What Role Will the U.S. Play in the World? "Trump Has Never Been an Isolationist"
Donald Trump at a campaign event in October
Foto:Jim Watson / AFP
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Wertheim, what role did foreign policy play in Donald Trump's re-election?
Wertheim: Election campaigns in the U.S., as in many countries, are heavily focused on domestic issues. I have my doubts as to whether it’s wise for a country consumed by internal affairs to be so important for security arrangements around the world. But, in a way, foreign policy did play a role – much like it did around 50 years ago.
DER SPIEGEL: What do you mean by that?
Wertheim: In the 1970s – after the United States had suffered a certain national humiliation as a result of the war in Vietnam – Americans wanted to come to terms with themselves and feel good about their country's role in the world again. Both parties were looking for an answer to the question of how this could be achieved. Jimmy Carter's response was his quest for a foreign policy based on human rights – an idealistic approach, animated by idealistic appeals to the values of liberal democracy. However, this approach then largely collapsed.
DER SPIEGEL: Because, among other developments, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979.
Wertheim: Yes, there was a resurgence of Cold War tensions. Carter's successor Ronald Reagan gave a different response, centered on the idea of "peace through strength" – a formula that President-elect Donald Trump is now also using. But both Carter and Reagan made heavy use of moralistic language in response to the perceived failure of realpolitik. Trump, by contrast, is now saying: We have tried idealistic crusades that amounted to nothing. Let's be harder nosed and pursue a foreign policy that benefits America. So Trump rejects the sanctimonious moralism that came from Democrats and from neo-conservative Republicans.
DER SPIEGEL: With some success, apparently.
Wertheim: The wars in Europe and the Middle East have certainly helped him convey the impression that the world is on fire. And that fits in very well with Trump's overall narrative that things are a mess. His basic message during the campaign was: The Biden administration exercised weak leadership. Everything was better, safer and more stable under my leadership. If I had been president, these wars wouldn't have broken out in the first place. And if I become president again, I'll end them quickly. So vote for me.
Stephen Wertheim
DER SPIEGEL: Is there any truth to this message?
Wertheim: Let’s leave aside the plausibility of his policy arguments for a moment. Trump's opponent, Vice President Kamala Harris, told a different story. She presented herself as a candidate of the system. And a lot of people were dissatisfied with the way things were going, with the direction the country was taking in general, but also with the course that foreign policy had taken. Trump struck a chord by at least professing a desire to end the wars quickly. Harris did not give any kind of indication about what the endgame was in Ukraine, and she did nothing to differentiate herself from the Biden administration’s unsuccessful attempts to ask Israel to stop its war-making.
DER SPIEGEL: Trump, in other words, used this bleak global situation to reinforce his domestic message. Do you consider Trump – as many in Europe do – to be an isolationist?
Wertheim: Trump has never been an isolationist. That view has been wrong from the beginning. I would even go so far as to say that there are really no isolationists at all in the U.S. I can’t think of anyone in Congress who wants the United States to play no role in world affairs. Trump is not going to retreat from competition with China and is more likely to intensify it. Nor do I expect him to pull many U.S. forces out of the Middle East, either; he talks about this much less now than he did during his first term. But with respect to Europe, it is true that he has made noise about the United States potentially not coming to the defense of NATO allies if they are attacked. Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine, and it is more important to him that this happens quickly than ending the war on specific terms which would be desirable for Ukraine.
Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting Trump in Mar-a-Lago in 2017
Foto: Carlos Barria / REUTERSDER SPIEGEL: Do you think he can pull it off?
Wertheim: I don't think he can keep his promise to end the war within 24 hours, or even before he takes office, as he later said. But he can absolutely foster negotiations between the two sides. Right now, this conflict is stuck, and Trump can change that, for better or worse. If he is determined to reorient the United States away from Europe, he could do that. Unlike in his first term, he could now find the personnel to execute on that desire. But he hasn’t made clear that that's what he wants to do. His rhetoric – of which there is a lot – is primarily aimed at getting the Europeans to pay more for their own defense. This does not rule out the U.S. continuing to provide protection to the Europeans, if they themselves contribute more to their own defense.
DER SPIEGEL: Would you advise Europeans to boost defense spending as quickly as possible?
Wertheim: They should face up to a reality that has nothing to do with the election results: The United States is ill-equipped today to be the leading military provider for Europe. Should there be an attack on NATO territory, the U.S. may well be unable or unwilling to come to the defense of that territory. It is long overdue for Europe to take the lead in defending itself. That would also be true if Kamala Harris had won the election. Of course, Trump's election now increases the time pressure. But I don't think Trump is going to willy nilly withdraw from NATO or pull all – or even most – troops out of Europe.
DER SPIEGEL: Really?
Wertheim: Yes. Europeans don’t need to feel desperate. The Russian military is currently bogged down in Ukraine. I believe it is entirely possible to manage a coordinated, even cooperative transition to a European defense over a period of several years. Europe shouldn’t suddenly think its security is so acutely threatened that it needs to cut deals with Russia.
An over-sized inflatable Trump doll during a protest against his visit to London in 2018
Foto: Matt Dunham / APDER SPIEGEL: As someone who argues for a restrained U.S. foreign policy, you also seem to see certain advantages of a Trump presidency.
Wertheim: I'm not sure. He didn't show much restraint in his first term. In fact, NATO expanded under his watch.
DER SPIEGEL: Montenegro joined in 2017, North Macedonia in 2020.
