530001
b. Osc cpp20080408507001
c. Osc fea20080407617427
Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) President Hu Jintao remains firmly in charge of
China's policy on Tibet, with the leadership unified over
Beijing's current hard-line stance and buoyed by rising PRC
nationalist sentiment, xxxxx.
Given Hu's background and experience in Tibet, as well as
the "extremely sensitive" nature of the issue, no one would
"dare" challenge Hu or the Party line, contacts say. While
there may be differences in how various leaders publicly
articulate China's Tibet policy, there are no substantive
differences among the top leadership. Similarly, Embassy
sources do not believe that two recent articles in
Party-controlled southern newspapers signaled leadership
debate or a review of policy, instead arguing the pieces
perhaps reflect an adjustment in the Party's media strategy.
The Party has been buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment,
fueled in part by anger at the West over "biased" media
reporting on Tibet and Olympic-related protests, but this
nationalistic fervor also constrains future policy choices.
Regardless, any modification of Tibet policy is unlikely in
the short term, at least until after the Olympics, contacts
say. End Summary.
Hu Jintao Firmly in Charge, Leadership Unified
--------------------------------------------- -
2. (C) President Hu Jintao is firmly in charge of the PRC's
Tibet policy, with the leadership unified over Beijing's
current hard-line stance, several Embassy contacts told
PolOffs over the past week. Sources argued that given Hu
Jintao's own expertise and experience regarding Tibet (Hu was
provincial party secretary in Tibet in the late 1980s), as
well as the "extreme" importance and sensitivity of the Tibet
issue, it would be virtually "impossible" for any leader to
challenge Hu on Tibet. An issue as sensitive as Tibet policy
would be controlled by a small group of top leaders, limited
primarily to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee
(PBSC), meaning it is difficult to know precisely the content
of leadership discussions on Tibet, longtime Embassy contact
xxxxx.
Nevertheless, "it is still quite clear," xxxxx argued, that Hu
Jintao is "completely" in charge of the Tibet issue, and no
other leader would "dare" confront Hu or the Party line over
such a critical issue. Doing so would be "political suicide"
and would make any leader vulnerable to charges of being
"soft," or even being a "traitor," risking eventual removal,
a la the ouster of former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang
in 1987, xxxxx averred.
3. (C) There is "absolutely no division" within the
leadership on Tibet, xxxxx. For the
Chinese leadership, Tibet is even more sensitive than Taiwan.
Among the nine members of the PBSC who are controlling
China's Tibet policy, no one has the stature or experience to
challenge Hu, xxxxx said, noting that four are brand new
members of the PBSC, and no one on the PBSC other than Hu has
direct experience in Tibet. It was Hu Jintao, as then-Party
Secretary in Tibet, who oversaw the "quick and effective
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suppression" of protests there in 1987 and 1989, which earned
him "great praise" from then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping
and which was an important factor in his elevation to the
PBSC in 1992, xxxxx recalled. Thus, Hu has "great confidence"
when it comes to Tibet, putting him in a virtually
unassailable position. There may be room within the
leadership for expressing differences with Hu on issues such
as Taiwan, economic development or political reform, but not
on Tibet, xxxxx asserted.
Different Views Exist in Party, but No Disagreement at Top
--------------------------------------------- -------------
4. (C) A range of contacts have acknowledged that there are
differences of opinion within the Party and among elites
regarding Tibet, though none believed this reflected any
disagreement among the top leadership. For example,xxxxx acknowledged the presence of
more "moderate" voices on Tibet within the Party, but he
nevertheless stressed that it is Hu Jintao who is
"completely" in charge of China's Tibet policy. Moreover, it
Beijing 00001454 002 of 004
is clear that those such as Hu favoring a "hard line" are
calling the shots. (Note:xxxxx view
that Tibet policy is more sensitive for China's leadership
than even Taiwan, noting that despite its rhetoric, Beijing
has de facto accepted the involvement of the United States in
Taiwan, but China can never accept the "interference" of
foreign powers in Tibet.)xxxxx,
confessed that he "personally" favors a more "measured"
approach to Tibet, to include dialogue with the Dalai Lama,
given that "only the Dalai Lama" can unify the majority of
the Tibetan community both within China and abroad.
