US-Vorwürfe gegen Kenia Kampfansage an Korruptistan

Korruptionsbekämpfer Lumumba: Redegewandt, entschlossen, furchtlos
Foto: NOOR KHAMIS/ REUTERSDer Mann ist klein, redegewandt, vor allem aber ist er entschlossen. Und deshalb wirkt er im Moment ziemlich groß: Patrick Lumumba heißt der Mann, ehemaliger Rechtsanwalt, und er mischt in diesen Tagen die Kaste der Mächtigen in Kenia auf. Er beendet Karrieren, er schiebt damit auch neue an, und es scheint, als wäre er furchtlos.
Todesdrohungen, Morde, spurloses Verschwinden - man ist in Kenia nicht zimperlich, wenn handfeste Interessen gefährdet sind. Man darf in Kenia auch nicht zimperlich sein, wenn man gegen die Korruption ankämpft.
Seit Juli ist Lumumba neuer Chef der nationalen Anti-Korruptions-Kommission, und während sein Vorgänger die politische Kaste vor Verfolgung schützte, scheint er durchgreifen zu wollen. Innerhalb nur weniger Tage mussten der Außenminister, der Bildungsminister, ein Staatssekretär und der Bürgermeister der Hauptstadt Nairobi ihren Stuhl räumen.
Kein Wunder, denn, so sickerte es unlängst aus Lumumbas Behörde hinaus, es gebe so gut wie keinen unter den 42 kenianischen Ministern im aufgeblähten Kabinett, der sein Amt nicht dazu benutze, sich selbst zu bereichern.
Die Abzocke der kenianischen Kleptokraten
Die US-Botschaft beobachtet die Riege der Kleptokraten seit langem. Denn Kenia ist zentral für die Politik in Afrika. Und die Absahner in der Regierung verursachen Hungersnöte und zetteln Aufstände an - deren Folgen dann mit Hilfsgeldern aus dem Westen gemildert werden müssen. In einer für Diplomaten ungewöhnlich deutlichen Sprache hat die Botschaft deshalb die schlimmsten Drahtzieher aufgelistet. 15 hochrangige kenianische Offizielle haben inzwischen Einreiseverbot in die USA.
Wortlaut: Die wichtigsten Depeschen zum Thema
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<<223100>>
09.01.2009 08:58
09NAIROBI1829
Embassy Nairobi
SECRET
08STATE81854
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNR #1829/01 2440858
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 010858Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0826
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3308
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
TAGS: CVIS, KCOR, KCRM, PGOV, PREL, ECON, KE
SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA DENIAL
REF: A. 2008 STATE 81854
S e c r e t nairobi 001829
Sensitive
sipdis
Dept for a/s carson, inl/c/cp, jane becker; nsc for senior
director gavin
E.o. 12958: decl: 08/27/2019
Tags: cvis, kcor, kcrm, pgov, prel, econ, ke
Subject: visas donkey: corruption 212(f) visa denial
Ref: a. 2008 state 81854
b. Td-314/081112-08
c. Td-314/081567-08
d. Td-314/083973-08
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, Reasons 1.4 b,d
1. (C) Embassy is seeking a security advisory opinion under
Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
Proclamation 7750, precluding the entry into the United
States of Henry Kiprono Kosgey and his family. Kosgey was
born in Nandi district, Rift Valley Province, Kenya on July
14, 1947. There is strong evidence that Kosgey has
consistently engaged in official corruption from at least
1987 to the present while holding a variety of ministerial
and parastatal director positions, and that corruption has
had serious adverse effects on both U.S. foreign assistance
goals and on the stability of Kenya's democratic
institutions. The following provides information requested in
ref A, paragraphs 26-28.
2. (C) Like many members of Kenya's political elite, Kosgey
has had a long career in politics and served in numerous
ministerial positions under the kleptocratic administration
of former President Daniel arap Moi. He has, however, also
continued to enrich himself at the public's expense while
serving as a member of Parliament (MP), as director of the
parastatal and now bankrupt Kenya National Assurance Company
and as Minister for Industrialization under the current
coalition government.
3. (C) Kosgey was first elected as MP of Tinderet
constituency in Rift Valley Province in 1979 under Moi's
Kenya African National Union (KANU) party. (Note: At that
time, Kenya was a single-party state.) He was re-elected as
MP in 1983, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007, when he ran as
a candidate under Prime Minister Raila Odinga's Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM) party. After becoming an MP, Kosgey
served under Moi as Minister for Transport and Communications
(1980-1985), Minister for Cooperatives Development
(1985-1986), and Minister for Culture and Social Services
(1987-1988). Kosgey, like Moi, is an ethnic Kalenjin from
Rift Valley province. Although he is a member of the Nandi
sub-tribe and not Moi's Tugen sub-tribe, he was for many
years a close and trusted associate of the former president.
From 1989 to 1992, he served as Executive Chairman of the
now-defunct parastatal Kenya National Assurance Company
(KNAC). From 1993 to 1996, he served as an MP but did not
hold a cabinet position. In 1996, he reentered the cabinet
when he was appointed by Moi as Minister for Environment and
Natural Resources (1996-1997). He subsequently served as
Minister for Tourism (1998-1999), Minister for Science and
Technology (1999-2001), and Minister of Education
(2001-2002). During President Kibaki's first term
(2003-2007), Kosgey reinvented himself as an ODM MP after Moi
left power in 2002. Following the formation of the coalition
government in February 2008, he was appointed by Prime
Minister Odinga as head of the newly-created Ministry of
Industrialization, a post he currently holds. He is also the
current chairman of ODM.