Wertheim: During Trump's first term, the U.S. entered into an intense security competition with China. America initially escalated its war in Afghanistan and fully withdrew its troops only under Joe Biden. Trump also announced several times that U.S. troops would leave Syria. They never left. Trump has contradictory impulses on foreign policy. He is often torn between the desire to dominate or to retreat. In his first administration, he said that U.S. military dominance must be unquestioned. That's what he ran on. That didn't sound like an isolationist to me. Now he is once again talking about "peace through strength."
DER SPIEGEL: A recent example is his appointment of Michael Waltz as his national security advisor, a known China hawk.
Wertheim: What is also clear is that Trump is not going to cycle through the so-called adults in the room again, the old mainstream foreign policy advisers he brought in during his first term, only to dismiss them again. This time, he is appointing people who are more aligned with his worldview, sometimes in a hawkish direction, sometimes not. And I think there will be many divergences of perspective within the new administration.
DER SPIEGEL: If, as you say, Trump is not an isolationist, then what is his grand strategy? What is he aiming for in world politics?
Wertheim: I think the big geopolitical question of his second term is the following: Will his administration attempt to bolster military deterrence against America’s four most important and increasingly aligned adversaries, China, Russia, North Korea and Iran? Or, because of the costs of this approach, will Trump try to split these four apart or shift the burden of deterrence onto U.S. allies and partners?
Trump's designated secretary of state, Marco Rubio, at the Republican convention in July 2024
Foto: Leon Neal / Getty ImagesDER SPIEGEL: As far as Russia is concerned, that would mainly be the Europeans.
Wertheim: Strong deterrence will certainly remain an important element of his approach. But will he focus on the strongest adversary, China, and make deals with Russia, perhaps also with North Korea? That is a possibility. One thing distinguishes Trump from other recent presidents in recent history: He believes there is a certain toughness and strength involved in sitting down with an opponent and making a deal. Therein lies his own right-wing justification for diplomacy. Democrats have become much more averse to negotiating with adversaries, especially under Biden.
DER SPIEGEL: Military deterrence also includes the nuclear arsenals of the major powers, something that hardliners in both Russia and the U.S. have reminded us of in recent months. During his first term, Trump even threatened North Korea with "fire and fury” and his "nuclear button.” Some have even raised the possibility of the U.S. using nuclear weapons first in a conflict. Where does Trump stand on this issue today?
Wertheim: I don't know, and I'm not sure he knows. But it is logical that if the United States insists on maintaining its expansive geopolitical objectives and does not shift the burden of defense onto the shoulders of allies, then it is left with two options. One is to spend much more on defense – and by that, I mean twice, perhaps three times as much. Neither Trump nor Harris proposed anything like that in their election campaigns.
North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the “Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times.” Will someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) January 3, 2018
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DER SPIEGEL: And the other option?
Wertheim: The other option would be to find some clever way to compensate for our opponents' advances in conventional military power. That leads to the idea of escalating to the use of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence. I think that gambit would be misguided and would not be a terribly credible threat. Even if Trump could convince America's adversaries to think that he would be crazy enough to use a nuclear weapon first, deterrence has to work in the long term, and I doubt his successors would have the same view. So this approach should not be adopted. But it shows that the dilemma in which we find ourselves is so serious that it even leads to considering whether we should threaten to use nuclear weapons first in certain scenarios.
A U.S. Air Force B-52 flying over Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, South Korea in 2016
Foto: KIM HONG-JI/ REUTERSDER SPIEGEL: If the old mainstream politicians, as you call them, no longer play a role under Trump, in which direction will the Republican Party’s foreign policy establishment move in the next four years?
Wertheim: There are basically three camps right now in the Republican Party's foreign policy universe: There are primacists, who argue for America's global military dominance; there are those who argue for restraint; and there is a third group, those who prioritize Asia. All three of these groups will be represented in the Trump administration, and they are going to have a lot of differences. It’s always hard to create internal agreement on a common strategy, but it may be especially difficult for the incoming administration.
DER SPIEGEL: Do Trump’s initial foreign policy and national security nominations – Marco Rubio as secretary of state, Michael Waltz as national security advisor and Pete Hegseth as secretary of defense – give an indication as to whether any of the three camps has an early advantage?
Wertheim: The restraint view is not well represented in Trump’s early nominations and appointments. Rubio and Waltz are quite hawkish and favor U.S. global primacy. They also have a foot, or a few toes, in the prioritizer camp: They regard China as the number-one U.S. adversary and have recently criticized Europeans for doing too little to aid Ukraine. Both of them voted against the latest, $61 billion aid package for Ukraine in April. Trump may have picked Hegseth, a cable TV host, mainly to make changes within the U.S. military.
DER SPIEGEL: What might historians like you write about Donald Trump's 2024 re-election 25 or 50 years from now?
Wertheim: It’s hard enough to absorb these events as they’re happening. In 2016 and 2020, some people were quick to draw grand conclusions about what a single election meant. And that often led them astray. Joe Biden came into office four years ago and said: America is back. Now Donald Trump is back. The truth is: There’s no contradiction between those two statements. The same America that elected Joe Biden was the America that elected Donald Trump before him and Donald Trump after him. We can dispense with the idea that Trump was an aberration. I can't tell you what historians will one day write about Trump's second term. But I think I can tell you what they won’t say — that Trump's ascent to the presidency was an aberration from what America truly is.