5. (C) Separately, xxxxx "many elites" are advocating
a reassessment of policy toward the Dalai Lama, questioning
the wisdom of demonizing and refusing to negotiate with him.
According to xxxxx however, apart from a "minority" of
"elites" and "intellectuals," the majority of the Party
rank-and-file, as well as "98 percent" of the public, support
the current policy. Any serious disagreement over Tibet
among the Party leadership is "simply unimaginable," xxxxx
stated, a view separately shared xxxxx.
Public Statements: Difference in Nuance, not Substance
--------------------------------------------- ----------
6. (C) While there may be differences in how various leaders
have publicly articulated China's Tibet policy, there are no
substantive differences among the top leadership, contacts
asserted. For example, xxxxx said he
does not believe there is disagreement between President Hu
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao over Tibet, as some have
speculated based on Wen's purportedly more "moderate"
comments to UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his statement
to the media in Laos on March 30 regarding the Dalai Lama.
xxxx asserted that, on Tibet, Hu and Wen are like a
"restaurant sugar packet," black on one side and white on the
other, but still part of the same whole. In other words, Hu
and Wen merely emphasize different aspects of the same
policy. xxxxx said xxxxx"sensed" Wen may be
"slightly more moderate" on Tibet than some other leaders,
but he thought that represents Wen's style and does not imply
a disagreement over official policy. xxxxx shared this view,
attributing the Prime Minister's March 30 remarks to "Wen
simply being Wen" and appearing more "moderate and
reasonable" on almost every issue, even though his comments
represented no serious departure from the official line.
Southern Media Pieces Reflect No Division over Policy
--------------------------------------------- --------
7. (C) xxxxx did not think that two
recent articles in Party-controlled southern newspapers
signaled leadership debate or divisions, instead offering
that the articles perhaps reflected an adjustment in the
Party's media strategy. Both articles appeared on April 3 in
Guangdong Provincial Party papers that have a reputation for
pushing the limits of Central Propaganda Department (CPD)
guidelines. The first, which appeared in a blog run by
Southern Metropolis (Nanfang Dushibao), was critical of the
Party's restrictions on reporting in Tibet, arguing that
allowing foreign reporters to cover the story directly would
provide a more accurate picture of events. The second,
published in Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumou), argued that
most Tibetans are not separatists and do not support or
participate in the unrest or advocate violence, and that such
distinctions should be made when responding to the issue.
The article also called for talks with the Dalai Lama. (See
refs A-C.)
8. (C) xxxxx with whom
PolOffs met in the last week had not read or heard of either
article, which PolOffs interpreted as a sign that the pieces
are not terribly significant. xxxxx, explicitly made
this point, arguing that the article in the Southern
Metropolis did not represent anything other than the
"pro-Western slant" of the Southern Daily Media Group and
"liberal southern journalists." The piece would only be
significant if more "authoritative" media outlets had picked
it up. xxxxx, thought it represented a desire among some
elites for a review of Tibet policy but also noted that the
piece was criticized by many internally in the Party. xxxxx, saying that
the articles merely reflected the "traditionally liberal"
stances of both newspapers, which are noted for "pushing the
envelope" ("da cabianqiu," literally "playing edge ball").
Beijing 00001454 003 of 004
It is too early to tell whether these pieces have crossed a
red line, xxxxx said, noting that both papers have often
gotten into trouble with propaganda officials in the past.
9. (C) Surprisingly, even the xxxxx had
not read either article that appeared in his group's
newspapers. In response to PolOff's summary of the pieces,
he strongly doubted they carried any political significance.
Perhaps, he said, they represent an adjustment in the Party's
media strategy. The Southern Weekend editor-in-chief must
have had prior approval from Party authorities to publish the
piece, xxxxx surmised, otherwise the editor would have been
"dismissed immediately" for publishing such a sensitive
article on his own. With Hu Jintao himself in charge of the
media response to Tibet, xxxxx asked rhetorically, what
newspaper editor would dare challenge the official media
line, even implicitly? Therefore, the article's import, xxxxx
claimed, is that it demonstrates the "slight loosening" of
Party propaganda guidance on Tibet coverage beginning in late
March, which purportedly allows for the "more nuanced"
reporting advocated in the Southern Weekend article itself.