Embezzling funds, looting parastatal assets
4. (C) Open source reporting alleges that, when serving as
Minister of Culture and Social Services, Kosgey was part of
the team that brought in American marketing consultant Dick
Berg to assist Kenya in organizing and hosting the fourth
All-Africa Games in 1987. Berg's task was to assist the GOK
in raising funds to support the games; he is accused of
fleeing the country with roughly $2.6 million before the
games began. Kosgey is also alleged to have participated in
the looting of the assets of the Games' organizing committee
by misappropriating funds designated for costs associated
with the Games for his personal use. Kosgey is also accused
of looting the real estate assets of former parastatal Kenya
National Assurance Company (KNAC) when he served as its
director from 1989 to 1992. Under his management, KNAC is
also alleged to have made illegal loans and paid out
fradulent claims to politically connected individuals. By
illegally appropriating KNAC's most valuable assets, Kosgey
reduced the company to an undercapitalized shell that
ultimately collapsed and failed to meet its financial
obligations to pension and life insurance policy holders. At
the time the KNAC went into receivership, it held more than
$13 million in life insurance policies. As a result of the
collapse of KNAC, 900 employees lost their jobs and thousands
of Kenyans from all walks of life lost their pensions or did
not receive insurance payments upon the deaths of
beneficiaries. The former employees also allege that the
company owes them an estimated $655,000 in pension benefits.
Accused of grabbing public lands
5. (C) When President Kibaki first took office in 2003, he
ordered a number of commissions of inquiry aimed at examining
and correcting some of the worst corruption excesses of the
Moi era. Unfortunately, once the first blush of reformist
zeal had passed, there was almost no accountability for those
officials named in the commissions' reports or implementation
of the commissions' corrective recommendations. The Ndung'u
Commission was constituted in 2003 to investigate "irregular
allocation" or illegal privatization of public land in urban
areas, settlement schemes, forests, and reserves during the
Moi era. Its report, released in December 2004, was more than
2,000 pages long with annexes and provided the most
comprehensive analysis to date of shady land deals during the
Moi years (1978-2002). The commission recommended the
revocation of hundreds of land allocations, including many to
past and current political figures. To date, none of these
revocations have been implemented despite pledges by current
Minister of Lands James Orengo to do so.
6. (C) Kosgey (along with fellow minister Sally Kosgei) is
named in the Ndung'u report as the improper recipient of more
than 300 hectares of the South Nandi forest in 1999.
According to local anti-corruption NGO Mars Group Kenya, the
illegal carving out of a total of 1,170 hectares of forest
land was supposed to be part of a land swap in which Kosgey
and two other politicians would exchange the forest land for
farmland held by local farmers and the minority Ngerek
community. When the exchange took place, many of the intended
beneficiaries were excluded and rendered landless. In 1995,
Kosgey was serving on the board of directors of Kakuzi Tea
Company, which is still in existence and is publicly traded
on the Nairobi and London stock exchanges. He is accused of
colluding with other corrupt directors in stripping Kakuzi of
some of its prime assets by illegally transferring 97
hectares of Siret Farm (a tea plantation) to the Tinderet
Development Trust Company, a shell company co-owned by Kosgey
and his son Allan. In the face of declining global tea prices
and burdened by debt of more than $8.5 million, Kakuzi put
the remainder of Siret Farm up for public sale in 2007.
Involvement in post-election violence and opposition to
accountability
7. (S) In October 2008, Kosgey was named in the report of the
Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence (CIPEV),
commonly known as the Waki Commission after its chairman,
Justice Philip Waki. The report alleged that Kosgey
participated in incitement, planning, and illegal financing
of post-election violence in and around his rural
constituency of Tinderet in the Nandi Hills district of Rift
Valley province. Tinderet is a tea-growing area, and many tea
pickers working on the plantations hail from western Kenya
and are ethnic Luo or Luhya. Many workers and their families,
who usually live in company-owned housing on the larger
plantations, fled or were driven out of the area during the
post-election violence by groups of youths who resented
non-Kalenjins being employed in the local tea industry.
8. (C) When the report was released, Kosgey joined a number
of his fellow ODM MPs in rejecting the Waki Commission's
findings, despite Odinga's public statements that the Waki
report's recommendations be fully implemented. Key
recommendations included setting up a local special tribunal
to try persons suspected of participating in post-election
violence and/or sending the dossiers on these individuals to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) for potential
prosecution. In his capacity as ODM chairman and as an MP,
Kosgey has repeatedly and publicly rejected both the local
tribunal and ICC options, joining some of the other MPs named
in the Waki report as instigators in calling instead for
healing and reconciliation. In public remarks on October 14,
2008, Kosgey stated that "the people in that list were not
given a chance to defend themselves. That is very unfair."
Questions on the maize scandal
9. (C) In early 2009, a national scandal erupted when a
number of prominent politicians, including Minister of
Agriculture William Ruto, were accused of speculating in
government-subsidized maize designated to feed the hungry
after the planting cycle was disrupted in many growing areas
by the post-election violence. (Note: Kosgey's constituency
was among those most affected, as it is located near the
epicenter of inter-ethnic violence in Rift Valley province.)
Twenty-one MPs and three ministers, including Kosgey, were
summoned for questioning by investigators at the Kenya
Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) in February 2009. Local
media reported that Kosgey was asked about letters he sent to
the National Cereals and Produce Board requesting an
allocation of subsidized maize.