10. (C) Similarly, xxxxx was not aware of the articles. After
listening to PolOff's explanation of them, however, xxxxx
commented that the pieces likely represent the fact that
there is "room for diversity" under the Propaganda
Department's latest guidance. (Note: Despite this supposed
"room" for more nuanced reporting on Tibet, xxxxx
said Tibet is "far too sensitive" and his magazine has
therefore decided "not to touch" the story for now.xxxxx,
reportedly have been "ordered" to produce cover stories on
Tibet under "very strict" guidelines from the Propaganda
Department.)
Party Buoyed by Nationalist Sentiment...
----------------------------------------
11. (C) Almost all of xxxxx the Party has been
buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment, fueled in part by
anger at the West over "biased" media reporting on Tibet and
Olympic-related protests.xxxxx all emphasized to
PolOff that Chinese "anger" over the West's "bias" on Tibet
is real, widespread and will have long-term effects. xxxxx
them seemed themselves to be angry over Western
media reporting, refusing to recognize the irony that for
most Chinese, their only access to this "biased Western
reporting" is through the official PRC press agency Xinhua's
characterization of it. xxxxx emphasized that virtually
"everyone" he knows is angry and believes that Western
reporting, together with calls for boycotting the Olympic
opening ceremony, implies support for Tibetan independence
and makes the public feel that the West is trying to "keep
China down." xxxxx, meanwhile, said
nationalism is definitely surging, but he thought this
sentiment is largely concentrated in the 25-35-year-old age
group among both Hans and Tibetans.
12. (C) Whatever the causes of the surge in nationalism, the
result has been a dramatic increase in support for the
Party's policy on Tibet, contacts say. xxxxx said this outcome is partly a "natural"
reaction to the fact that Chinese have in recent years become
more nationalistic as a result of growing pride over China's
rapid development, with the Tibet furor merely providing the
most recent "spark" to inflame passions. xxxx separately acknowledged, however, that the Party's
propaganda line has also purposefully stoked nationalistic
feelings in order to rally the public in support of the
Center's Tibet policy, and so far, it has been very
successful in doing so. The recent Tibet crisis has
"completely unified" the people behind the Party and
Government, something that had been "unthinkable" throughout
most of the 1980s and 1990s,xxxxx asserted.
...But Also Constrained by Popular Passions
-------------------------------------------
13. (C) Although support for the Party over Tibet is
currently quite high, popular passions also serve to
constrain the leadership's options, xxxxx
warned. Nationalism remains one "pillar" of Party rule, but
central leaders do not want to let these feelings "spin out
of control," xxxxx said. Perhaps reflecting these concerns,
the Propaganda Department earlier this month reportedly
directed that attacks on the Western press in China's
official media be curtailed, according xxxxx
Beijing 00001454 004 of 004
xxxxx. That has not, however, stopped Chinese bloggers
from continuing their attacks via the Internet, xxxxx
observed.xxxxx also expressed concern about the
long-term implications of the surge in nationalism, noting
that "nothing is ever completely good." At any rate, there
is "virtually no way" the Center could initiate a change in
policy toward Tibet and the Dalai Lama, at least in the short
term, given the popular anger over such issues, xxxxx said.
Policy Change Unlikely in the Short Term
----------------------------------------
14. (C) Major policy adjustment on Tibet is highly unlikely
for the foreseeable future for a host of reasons other than
popular sentiment, at least until after the Olympics,
contacts say. Given Hu's own legacy in Tibet, where he
cracked down on similar demonstrations in 1987 and 1989, Hu
Jintao will likely be loath to adopt a "softer" line, lest
his own policies and past actions come under criticism,
xxxxx argued. Moreover, it will be
almost "impossible" for Chinese leaders to reorient policy if
they look like they are doing so under international
pressure, xxxxx assessed. Moreover,
xxxxx observed, domestic stability remains the
leadership's top priority above all else, meaning there will
"almost surely" be no relaxation of the current hard line on
Tibet or in places like Xinjiang. xxxxx said he sensed
Chinese leaders worry they could lose control of Tibet if
they do not maintain tight control there, which would have
both domestic consequences and could invite "unwanted
interference" from India.
15. (C) While staging a successful Olympics is also a
priority, xxxxx said he senses the leadership has
assessed that at a minimum, athletes will show up to the
Games. As a result, the Center is starting to adjust public
expectations about the Games by saying that, even if there is
a "boycott" of the opening ceremony, that is not important,
given that it is the IOC and respective National Olympic
Committees, not the Chinese Government, hat decide whether
to invite national leaders. (Note: xxxxx disagreed,
saying that, in his view, the success of the Games for
Chinese leaders hinges on whether President Bush attends the
opening ceremonies.) xxxxx said
that Hu Jintao's comments on April 12 to Australian PM Rudd
on the margins of the Bo'ao Forum, which were reported via
Xinhua and reflected China's hard-line stance on Tibet to
date, signaled that domestically there is "no room for
debate" on the Tibet issue. Only after Tibetan areas have
"settled down" and the Olympics have concluded, will there be
any chance for a possible review of Tibet policy, he asserted.
Randt
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SUBJECT: TOP LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS DRIVEN BY CONSENSUS,
REF: A. BEIJING 2063
C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 02 beijing 002112
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Tags: pgov, ch
Subject: top leadership dynamics driven by consensus,
interests, contacts say
Ref: a. Beijing 2063
b. Beijing 2040
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.
4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) The need for consensus and the desire to protect
vested interests are the main drivers of Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC) decision-making and Chinese leadership
dynamics in general, according to Embassy contacts with
access to leadership circles. Contacts have variously
described relations at the top of China's Party-state
structure as akin to those in the executive suite of a large
corporation, as determined by the interplay of powerful
interests, or as shaped by competition between "princelings"
with family ties to party elders and "shopkeepers" who have
risen through the ranks of the Party. End Summary.
Hu Jintao as Chairman of the Board?
-----------------------------------
2. (C) Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo
decision-making is similar to executive decision-making in a
large company, two well-connected contacts say. xxxxx that Party General
Secretary Hu Jintao could be compared to the Chairman of the
Board or CEO of a big corporation.xxxxx, used the
same analogy in a May 18 meeting with PolOffs. xxxxx said that
PBSC decision making was akin to a corporation in which the
greater the stock ownership the greater the voice in
decisions. "Hu Jintao holds the most stock, so his views
carry the greatest weight," and so on down the hierarchy, but
the PBSC did not formally vote, xxxxx. "It is a
consensus system," he maintained, "in which members can
exercise veto power."
3. (C) xxxxx had told PolOff previously that he knew "on very
good authority" that "major policies," such as the country's
core policy on Taiwan or North Korea, had to be decided by
the full 25-member Politburo. Other more specific matters,
he said, were decided by the nine-member PBSC alone. Some
issues were put to a formal vote, while others were merely
discussed until a consensus was reached. Either way, xxxxx
stated sarcastically, the Politburo was the "most democratic
body in the world," the only place in China where true
democracy existed. xxxxx said that although there was
"something" to the notion of a rough factional balancing at
the top between the Jiang Zemin-Shanghai group and the Hu-Wen
group, neither group was dominant, and major issues had to be
decided by consensus.
Leadership Dynamics: Driven by Vested Interests
--------------------------------------------- ---
4. (C)xxxxx asserted to PolOff March 12 that the Party should be
viewed primarily as a collection of interest groups. There
was no "reform wing," xxxxx claimed.xxxxx made the same
argument in several discussions with PolOff over the past
year, asserting that China's top leadership had carved up
China's economic "pie," creating an ossified system in which
"vested interests" drove decision-making and impeded reform
as leaders maneuvered to ensure that those interests were not
threatened. It was "well known," xxxxx stated, that former
Premier Li Peng and his family controlled all electric power
interests; PBSC member and security czar Zhou Yongkang and
associates controlled the oil interests; the late former top
leader Chen Yun's family controlled most of the PRC's banking
sector; PBSC member and Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference Chairman Jia Qinglin was the main
interest behind major Beijing real estate developments; Hu
Jintao's son-in -law ran Sina.com; and Wen Jiabao's wife
controlled China's precious gems sector.