Hiring and firing without transparency
10. (C) As Minister of Industrialization, Kosgey is
responsible for overseeing the operation, management, and
privatization of the Kenyan government's ten state
corporations. He also oversees the implementation of the
GOK's new "quality mark" requirement without which many goods
cannot be sold in Kenya. Many private sector companies,
including major U.S. companies like Eveready and Sara Lee,
have protested this new requirement adds unreasonable costs
to importing goods and discriminates against products
manufactured outside Kenya. Major private sector advocacy
groups, including the Kenya Association of Manufacturers
(KAM), have also noted the great potential for corruption in
implementation of the new quality mark requirement. In June
2009, KAM also accused Kosgey of illegally and unilaterally
removing some of the private sector members of the board of
the Kenya Bureau of Standards, the entity charged with
implementing the quality mark program. xxxxxxxxxxxx have told us that they have credible
information that Kosgey is benefitting illegally from the
imposition of the quality mark requirements (i.e., by taking
bribes from local producers in lieu of their actual
compliance with the new quality standards) and that he is
deeply involved in corruption.
11. (C) In July 2009, Kosgey was publicly accused by his
Assistant Minister Nderiti Mureithi (a member of Kibaki's
Party of National Unity) of improperly firing three heads of
parastatals (the Industrial Development Bank, the Kenya
Industrial Research and Development Institute, and the Kenya
Industrial Estates) without following proper procedures and
without consulting the boards of directors of those
companies. In an interview with national TV outlet NTV,
Mureithi called Kosgey "a throwback to the dark days of the
Moi era" and alleged that the three directors were
unilaterally fired by Kosgey without any consultation and
replacements selected by him without a transparent or
competitive recruitment process as required by Kenyan law.
Odinga ultimately had to intervene in the dispute and ordered
that the directors remain in office until the correct
procedures could be instituted to remove them.
Negative impact on u.s. National interests
12. (S) Stability of Democratic Institutions and Impact on
U.S. Businesses: Kosgey's involvement in inciting
post-election violence in Rift Valley province directly
contributed to the deaths and displacement of Kenyans and
significantly undermined the stability and security of the
region. Non-Kalenjin tea workers had to flee their jobs and
the tea industry was hit hard by the disruption of production
and interference with local transport routes. Displacements
in the region also disrupted the planting and harvesting
cycles and directly contributed to hunger and official
involvement in speculation in the maize market. Kosgey's
corrupt activities also have an adverse impact on U.S.
national interests in promoting the reform agenda agreed upon
in the Annan accord. Because he is an influential voice in
the Kalenjin community, Kosgey's repeated public opposition
to prosecution of perpetrators of violence, either locally or
internationally, has contributed to undermining public
confidence in the judiciary and will make it much more
difficult to pursue accountability in these cases. His
extensive illegally-acquired land holdings will motivate him
to oppose meaningful land reform legislation when it comes up
in parliament later this year. He is also likely to oppose
reform-oriented land policy changes in a new constitution.
His corrupt and unfair application of the quality mark
program has had a direct discriminatory impact on importers
and vendors of U.S. products in Kenya.
13. (C) U.S. Foreign Assistance Goals: Kosgey's diverse
corruption activities over decades have negatively impacted
U.S. foreign assistance goals in a number of ways. His
continuing ownership of illegally transferred forestry lands,
part of the greater Mau Forest which comprises Kenya's
largest water catchment area, has contributed to ethnic
conflict over land ownership in Rift Valley, and has also
contributed to deforestation and resulting drought and hunger
that currently plagues Kenya. Donors, including the United
States, have had to provide billions of dollars in emergency
food aid to Kenya over the last four years of chronic
drought, even in areas of Rift Valley that were historically
the most agriculturally productive regions of Kenya. His
looting of public and private company assets undermine
investor confidence, directly create job loss, and damage
public confidence in the security of pension funds. Kosgey
has repeatedly ignored government regulations for hiring and
firing directors of parastatals and, through these actions,
signals a profound disrespect for the rule of law which we
are striving to promote.
Additional information required for finding
14. (C) Kosgey has not been informed that he may be
ineligible for a U.S. visa under section 212(f) of the INA
and Proclamation 7750.
15. (C) Kosgey last traveled to the U.S. in November 2006. He
applied for and was issued U.S. visas in 1997, 1999, 2003,
2004, 2005, and 2006 (all G2 visas). His most recent
application was for a G2 visa to attend a parliamentary forum
at the UN General Assembly in New York. He was issued a G2
multiple-entry, 3-month visa on November 2, 2006 in
diplomatic passport D006890. He has not applied for a visa
since 2006. As a sitting minister and member of parliament,
he may intend to apply for a U.S. visa for either
professional or personal travel. However, we do not have any
clear indication that he intends to apply soon. He has two
sons who have made forays into politics: Allan Kosgey, who is
a co-director of the Tinderet Development Trust with his
father, and youngest son Alex Kosgey, an aspiring MP.
16. (C) Since almost the beginning of his long political
career, Kosgey has consistently availed himself of
opportunities to enrich himself at the expense of the Kenyan
taxpayer. His participation in official corruption led
directly to the financial collapse of one parastatal, and he
has also undermined stability and security in the Rift Valley
by instigating and planning inter-ethnic violence before,
during, and after the December 2007 elections. Post
recommends that he be excluded for travel to the U.S. under
section 212(f) of the INA and that no exception be granted.
Ranneberger
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<<225330>>
9/16/2009 9:24
09NAIROBI1938
Embassy Nairobi
SECRET
08STATE81854|09NAIROBI1830|09NAIROBI1831|09NAIROBI1859
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNR #1938/01 2590924
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 160924Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0989
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3327
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
TAGS: CVIS, ECON, KCRM, KE, PGOV, PREL, KCOR
SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA DENIAL
REF: A. 08 STATE 81854
S e c r e t nairobi 001938
Sensitive
sipdis
Dept for af a/s carson, inl/c/cp jane becker, nsc for
senior director gavin
E.o. 12958: decl: 09/09/2019
Tags: cvis, econ, kcrm, ke, pgov, prel, kcor
Subject: visas donkey: corruption 212(f) visa denial
Ref: a. 08 state 81854
b. Td-314/014437-09
c. Nairobi 1830
d. Nairobi 1859
e. Nairobi 1831
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL RANNEBERGER. FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (
d).
1. (C) Embassy is seeking a security advisory opinion under
Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
Proclamation 7750, suspending the entry into the United
States of Aaron Gitonga Ringera and members of his family.
Ringera was born in Meru, Kenya on June 20, 1950. Post
strongly believes Mr. Ringera has engaged in and benefited
from public corruption in his capacity as Director/Chief
Executive of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) for
the last five years by interference with judicial and other
public processes, and that this corruption has had a serious
adverse impact on U.S. national interest in the stability of
democratic institutions in Kenya, U.S. foreign assistance
goals and the international economic activities of U.S.
businesses. Ringera travels frequently to the U.S. He is
expected shortly to apply for a U.S. visa. The following
provides information requested in ref a, paragraphs 26-28.
2. (C) Justice (retired) Aaron Ringera has been
Director/Chief Executive of the Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission since its inception in 2004. During this period,
despite a string of major corruption scandals that have come
to light before and after his appointment, he has not only
failed to successfully investigate a single senior government
official, he has actively thwarted their successful
investigation and prosecution by teaming with Attorney
General Amos Wako (ref b). Ringera is part of a system that
has evolved over time involving the Attorney General and the
judiciary that works together to avoid or suppress
investigations/prosecutions of top GOK officials. Ringera
provides cases via investigation to the Attorney General's
office and insists that they're strong cases. The Attorney
General fails to prosecute, arguing that the cases are poorly
investigated and sends them back to Ringera. If any cases of
significance leak through and go to court, the judiciary can
be counted on to quash those that are the most sensitive at
the direction of senior government officials. Ringera's key
role was recently confirmed by the irregular manner in which
he was reappointed on August 31 by President Kibaki to a
second five-year term. The "process" involved in Kibaki's
decision-making demonstrates that key players in the GOK
hierarchy wanted to retain Ringera to avoid having to deal
with a new and potentially effective KACC Director (ref d).
Leading anti-corruption NGOs have repeatedly noted that "no
politically significant corruption case has been successfully
investigated by the KACC" under Ringera.
3. (S) Justice Ringera's corrupt practices have come out in a
number of ways, most prominently in a recent book, "It's Our
Turn to Eat," an account of the resignation of former Kenya
anti-corruption czar John Githongo. Ringera's involvement
with death threats, which Githongo asserts repeatedly in the
book, is corroborated by ref b (described in para 7 below).
Leading anti-corruption NGOs have followed Ringera's work for
years and firmly believe that his gross negligence is
intentional, making him a ready accomplice. Ringera's own
submission to President Kibaki in 2006 regarding the
Anglo-Leasing scandal concluded that a number of senior
officials should have been prosecuted. To date, none of them
have. Finally, the 2006 Parliamentary Public Accounts
Committee report on Anglo-Leasing makes a number of
recommendations to the KACC, none of which have been carried
out. The clear pattern of Justice Ringera's material
negligence and his involvement in attempts to violently
suppress information on corruption constitutes corruption in
and of itself.
It's Our Turn to Eat
4. (C) "It's Our Turn to Eat" chronicles former Kenya
anti-corruption czar John Githongo's rise and fall from power
in Kenya in the early days of the post-Moi administration
under then new President Mwai Kibaki. The book, by Financial
Times reporter Michela Wrong, outlines in particular
Githongo's investigation of the Anglo-Leasing scandal.
Anglo-Leasing was one of a series of phantom entities used to
perpetrate fraud on the Kenyan taxpayer through non-delivery
of goods and services alongside significant overpricing. The
beneficiaries include the most senior levels of the GOK.
However, due in part to Ringera's complicity, not a single
senior government official has been successfully prosecuted
for the theft of hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars from
Kenya. Justice Ringera has played his part in not pressing
hard on this case and attempting to discourage Githongo from
releasing information and investigating Anglo-Leasing
further. The book is drawn primarily from interviews with
John Githongo and Githongo's writings from his time as
anti-corruption advisor to President Kibaki. Githongo's
interactions with Ringera paint the picture of a man
(Ringera) who is part of the system within the GOK that
protects its own from prosecution regardless of the crime
committed and will, if necessary, kill to enforce the system.
On November 4, 2005, Githongo admitted to Ringera his
realization that the GOK leadership (among them President
Kibaki) really only wanted him there as window dressing to
"go through the motions" in fighting corruption. Ringera
agreed and said, "So you stay there, you are a little wiser
and you know that you are there. You can't, in fact, afford
to make any move. That's when you will really be killed."
Ringera added, "If you wanted to resign and go today, that's
when they would kill you." In February 2006, Githongo was
speaking with Ringera in London one last time before Githongo
resigned and went into exile. According to Githongo, Ringera
told him that Kenyan intelligence "would put something in
your tea" if Githongo went public with what he knew.