5. (SBU) Note: In a development that could fan the "vested
interest" rumor mill, China-related websites in the United
States this week were reporting that a Chinese security
technology company with links to Hu's eldest son, Hu Haifeng,
was being investigated in Namibia on charges of corruption.
A July 19 article in a Malaysian paper, cited by a U.S.-based
dissident website, wenxuecity.com, reported that Hu Haifeng
was a "potential witness" in the case but was not himself a
suspect. The report said that the younger Hu was a former
CEO of Nuctech and currently the Party Secretary of its
Beijing 00002112 002 of 002
parent company, Tsinghua Holding Co. Ltd. According to the
China Digital Times website at the University of California
Berkeley's China Internet Project, the Central Propaganda
Department on July 21 issued orders to block any reference to
the case in the PRC media. End note.
6. (C) xxxxx, had told PolOff earlier that
leaders had close ties to powerful economic actors,
especially real estate developers and corporate leaders, who
in some cases were officials themselves. The same was true
at the local level, xxxxx stated. He claimed that these
interest networks had policy implications since most local
leaders had "bought" their positions and wanted an immediate
financial "return" on their investment. They always
supported fast-growth policies and opposed reform efforts
that might harm their interests, xxxxx. Vested
interests were especially inclined to oppose media openness,
he said, lest someone question the shady deals behind land
transactions. As a result, the proponents of "growth first"
would always be in a stronger position than those who favored
controlling inflation or taking care of the poor, xxxxx.
7. (C) xxxxx that the central feature of leadership
politics was the need to protect oneself and one's family
from attack after leaving office. Thus, current leaders
carefully cultivated proteges who would defend their
interests once they stepped down. It was natural, xxxxx said,
that someone like Xi Jinping, who maintained a
non-threatening low profile and had never made enemies, would
be elevated by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong. Xi would act
to ensure that Jiang was not harassed or that Jiang's corrupt
son would not be arrested, xxxxx.
Princelings vs. Shopkeepers
---------------------------
8. (C)xxxxx, separately
described leadership alignments at the top of the CCP as
shaped largely by one's "princeling" or "shopkeeper" lineage.
In separate conversations in recent months, xxxxx said that some argued that China's
"princelings," the sons and daughters of prominent Communist
Party officials, including many who helped found the PRC,
shared a perception that they, as the descendents of those
who shed blood in the name of the Communist revolution, had a
"right" to continue to lead China and protect the fruits of
that revolution. Such a mindset could potentially place the
"princelings" at odds with Party members who do not have
similar pedigrees, xxxxx, such as President
Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Party members with a CYL
background, who were derisively referred to as "shopkeepers'
sons." xxxxx had heard some princeling
families denounce those without revolutionary pedigrees by
saying, "While my father was bleeding and dying for China,
your father was selling shoelaces."
Goldberg
On other issues, however, informants told American diplomats that Chinese leaders were often left to pursue their own interests. Politburo member Zhou Yongkang, who heads up Chinese security services, is said to be closely linked with the state oil industry, for example. Jia Qinglin, in slot four of the Chinese leadership hierarchy, allegedly maintains close contacts with Peking's construction industry. Hu Jintao's son-in-law was the boss of the big internet firm sina.com. One source claimed that Wen Jiabao's wife controlled the precious gems industry.
In addition, many of the 25 Politburo members are thought to maintain "close ties" to real estate magnates, many of whom are likewise party functionaries. Posts within the Chinese Communist party, US diplomats believe, sometimes go to the highest bidder. In order to turn a quick profit, such functionaries, sources told the US, are especially eager to push for economic growth, no matter what the environmental or social price might be.