5. (C) Githongo's belief that Ringera was part of the
corruption problem was largely based on the latter's
unwillingness to be responsive to the dossier of information
on Anglo-Leasing that Githongo had put together. Two
instances led Githongo to this conclusion. At the end of
2005 when President Kibaki failed to respond to the dossier,
he sent a copy to Ringera. Githongo said, "I'd told him,
"I'm ready to come and share incontrovertible proof with you,
just ask me." There was no response from Ringera. At the
same time, it was clear that Ringera was not independent of
President Kibaki. According to the book's author, "The day
we met he (Ringera) boasted that he had never taken a
telephone call from the presidency during his time in office.
But a former colleague says he never needed to, going round
in person to State House to receive instructions. He would
call staff together and say: the message from the president
is A, B, C, and D." Ref d's tale of Ringera's sudden and
back-door reappointment by President Kibaki on August 31,
2009 confirms that Ringera is part of the cabal keeping a lid
on justice, ensuring senior GOK officials are never held
accountable for their corrupt acts.
6. (C) More evidence of Ringera's involvement in protecting
the corrupt elite came when Githongo testified to the KACC on
Anglo-Leasing in March 2006 in London at the Kenyan High
Commission. According to the book, "Understandably wary,
John had insisted his evidence be taped. Yet at the end of
two days of testimony - long enough, one would have thought,
for any malfunction to be detected and rectified -- Ringera
informed John the recording equipment had failed and his
words were, sadly, inaudible. There would be no audio
transcript, only a KACC-drafted summary. After delivering
that bombshell, Ringera waxed astonishingly candid about the
charade being staged for public consumption. There would be
no Anglo Leasing prosecutions until after the 2007 elections,
if ever, he said. When John's lawyer asked when his client
could return to Kenya to give evidence, Ringera said: "no,
no, I wouldn't advise that." According to the book, "a
former lead KACC investigator who had accompanied Ringera to
London went public to confirm the details of the
conversation. I was amazed at what Ringera said. There was
no indication whatsoever the equipment wasn't working. You
don't go for days without once going through what you have
recorded." Once again, the head of Kenya's anti-corruption
body was doing his best to halt an investigation.
Td-314/014437-09
7. (S) Paragraph 5 provides details of statements made by
Ringera to Githongo that Githongo took as direct threats to
his life by the Kenyan political elite, to include Ringera.
This TD corroborates Githongo's conclusion about Ringera who
is identified in a room with leading Kikuyu politicians,
including Ministers of government, plotting to kill Githongo
in 2009. The conclusion one can draw from this report,
combined with Githongo's testimony, is that Ringera is part
of those within the Kenyan political elite seeking to
suppress information and those with information that could
assist in punishing and minimizing corruption in Kenya.
Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee Report on
Anglo-Leasing
8. (C) In March 2006, the Kenyan National Assembly's Public
Accounts Committee (PAC) released its report on
Anglo-Leasing. In its general recommendations, the PAC said
the KACC Director "should liaise with the Attorney General,
the Police Commissioner, and other relevant bodies with a
view to prosecuting persons who were involved in negotiations
and approval of the procurement of Passport Issuing
Equipment" (one of the fraudulent Anglo-Leasing contracts).
To date, after more than three years, the KACC, under
Ringera's direction, has not carried out this action. The
report further recommends that the "KACC should hasten its
investigations and make its report public as soon as
possible." In fact, KACC has done the opposite.
Investigations have ceased and there is no public report.
Per ref e, both the PAC report and Githongo have made clear
the complicity of then Justice Minister Murungi in covering
up Anglo-Leasing. Despite the evidence, Ringera has never
followed through on the investigations into Murungi's role in
the mega-scandal.
KACC Status Report to President Kibaki on Anglo-Leasing
9. (C) In June 2006, the KACC under Justice Ringera provided
a brief report to President Kibaki regarding Anglo-Leasing
entitled, "Status of the Investigation of Security Related
Contracts." In that document, the KACC indicates that there
is "a probability of prosecution" for four senior government
officials, including former Vice President Moody Awori,
former Minister of Finance David Mwiraria, former Minister
for Internal Security Chris Murungaru, and current Attorney
General Amos Wako. Not one of them has been successfully
investigated and prosecuted on the Anglo-Leasing case. Two
groups of businessmen are also specifically linked to
fraudulent Anglo-Leasing contracts -- those linked to the
Kamani family and those linked to Anura Perera. Neither of
those principals or their families have been successfully
investigated and prosecuted. Again, as is demonstrated also
in paragraph 8, there is a pattern of behavior by Justice
Ringera that makes it clear that he is part of the shell
game, rather than trying to fight it. KACC reports indicate
that investigations are underway and prosecutions are
"probable" and that there is evidence of corrupt acts yet the
record, particularly for those at the top of government and
business, are unsuccessfully investigated or prosecuted or
there is no action over a number of years. This is
particularly damning when the KACC is not following up on its
own recommendations. As one NGO has noted (see below), it is
currently rare for KACC reports to even mention
Anglo-Leasing, one of the largest scams in recent Kenyan
history, let alone investigate the case.
NGO Views of Ringera
10. (SBU) Ref d reports Ringera's reappointment by President
Kibaki to a second five-year term as KACC Director. Key NGO
reactions, aside from expressing opposition to the process of
Ringera's reappointment, called into question his performance
and how it warranted reappointment. xxxxxxxxxxxx said the following:
"Public service legitimacy depends on the faithfulness of
public service to the aspirations of the citizens. The track
record of KACC is testimony of betrayal of this principle.
No politically significant corruption case has been
successfully investigated by KACC. While the reasons for
this dismal performance lies with the President, cabinet,
judiciary, Attorney General's office and parliament, the buck
stops with the head of the anti-corruption oversight
institution. He should have recognized the structural and
policy weaknesses that were going to lead to this failure and
resigned. Or fought for fundamental reforms in a way that
was both visible and credible. In democratic states,
oversight institutions required application of "arms-length"
principles in their leadership, functioning and resourcing.
For a president to appoint the head of an institution that
would take him/her to jail if s/he was corrupt is a travesty
of democratic governance principles. KACC is the one
institution, if any, whose head and staff should owe no
loyalty to the executive they should be investigating."
11. (SBU) Mars Group Kenya, another anti-corruption NGO,
reacted to Ringera's reappointment as follows: "Apart from
the possible illegality of his new tenure, Kenyans will no
doubt wonder why Justice Ringera merits reappointment in view
of the abject failure of the KACC under his leadership to
make a meaningful contribution towards ending grand
corruption impunity in Kenya."
12. (C) There are two key points in these paragraphs. First,
the KACC is the body that must lead on corruption. Ringera,
who frequently attempts to shift the blame to the Attorney
General (and, per ref c, he is certainly blameworthy), is, in
fact, not taking up fully the duties that are allocated to
him under Kenyan law. His successes have been of the "small
fish" variety. While decrying the KACC's insignificant
results (which his own staff has reported to us), Ringera
does not act to resolve them or to protest by taking bold
steps to expose those involved in holding up action against
corruption or to resign given the ineffectual nature of his
organization. The second point, regarding the reappointment
makes it clear that Ringera is entirely beholden to President
Kibaki and those around the President, many of whom are
linked to various forms of public corruption over a long
period of time. That lack of independence and clear
connection to the political/corrupt elite inextricably links
Ringera to the corruption that is dragging Kenya away from
the fundamental reforms necessary to assure democratic
stability and economic prosperity.
13. (C) In March 2007, Mars Group issued a review of the
KACC's activities from 2005-2007. In the report, Mars
focused in part on KACC's efforts on the largest corruption
cases, such as Anglo-Leasing. Its conclusion, among others,
is that "prominent personalities are more likely to benefit
from a recommendation to the KACC to close their files than
less prominent public officers." They noted that two key
players linked directly to Anglo-Leasing and its cover up,
former Finance Minister Mwariria and current Minister of
Energy (ref e) Kiraitu Murungi, were such ministerial
beneficiaries of apparent KACC largesse.
Serious Effect on U.S. National Interests
14. (C) KACC Director Justice Aaron Ringera's five years of
involvement in public corruption through interference with
judicial and other public processes have had serious adverse
effects on those U.S. interests specified in Proclamation
7750 as well as U.S. foreign policy priorities of promoting
democracy and good governance and sustainable economic
development. Overarching all U.S. interests in Kenya is the
need for the GOK to implement the reform agenda agreed to by
all major political parties in the aftermath of the 2008
post-election violence. This agenda -- which focuses on
accountability for the violence and preventing corruption
through constitutional revision, electoral, judicial, police
and land reform, is essential to democratic success, economic
prosperity, stability and security in Kenya. As made clear
by Secretary Clinton during her August 2009 visit to Kenya,
pressing for implementation of the reform agenda and
dismantling Kenya's culture of impunity is at the core of
U.S. policy. Without significant progress on the reform
agenda, including significant curbs on corruption, Kenya will
almost certainly repeat (or surpass) the election-related
violence ahead of/during/after 2012 elections. By
obstructing due process and committing corrupt acts, Ringera
has demonstrated that he is an obstacle to reform in Kenya
and a major contributor to the country's culture of impunity.
As a result, he stands against vital U.S. interests in Kenya.
15. (C) Stability of Democratic Institutions and Nations:
Justice Ringera's active participation in a system that
protects senior officials from punishment for corrupt acts
obstructs the fundamental reforms required for Kenya to
ensure democratic stability. Not moving forward on scandals
like Anglo-Leasing or Goldenberg (ref c) means that many of
those suspected of stealing massively from the country's
treasury have remained not only unpunished but on the job as
Ministers of Government to this day. His protection has
ensured that they continue to be in a position to steal funds
to support election campaigns, and incite/support violence.
For example, per ref e, after leaving the Ministry of
Justice, Kiraitu Murungi went on to be Energy Minister where
he once again has benefited from public corruption. In
addition, per ref b and the credible reporting of John
Githongo, there is strong evidence that Justice Ringera is
involved in planning violence to suppress those who would
expose corruption and seek to act to halt it. That kind of
planning with involvement of elements of the Kenyan state is
a direct assault on democracy and institutions in this
country. At the same time, it is clear to all Kenyans that
participating in public corruption, especially if you are
among the political elite, does in fact pay. There is
little, if any threat of punishment. In a September 2009
letter to Ambassador Ranneberger describing his achievements,
Ringera argues that he has recommended prosecutions of
Ministers, MP's and others on corruption charges. Yet none
of them have been prosecuted. In the case of Anglo-Leasing,
he asserts that he is held up by various court cases that
have impeded prosecution. He and the Attorney General act in
concert to decry these circumstances, some of which have been
in place for years, but they do not act separately or in
concert to seek changes to law or to key rulings to ensure
that the cases move forward. After five years of working
together, their collaboration rather appears to be an
elaborate system of maintaining the appearance of activity
while achieving the reality of inactivity. The corrosive
nature of this culture of impunity has: directly undermined
the ability of the Kenyan economy to grow at levels required
to move the population to middle income status; built a
permanent level of disregard for the rule of law and the
institutions that are meant to enforce those laws; and
reinforced a system whereby the government does not serve its
population but further marginalizes it while enriching those
in power. The bottom line is that the Kenyan state is weaker
and less able to enhance the lives of its population and
maintain the security of the country's already porous and
dangerous border areas.
16. (C) U.S. Foreign Assistance Goals: According to
Transparency International, the Goldenberg scandal alone
directly cost the Kenyan taxpayer an estimated $500 million.
Anglo-Leasing as well damaged the Kenya government and people
to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars more. Under a
KACC Director committed to protecting the Kenyan people,
those most directly involved and benefiting from this scandal
would have been aggressively investigated and prosecuted.
That has not been the case. With economic prosperity and
poverty alleviation at the heart of our foreign assistance
goals, the ongoing damage done by: (a) not returning the
funds stolen from the Kenyan people, and (b) encouraging
continued public corruption by maintaining the culture of
impunity limits our ability to provide assistance to the
government, denies hundreds of millions of dollars to the
public that could otherwise be utilized to assist in
developing the country, and slows dramatically the
construction of the infrastructure required to create the
environment in which domestic and foreign investors could
thrive.
17. (C) International Activity of U.S. Businesses: In his
five years in office, Justice Ringera has helped to maintain
the institutionalization of the culture of impunity that is
rife in Kenya. Under Ringera's leadership, the KACC has
actively participated in a system that works to discourage
investigation, minimize the likelihood of prosecution, and
throw out court cases that appear to have a chance of taking
down senior GOK officials charged with corruption. Like the
Attorney General, Justice Ringera can claim a perfect record
of not investigating and convicting a single, senior GOK
official. This is a remarkable tally in a country that is
consistently ranked among the most corrupt in the world.
That level of impunity only encourages greater and greater
corruption throughout Kenya at all levels. The resulting
corruption has a direct impact on U.S. business attempting to
operate in Kenya from the police roadblocks set up along
major transport routes, to moving goods to/from the Port of
Mombasa, to fighting counterfeit products that are
undermining American manufacturers based here, to simply
being able to operate on a day-to-day basis with bribe-
seeking local and regional officials. The KACC Director's
corruption - protecting the most corrupt from accountability
-- ensures that U.S. businesses struggle in Kenya.
In Summary
18. (S) Justice Aaron Ringera, is at the heart of Kenya's
debilitating corruption problem. While it was anticipated
that he would be part of the solution when he took office, he
has, instead, become an important element in a system of
protection for political elites. Post strongly believes that
Mr. Ringera has engaged in and benefited from public
corruption in his capacity as KACC Director for the past five
years by interference in public and judicial processes. The
record demonstrates that:
-- the KACC Director is part of the group protecting itself
from prosecution for the Anglo-Leasing scandal;
-- he participated in at least one meeting in which the
attempted assassination of John Githongo was planned this
year;
-- he was aware of threats to Kenyan anti-corruption official
John Githongo and shared them with Githongo as an apparent
intermediary;
-- Ringera has not successfully investigated for prosecution
a single case involving a senior GOK official in five years
in a country that is consistently rated as among the most
corrupt in the world;
-- Ringera has not acted on recommendations from Parliament
or followed through on his own recommendations for
prosecution to the President of Kenya;
-- Ringera has stopped pursuing Anglo-Leasing cases, one of
Kenya's largest scandals for which no senior level
investigations/prosecutions have been concluded;
-- The backdoor manner in which Ringera was reappointed makes
clear the premium value placed on him heading the KACC among
the political elite.
Additional Information Required for Finding
19. (C) Mr. Aaron Gitonga Ringera has not been informed of
the fact that he may be ineligible for a U.S. visa under
section 212(f) of the INA and Proclamation 7750.
20. (C) Mr. Ringera's last visa issuance was a G2 that
expired on July 15, 2007. Mr. Ringera has travelled
frequently to the United States. He is expected shortly to
apply for a U.S. visa.
21. (C) Ringera has traveled to the United States five times
since 1997, including three times in 2007. He has been
issued J1, G2, and A1 visas. He currently carries a Kenyan
diplomatic passport D009090 that expires January 19, 2010.
Ringera xxxxxxxxxxxx. We have not
established whether or not Ringera has children and, if so,
who they are.
22. (C) Because of the serious effect of Mr. Aaron Ringera's
corruption, Post recommends that Mr. Ringera be excluded for
travel to the U.S. under section 212(f) of the INA and that
no exception be granted.
Ranneberger
Es ist ein System der Selbstbereicherung und Korruption, das in den 24 Jahren Präsidentschaft von Daniel arap Moi das ganze Staatswesen erfasst hat. Und obwohl Dutzende Untersuchungskommissionen Hunderte Korruptionsfälle ausgeleuchtet haben, wurde noch nie ein Minister verurteilt.
- Beim sogenannten Goldenberg-Skandal beispielsweise zahlte die kenianische Regierung Anfang der neunziger Jahre Subventionen an "Goldenberg International" und andere Firmen für Gold, das angeblich exportiert werden sollte. Letztlich aber wurden mit den Goldenberg-Geldern drei Wahlkämpfe finanziert, der Schaden soll zwischen 400 Millionen und drei Milliarden Euro betragen.
- Ein anderer Griff in die Staatskasse, der Anglo-Leasing-Skandal - eine Ansammlung schräger, teils nur scheinbar abgeschlossener Geschäfte -, war ebenfalls dazu da, private Taschen zu füllen. Er kostete das Land auch Hunderte Millionen Euro.
Auf ihrer schwarzen Liste führen die Amerikaner zum Beispiel den geschmeidigen Amos Wako, seit 19 Jahren Generalstaatsanwalt von Kenia und laut US-Depeschen maßgeblich dafür verantwortlich, dass kein Politiker jemals ernsthaft zur Rechenschaft gezogen wurde. Wako, einst von Präsident Moi ins Amt berufen, kam auch mit Nachfolger Mwai Kibaki bestens zurecht; von den Amerikanern allerdings hat er nichts mehr zu erwarten. Botschafter Michael Ranneberger hat Anfang September 2009 für das State Department ein Dossier über den "Ehrenwerten Generalstaatsanwalt" erstellt.
In dem als "geheim" klassifizierten Dokument heißt es:
"Wako steht im Zentrum des Korruptionsproblems in Kenia. Wir gehen fest davon aus, dass sich Mr. Amos Wako in den vergangenen 18 Jahren an staatlicher Korruption beteiligt und von ihr profitiert hat, indem er eine juristische Aufarbeitung sabotierte."
Die Berichte zeigten ein eindeutiges Muster, wie die Justiz immer versucht habe, ausgerechnet die zu schützen, die sich maßgeblich an öffentlichen Geldern vergriffen hätten.
Auch nach den Unruhen von Anfang 2008, unmittelbar nach den umstrittenen Präsidentschaftswahlen, als bei Kämpfen zwischen rivalisierenden Ethnien über 1300 Menschen starben und Hunderttausende vertrieben wurden, arbeitete Wako wie gewohnt: Nicht ein einziger Drahtzieher wurde verurteilt.
Im US-Bericht heißt es:
"Der Generalstaatsanwalt hat eine nahezu perfekte Bilanz als Nicht-Strafverfolger. Er schafft das, indem er mit viel Nebelwerferei und Spiegelfechterei den Anschein erweckt, als ob er sich intensiv um Aufklärung bemüht, während er tatsächlich alles tut, um die politischen Eliten zu schützen."
Ein ähnlich vernichtendes Urteil fällen die US-Diplomaten über Aaron Ringera, den früheren Chef der nationalen Anti-Korruptions-Behörde. Über ihn heißt es in einem Botschaftsdossier vom 16. September 2009:
"Unter Ringeras Führung war die Anti-Korruptions-Kommission aktiver Teil eines Systems, das zum Ziel hatte, Ermittlungen zu blockieren und aussichtsreiche Gerichtsfälle in Sachen Korruption gegen Regierungsmitglieder niederzuschlagen. Das ist eine bemerkenswerte Bilanz in einem Land, das zu den korruptesten der Welt gehört."
Ein weiterer Kandidat, den die Amerikaner gern politisch entsorgt oder hinter Gittern sehen würden, ist der amtierende Industrialisierungsminister Henry Kosgey. Kosgey, der aktuell in einen Skandal um importierte Autos verwickelt ist, war schon vieles in Kenia: seit Jahrzehnten Parlamentarier, zeitweise aber auch Chef der Nationalen Versicherungsgesellschaft - die unter seiner Ägide pleiteging -, Wissenschafts- und Bildungsminister.
Die Botschaft referiert unbewiesene Vorwürfe:
"Kosgey wird vorgeworfen, Immobilienvermögen der früheren halbstaatlichen Nationalen Versicherungsgesellschaft geplündert zu haben. Er eignete sich selbst die wertvollsten Teile der Gesellschaft an und wirtschaftete das Unternehmen so zu einer unterfinanzierten Hülle herunter, die schließlich zusammenbrach. 900 Angestellte verloren ihren Job, Tausende Kenianer aus allen Gesellschaftsschichten ihre Altersversorgung, oder sie erhielten keine Versicherungsleistungen."
Ein weiterer Bericht beschuldigt Kosgey zudem, einer der Drahtzieher der Unruhen nach der Präsidentschaftswahl 2007 zu sein:
"Laut Report soll Kosgey an Anstiftung, Planung und illegaler Finanzierung von Gewalt in der Provinz Rift Valley teilgenommen haben. Viele Arbeiter und ihre Familien mussten während der Auseinandersetzungen fliehen oder wurden vertrieben."
Der Mann kostet die USA angeblich auch ernsthaft Geld:
"Kosgeys jahrzehntelange korrupte Aktivitäten hatten negative Auswirkungen auf die US-Auslandshilfe. Sein Besitz von illegal erworbenen Waldgrundstücken, Teil des Mau-Forest, Kenias größtem Wassereinzugsgebiet, hat zu ethnischen Konflikten im RiftValley beigetragen sowie zu Dürre und Hunger, die Kenia derzeit heimsuchen. Geberstaaten, darunter auch die USA, mussten wegen der chronischen Dürre in den vergangenen vier Jahren Milliarden Dollar für Nothilfe bereitstellen."
Bisher konnten sich Minister wie Kosgey ziemlich sicher fühlen. Das dürfte sich ändern. Korruptionsbekämpfer Lumumba sagt: "Wir ermitteln derzeit gegen 4 Minister und 45 leitende Angestellte halbstaatlicher Organisationen."